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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis interrogates the (re)emergence of Cultural Revolution imagery in the 
21
st
 century as a cultural lens through which contemporary contradictory relations 
between China, Hong Kong and Singapore are revealed.  Between the late 1990s 
and throughout the 2000s, a number of images originating from political posters 
produced during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) were circulating in urban city cultures of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, and in cyberspace in China.  Removed from their original context 
those images were reproduced as new cultural products and sites in new urban 
environments.  
The research methods are predominantly shaped by the nature of the 
research which could broadly be described as ‘visual culture’ and the 
transformations of a set of images across time, as an extremely recent 
phenomenon.  Drawing on key concepts in cultural studies, such as signifying 
practices, representation, articulation and identity, I use Cultural Revolution 
popular cultural products as ‘media texts’ to understand societies and 
contemporary urban popular cultures in China, Hong Kong and Singapore.  As my 
research reveals, Cultural Revolution imagery can be flexibly transferred to 
different physical and virtual forms and its meaning varies according to cultural 
contexts, local practices which are shaped by historical backgrounds of respective 
locations.  It is the transferability of Cultural Revolution imagery which continues 
to play a role in mass communication in contemporary urban popular culture. 
The first chapter sets the scene for the (re)emergence of Cultural 
Revolution imagery in the 21
st
 century in China, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
Chapter Two provides a detailed account of methodologies and examines 
academic literature.  Chapter Three discusses the commodification of Chinese 
Revolutionary imagery in mobile multimedia pictures in Chinese urban culture.  
Chapter Four examines the ways in which Chinese Revolutionary imagery was 
borrowed by Hong Kong designers in the post-1997 Hong Kong context through 
some examples of commercial commodities using Cultural Revolution imagery as 
branding elements.  Chapter Five discusses how Chinese Revolutionary imagery 
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was used in commercial spaces (i.e. theme restaurant) in Singapore at the turn of 
the 21
st
 century.   
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This thesis interrogates the emergence of Cultural Revolution imagery in the 21
st
 
century as a cultural lens through which contemporary contradictory relations 
between China, Hong Kong and Singapore are revealed.  Between the late 1990s 
and throughout the 2000s, images influenced by political posters produced during 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
were circulating in the urban city cultures of Hong Kong and Singapore, and in 
cyberspace in China.
1
  Removed from their original context these images were 
reproduced as new cultural products and sites in contemporary urban 
environments. These products and sites included theme restaurants, stationery, 
mugs, T-shirts and picture messages on mobile phones.
2
   
This use of Cultural Revolution imagery was closely related to the rise in 
popularity of consumer items across Asian Chinese cultures which exploited 
Chinese revolutionary symbols as new commodities.
3
  Reflecting this popularity, 
                                            
1 Previous studies about the commercialisation and commodification of images of Mao Zedong and Chinese 
revolutionary culture in the post-Mao era of the People’s Republic of China can be found in such works as 
Geremie R Barmé, Shades of Mao: the posthumous cult of the great leader (New York & London: An 
East Gate Book M.E. Sharpe, 1996), Geremie R Barmé, In The Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture 
(New York and West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 1999) and Dongfeng Tao, "The Commercialised 
Revolutionary Culture in Contemporary China"in Cultural Studies in China, ed. Dongfeng Tao and Yuan 
Pu Jin (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005).  These studies focus on the recycling of Cultural 
Revolution imagery in printed or physical forms in the People's Republic of China mainly between the 
1980s and the 1990s, which are discussed in Chapter 2.  However, my focus in this work is the first 
decade of the 21st century.  The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Wuchan Jieji Wenhua Da Geming) 
will henceforth be referred to in this thesis as the Cultural Revolution.  It is generally considered to take 
place from 1966 to 1976, immediately after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong.  The term ‘China’ will 
henceforth be used to refer to the People's Republic of China (1949-present) throughout the thesis. 
 
2 The imagery itself was typically iconic revolutionary political pictures produced in the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1967) showing Red Guards in very stylized poses with their fists clenched. 
 
3 While this thesis focuses mainly on the cultural practices and phenomena at the turn of the new millennium 
and in the first decade of the 21st century, I recognise that the recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery, 
particularly in the PRC, had continued since the early 1980s.  In Hong Kong and Singapore, though it is 
impossible to trace every individual practice, similar phenomenon has only been prevalent in local urban 
popular culture since the late 1990s. 
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Cultural Revolution motifs frequently appear in various life-style magazines.
4
 
This trend coincided with the rapid rise of contemporary China through its 
integration with the global market economy and developments in new 
technologies.
5
 The contemporary renewal of Chinese revolutionary imagery is not 
only a representation of China in urban popular cultures in Singapore and Hong 
Kong. It is also an interface through which radical socio-economic 
transformations since the late 1990s can be contrasted and explored. The 
emergence of a ‘Cultural Revolution’ popular urban culture in China, Hong Kong 
and Singapore since the turn of the millennium, as my analysis reveals, 
corresponds closely with the wider cultural, social and political circumstances, 
local and global, specific to that period of time. 
There have been significant changes in urban societies in all three 
locations.
6
  Since the 1990s, continuing its policy of an open economy and the 
free enterprise system, the Singaporean government has encouraged local 
enterprises to invest outside Singapore, with the People's Republic of China and 
Hong Kong as two of the most important targets.
7
  Singapore is a globally 
oriented city-state dependent upon trade and industry as a basis of most of its 
economic activity; and it is always pragmatic in its approach to foreign policy, 
inclined to cultivate close relations with any country of any ideological shade
                                            
4 I found quite a few lifestyle magazines featuring Cultural Revolution imagery in Hong Kong and Singapore.  
These magazine articles include Metropop, "衣食住行毛處不在 (Pinyin: Yi shi zhu xing Mao chu bu 
zai )(English Translation: Mao & Chic)" Metropop Hong Kong, 27 April 2006 (see Figure 38), Lay Hoon 
Thio, How Mao! (Poole Associate, originally published in ID Magazine Singapore (April), April 1998 
[cited 6 June 2009]); available from http://www.poole-associates.com/house_of_mao1.htm , "The Great 
Leap Forward" Space Magazine Singapore 1998, "Nanny State Lifts Its Skirt" The Independent UK, 11 
September 1998, Daniel Jill, Party Politics (Poole Associates' website, originally published in The Expat 
Magazine  in February 1999,  1999 [cited February); available from http://www.poole-
associates.com/house_of_mao1.htm., "The Red Book" The Business Times Singapore, 14th May 1999  
The fact of publication of such magazine articles mainly in Hong Kong and Singapore itself speaks for the 
importance of it as a new lifestyle trend in the regions at the turn of, and during the first decade of, the 
millennium, whereas it is not something new in the PRC.  The publishing dates of these magazine articles 
also suggest that a similar phenomenon was popular in different regions at different times between the late 
1990s and during the 2000s. 
 
5 Since the late 1970s, China has achieved averaging nearly 10 percent economic growth per year, which has 
been known as the fastest of any other national economy in the world.  Some estimated in the late 1990s 
that China could become the world’s largest economy during the first half of the 21st century.  See James 
A. Dorn, "Introduction - China in the New Millennium"in China in the new millennium: Market Reforms 
and Social Development, ed. James A. Dorn (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1998). 
 
6 John Wong, The political economy of China's changing relations with Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1984), 98. 
 
7 Ibid.  
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provided they lead to a further trade opportunities or business relations.
8
  Such is 
the case with its relations with China ever since 1965 when Singapore became an 
independent state.   
The overall relations between Singapore and China have been influenced 
by a set of conflicting forces.  On the one hand, Singapore has built a close trading 
relationship with China.  On the other hand, the Singaporean government takes a 
harsh view toward the spread of pro-Chinese sentiments among its ethnic Chinese 
population, as is evident in the purging of the top executives of the two leading 
Chinese newspapers in 1971.
9
 
Since 1997, Hong Kong, the former British colonial city, has legitimately 
become a part of the People's Republic of China under the ‘One Country Two 
Systems’ principle, which took effect on 1 July 1997.
10
  One of the stipulations in 
this agreement is that the people of Hong Kong rule themselves and also maintain 
their way of life for fifty years between 1997 and 2047. 
Within China, social life and culture are greatly influenced by the rapid 
growth and development of new technologies such as the Internet and mobile 
phone networks.  It is in such a context that Cultural Revolution imagery has 
reappeared in new cultural forms and has entered into new cultural practices 




  This reappearance is significant 
in terms of its complex and multilayered integration with new information 
technologies in the context of China’s rise as an economic power.    
This thesis proposes that the cross-cultural practices of recycling Cultural 
Revolution imagery in popular cultural products in the 2000s should be 
understood as a social reality that is historically constituted, produced and 
reproduced.
12
  By analysing the practices and images used to constitute and 
represent reality in the past, drawing on Nick Lacey’s idea of an advanced textual 
                                            
8 Ibid.  
 
9 Ibid.  
 
10  Joseph Y.W. Pang, "Hong Kong and Financial Liberalization in China: Past and Future"in China in the 
new millennium: Market Reforms and Social Development, ed. James A. Dorn (Washington, D.C.: Cato 
Institute, 1998), 135.  
 
11 By cultural practice, I adopt a broader definition to include a wide range of  social engagement in mass 
culture in daily life. 
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analysis, I aim to understand Cultural Revolution imagery in the post-2000 
context first of all in the sense that ‘the past is a precursor to the present’.
13
  
Though people can deliberately change their surrounding social and economic 
conditions, I recognize that their ability to do so is restrained by various forms of 
social, cultural and political domination, which are context specific. Thus, I 
propose that Cultural Revolution popular culture across borders is produced by 
individuals and groups of different backgrounds, in different locations, yet under 
the constraint of the macro social, cultural and political circumstances.  This 
project aims to bring to light the particular conditions of this social phenomenon, 
and therefore, based on the common use of Cultural Revolution imagery in 
different urban city cultures during the same timeframe (i.e. between 1999 and 
2009), I focus on the conflicts and contradictions in China, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, where the history and people have been under the influence of Cultural 
Revolution culture (i.e. political pictures and Chinese communist ideologies 
during the Cultural Revolution period) in specific yet different ways. 
Drawing on key concepts in cultural studies, such as signifying practices, 
representation, articulation and identity, I use Cultural Revolution popular cultural 
products as ‘media texts’ to understand societies, in particular Chinese societies, 
and contemporary urban popular cultures in China, Hong Kong and Singapore.
14
  
At first glance, these cultural products suggest a business strategy that makes use 
of Chinese revolutionary symbols or images, such as Red Guards, the Little Red 
Book, Green Military Uniform or portraits of Mao Zedong, most of which were 
very popular at the time of the Cultural Revolution, for commercial purposes in 
the post-2000 era.  This corresponds to the overall development of global 
economic and cultural flows as well as the rise of consumerism in Southeast Asia, 
which characterises the prosperity of Southeast Asian cities and countries since 
the 1990s.
15
  It also refers to the rise of transnational corporations and the 
                                            
13 Nick Lacey, Image and Representation: Key Concepts in Media Studies, Second ed. (Hampshire and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 83. 
 
14 I drew on Nick Lacey’s approach in which he contents that media texts can be used to understand society 
and they are ‘effective in enabling us to better understand society’ through which we can understand 
society in the present and in the past.  See Ibid. , 83. 
 
15 I read such books on the rise of Southeast Asian Chinese states since 1990s as Peter Drysdale, Reform and 
recovery in East Asia: the role of the state and economic enterprise (New York: Routledge, 2000), Gerald 
Tan, The economic transformation of Asia (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1997) and Gerald Tan, 
Asian Development. Introduction to Economic, Social and Political Change in Asia (Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish, 2003). 
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accelerated global flow of cultures and information assisted by the use of 
communications technologies.
16
   
In such a context, the values and meanings of Cultural Revolution imagery 
attached to its original place of production and consumption remain significant, 
yet an extra layer of contemporary cultural meaning of the imagery is also 
produced in the extended networks beyond its immediate physical locations and 
historical contexts.  I am aware that the distribution of Cultural Revolution posters 
during the Cultural Revolution was not limited to the national borders of the 
People's Republic of China.  There were posters published in foreign languages to 
be distributed outside China to promote Chinese Communism.  This is further 
complicated in that ‘original production and consumption’ not only refers to the 
original artefacts produced in the 1960s and 1970s but also to the new cultural 
products/sites which emerged in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s.   
The emergence of a cross-cultural ‘Cultural Revolution’ popular culture 
since the late 1990s brings to light a specific cultural juxtaposing, meeting and 
mixing in contemporary urban cultures in Chinese-dominated Asian societies.
17
  
While Cultural Revolution imagery remains a significant cultural symbol of the 
People's Republic of China, the cross-cultural, local-specific arrangement of the 
imagery in Hong Kong can be understood as a site of struggle between local 
cultural and political issues and those of mainland China.  The use of Cultural 
Revolution imagery in Singaporean commercial space took place at a time when 
Singapore was looking for opportunities to improve its economy after the 
economic crisis.  Cultural Revolution cultural products then appeared as consumer 
goods in Singaporean commercial spaces.   
However, such consumer culture is simultaneously constituted by a set of 
contradictory values as manifest in the differences in cultures and political 
ideologies of mainland China, Hong Kong and Singapore.  Fundamentally, 
therefore, my aim is to analyse the emergence of Cultural Revolution popular 
                                                                                                                        
 
16 I read such books on the rise of corporations and technologies in East Asia since 1990s as Edward J. 
Lincoln, East Asian economic regionalism (Washington D.C.: The Books Institution, 2004) and Axéle 
Giroud, Transnational corporations, technology and economic development: backward linkages and 
knowledge transfer in South East Asia (Cheltenham and Northampton Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2003). 
 
17 Chris Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice, Third ed. (London: SAGE, 2008), 158. 
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culture in the 21
st
 century in China, Hong Kong and Singapore. These are regions 
usually referred to as ‘Greater China’ with respect to the presence of dominant 
Chinese populations and social practices, even though Hong Kong and Singapore 





My analysis of contemporary Cultural Revolution cultural practices/products 
contributes new perspectives to the historical and political studies of Cultural 
Revolution pictures.  While, as I summarise in later paragraphs, there are a 
number of works that cover Chinese revolutionary culture in the reform era of 
China, there have been no significant academic works that focus on the shifting 
cultural meanings of Cultural Revolution imagery across time, media and 
cultures.
19
  Previous works that relate to the commercialization of Cultural 
Revolution imagery mainly focus on the practices within China in the pre-2000s 
context without paying much attention to the impact of new technologies.  In an 
analysis of newly emergent telecommunication virtual consumer items, I reveal 
the contemporary practice of distributing and consuming Cultural Revolution 
images via new communication technologies, as a significant cultural 




  More significantly, my 
                                            
18 Wei-Ming Tu, "Cultural China: the periphery as the center" Daedulus 120, no. 2 (1991). 
 
19 Works covering the manifestation of Cultural Revolution culture in the culture of the reform era of China 
include: Tao, "The Commercialised Revolutionary Culture in Contemporary China" ; Barmé, Shades of 
Mao: the posthumous cult of the great leader Barmé, In The Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture ; 
Jiehong Jiang, "Burden or Legacy: From the Chinese Cultural Revolution to Contemporary Art"in Burden 
or Legacy: From the Chinese Cultural Revolution to Contemporary Art, ed. Jiehong Jiang (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2007), 1-32. 
 
20 The nationwide distribution of Cultural Revolution imagery during Cultural Revolution in the People's 
Republic of China was achieved by mass production of printed posters which could be widely 
disseminated.  I am aware of the Chinese government’s overall support to the nationwide development of 
new technologies since the 1980s.  According to the statistical reports of the development of China 
Internet, there were 2,100,000 Internet users in China in January 1999.  The number of Chinese Internet 
users was drastically increased to 8,900,000 in January 2000 and 22,500,000 in January 2001.  The 
number of users that used mobile telephones or PDA to access to the internet was 200,000 in January 2000, 
which was increased to 720,000 in January 2001.  In early 1999, only 0.7% of total internet users were 
under the age of 15.  But it shows that 2.4% of total internet users were under the age of 16 in early 2000 
and 14.93% were under the age of 18 in early 2001.  The report released in 2000 shows that over 50% of 
total internet users could afford to pay below RMBҰ100 for accessing to the internet.  In 2002, report 
shows that 70% of internet users actually spent below RMBҰ100.  These data show that it was not until 
the early 2000s –at the time when mobile phone and access to the Internet became relatively affordable 
and the increasing number of young computer literates – that the social use of mobile phones and the 
internet became prevalent in major urban cities in China.  Sources from the 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th Survey 
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work uncovers the cross-cultural meanings of Cultural Revolution imagery in 
Hong Kong and Singapore in which the local residents experienced both British 
colonial rule and post-colonial cultural developments.
21
  This thesis elucidates the 
different regional social understandings and political meanings of Cultural 
Revolution imagery across China, Hong Kong and Singapore due to regional 
differentiation in history and identities.  My analysis of contemporary ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ cultural phenomena therefore contributes new perspectives to the 
understanding of Cultural Revolution culture in relation to the conflicts and 
contradictions within China, and between China and post-colonial Chinese-
dominated regions in newly emerging identity formations of the 2000s.  When I 
describe Hong Kong as ‘post-colonial’, I am aware of the debates on whether the 
post-1997 situation is in fact a ‘re-colonisation’ by the People's Republic of 
China,
22
  or whether the situation is both a de-colonization and re-colonisation at 
the same time.  However, my focus here refers to a Hong Kong culture, even after 
1997, still marked by a British influence, which creates inherent cultural 
differences in relation to the mainland culture and different social values toward 
the development of the Hong Kong political system.  The reform era of China can 
be considered as starting from 1978 and is defined by radical changes in national 
economic and social policies. 
I argue that the unprecedented method of distributing former political 
pictures via telecommunication networks and new information technologies in 
China’s urban context significantly shows how contemporary popular culture is 
integrated with new technologies as a result of the official Chinese guiding 
principles of economic and technological growth in a socialist-market economy in 
                                            
21 I recognise the global flow of Cultural Revolution imagery, particularly images of Mao Zedong, outside 
China other than Hong Kong and Singapore.  In London, for example, a series of stationery items 
including folders, notepads, and pencil cases were printed with some Chinese Cultural Revolution pictures 
such as Red Guards, Little Red Book and the worker-peasant-soldier depiction of three model social roles, 
and sold at Paperchase, a chain stationery store in the United Kingdom, in between 2006 and 2007.  
However, my focus in this work is predominantly the Cultural Revolution imagery in China and Chinese-
dominated regions like Singapore and Hong Kong where the city/state had under direct impacts of the 
original Cultural Revolution culture in its local history in the 1950s and 1960s respectively.  I will leave 
discussion of the global flow of Cultural Revolution imagery in Western cultures for another occasion. 
 
22 For example, Donald Tsang’s policy in 2003 is described as a policy of re-colonization. Sonny Shiu-Hing 
Lo, The Dynamics of Beijing-Hong Kong Relations: A Model for Taiwan? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2008), 74.  Other work that describe Hong Kong post-1997 situation as being 
‘recolonized’ include:Wing-Wah Law, "The Accommodation and Resistance to the Decolonisation, Neo-
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the context of rapid socio-economic transformation.  Considering how political 
leaders have publicly announced their support for technological development and 
the controversies around China’s engagement with the internet since the early 
2000s, analysis of Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures is an incisive way to 
understand the interactions between socialist culture and new technologies. 
Through analysing both archival and internet-based materials (i.e. original 
political pictures from the 1960s and reworked pictures in mobile phone text-
messaging consumer items in the 2000s), I observe the ideological conflicts and 
contradictions between the official guiding principles of the Cultural Revolution 
and those of contemporary Chinese societies in the post-reform era.  This concurs 
with the observations of scholars such as Tao Dongfeng, Arif Dirlik and Zhang 
Xudong that the contemporary conditions in China are characterised by the 
mixing and synchronization of revolutionary culture and post-revolutionary 
culture, and at the same time is also defined by the contradictions between them.
23
  
Informed by primary sources and conversations gathered during my 
research, I demonstrate that the use of Cultural Revolution imagery in Hong Kong 
popular consumer culture is closely linked with the socio-political changes in 
post-2003 Hong Kong.  I argue that this can best be understood as a site of 
struggle through which the relations between HKSAR and the Beijing government 
in the new millennium can be explored.  In the case of Singapore, my research 
demonstrates that the use of Cultural Revolution imagery in commercial spaces in 
Singapore in the late 1990s and early 2000s was highly constrained by official 
surveillance and shaped by the government’s ruling policy at the time. 
The use of Cultural Revolution imagery is taken as a cultural practice 
which engages with the shifting relations between China and the post-colonial 
Chinese-dominated cities in everyday popular culture.  Based on my archival 
research and consideration of a wide range of written sources on the recent 
histories of China, Hong Kong and Singapore, I argue that the cross-cultural use 
of Cultural Revolution imagery can be comprehended as a series of overlapping, 
                                            
23 For example, Tao Dongfeng’s work on the commercialised revolutionary culture in contemporary China 
describes the conditions in contemporary China as a ‘cultural hybridity’ in  which ‘there are no clear 
distinctions between high culture and low culture, elite culture and mass culture, modern culture and 
traditional culture, revolutionary culture and commercial culture, etc.’  See  Tao, "The Commercialised 
Revolutionary Culture in Contemporary China" , 69.  See also Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang, 
"Introduction: Postmodernism and China" Boundary 2: Postmodernism & China 24, no. 3 (1997), 3. 
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complex and contradictory conditions which cluster around key historical 
moments.
24
  In China, Cultural Revolution imagery is still integrated with day-to-
day practices, as illustrated by ‘Cultural Revolution’ mobile phone pictures, in a 
context of rapid socio-economic transformation.  In Hong Kong and Singapore, 
Cultural Revolution imagery is the cultural symbol of the mainland Chinese 
‘Other’ through which cultural disjunctures between China and the post-colonial 
cities can be identified.
25
  Thus, at the turn of the 21
st
 century, Cultural Revolution 
imagery remains an important cultural symbol of revolutionary history within the 
People's Republic of China and it has also become an emergent symbol of the 
Chinese cultural ‘Other’ in places such as Hong Kong and Singapore, where 
Cultural Revolution imagery is used to construct local identities through 
exclusions and contestations of the mainland Chinese ‘Other’.  
 
Terms of analysis: concepts and themes 
 
Deconstruction: différance & ‘under erasure’ 
My understanding of Cultural Revolution imagery in contemporary contexts 
across cultures is marked by its unfixed and shifting signification.  In this thesis, I 
adopt Jacques Derrida's notion of différance to conceptualise the instability of the 
                                            
24  These written sources consulted include, but are not limited to: Zixue Tai, The Internet in China: 
Cyberspace and Civil Society (New York & London: Routledge, 2006); English People's Daily Online, 
"China's mobile phone users exceeds 600 million", 27 September 2007; Tao, "The Commercialised 
Revolutionary Culture in Contemporary China" ; Wan-Chaw Shae and Pik-Wan Wong, "Popular protest 
and electioneering in Hong Kong"in Elections as Popular Culture in Asia, ed. Beng-huat Chua (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2007), 38-54; Haipeng Zhou, Whose Sound and Fury? The 1967 Riots of Hong 
Kong through The Times (Purdue University Calumet,  2005 [cited 21 October 2009]); available from 
http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/sp05/graduatesp05/gmj-sp05gradref-zhou.htm.; Hualing Fu, Carole 
J. Petersen, and Simon N.M. Young, eds., National Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong's 
article 23 Under Scrutiny (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005); Hong Liu and Sin-Kiong 
Wong, Singpaore Chinese Society in Transition: Business, Politics and Socio-Economic Change 1945-
1965 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004). 
 
25 Dated back in the 1950s and 1960s, Cultural Revolution imagery from China disseminated in Singapore 
and Hong Kong was mainly associated with the activities of so-called mainland Chinese leftist who 
reproduced and circulated political pictures from China in Singapore and Hong Kong.  Cultural 
Revolution imagery was originally culture of China which was not part of the local culture in Singapore 
and Hong Kong.  The colonial history of Hong Kong and Singapore prevented the development of a pro-
China sentiment among the Chinese citizens in the past.  With China reclaimed Hong Kong in 1997 and 
its closer economic ties with Singapore since the late 1990s, the relations between China, Hong Kong and 
Singapore have changed.  Sources from: Chung Jae Ho and Lo Shiu-hing,  “Beijing's Relations With the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: An Inferential Framework for the Post-1997 Arrangement” 
Pacific Affairs, 68, No. 2 (Summer, 1995), 167-186; Tan Eugene K. B., “Re-Engaging Chineseness: 
Political, Economic and Cultural Imperatives of Nation-Building in Singapore” The China Quarterly, 175 
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meaning of Cultural Revolution imagery across time, locations and cultures.  
According to Derrida, the concept of différance points to instabilities of cultural 
meaning since cultural forms are meaningful only in the way they are 
differentiated from each other or in relation to the other: 
one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on 
which our discourse lives, not in order to see the opposition erase itself but to see what 
indicates that each of the terms must appear as the différance of the other, as the other 
different and deferred, differing-deferring…
26 
I argue that this concept is not only useful in identifying the different ways of 
consuming Cultural Revolution imagery by people with different cultural 
backgrounds; but it is also valuable in pointing out the essence of Cultural 
Revolutionary imagery within a particular point of origin is an entity open to 
processes of ‘differing’ and ‘deferring’.  To demonstrate how this idea can be 
applied in real life, John Lechte writes: 
in everyday life people readily speak about difference and differences.  We say, for 
instance, that “x” (having a specific quality) is different from “y” (which has another 
specific quality), and we usually mean that it is possible to enumerate the qualities which 
make up this difference.
27
 
Through this example, Lechte explains why Derrida argues that language can be 
understood as a system of differences with positive terms because in this 
dimension language can be perceived and conceptualised.
28
  To borrow Derrida’s 
notion of différance, I seek to conceptualise the differences in forms, practices and 
contexts of Cultural Revolution imagery between the past (1966-1976) and in the 
present (21
st
 century).  The present as an outcome is a product of the continuous 
accumulation of meanings which have been added according to experiences and 
shifting contexts.  This is how I understand difference in the sense of a ‘deferred’ 
meaning that both ‘differs’ and 'defers'.
29
  I make use of this concept in order to 
understand the contemporary practices of reproducing and consuming Cultural 
Revolution imagery as a process of deferral out of which new meanings are 
                                            
26 Jacque Derrida, "Difference"in Margins of Philosophy, ed. Alan Bass (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1982), 17. 
 
27 John Lechte, Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers: from structuralism to postmodernity (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1994), 107. 
 
28 Ibid. , 107. 
 
29 Derrida, "Difference" , 17. 
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continually being constructed.  Thus, in Derridean terms, the meanings of Cultural 
Revolution imagery in contemporary practices are 'supplemented' outcomes which 
suggest that neither the traditional nor the present meanings determine its meaning 
but rather a combination of the two.
30
 
 I recognise that to borrow the notion of différance means to adopt the 
Derridean conception of deconstruction as a whole.  Deconstruction stresses the 
‘deferral’ which refers to the play and slippage of meaning that is always at work 
in the process of signification.  In this sense, I adopt a reading of Chinese political 
imagery as ‘signs’, taken from the concept of ‘signifying systems’ initiated by 
Ferdinand de Saussure.  Saussure argues that meaning is not generated because an 
object has an intrinsic meaning but because of the differences between signs.
31
 
According to Saussure, a signifying system refers to the meaning-making system 
operated by the signifier and the signified.
32
   
 Nicolas Royle points to a possible application of the Derridean concept of 
deconstruction to various aspects of culture: 
Deconstruction is about difference or otherness, then, and doubtless this helps to explain 
why it has proved such a popular term for thinking about such broad topics as race, 
gender, nationality and so on, as well as about literature and art…Deconstruction is not 
only about acknowledging difference, it is also about being open to being altered in one’s 
encounter with difference.  And it is about making a difference, changing the ways we 
think and what we think, altering the world.
33
 
I explore how the shifting meanings of Cultural Revolution imagery can result in 
the construction of something new.  I deliberately make use of Derridean concepts 
as a way to think about how Cultural Revolution imagery is being ‘processed’ so 
that evolving meanings of nationality and identity are made possible.  The notion 
of difference and deferral suggests the productivity of the processes of ‘differing’ 
and ‘deferring' – the continual addition of meanings – which contributes to the 
formation of new identities.
34
  Stuart Hall proposes a similar argument when he 
                                            
30 Lechte, Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers: from structuralism to postmodernity , 107. 
 
31 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (London: Peter Owen, 1960), 118. 
 
32 Lechte, Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers: from structuralism to postmodernity , 151. 
 
33 Nicholas Royle, "Blind Cinema"in Screenplay on Essays on the Film: Derrida, ed. Dick Kirby and Amy 
Ziering Kofman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 13. 
 
34 Lechte, Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers: from structuralism to postmodernity , 107. 
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asserts that cultural identity is organised around points of difference that are in a 
process of becoming, within a continually shifting set of subject positions, and 
therefore, its meaning is never finished or completed.
35
  The various ways of 
adapting Cultural Revolution imagery across different Chinese societies can be 
considered as a process of creating ‘points of difference’, within a similar set of 
images (e.g. Cultural Revolution imagery produced in early phrase of Cultural 
Revolution in 1966 and 1976).   
I argue that if we are to accept that meanings of Cultural Revolution 
imagery as unfixed, changing, shifting, situational and relational, we should 
recognise that it is through a ‘temporary closure of meaning’ that the phenomena 
can be grasped for analysis by stabilizing the imagery’s meaning at specific 
historical moments and in specific contexts.
36
 For example, the flexibility of 
Cultural Revolution imagery is such that it appears in posters in the 1960s and 
then later as mobile phone screens in 21
st
 century China.  To acknowledge this, 
my research looks at how the meaning and the role of Cultural Revolution 
imagery has transformed at different points of ‘closure’ in order to understand its 
significance in specific historical moments and contexts. 
In other words, meaning in Cultural Revolution imagery is constructed 
through how it is used in certain regulated ways in which people speak about the 
world and themselves.  While there can be countless recurrences of Cultural 
Revolution imagery after its original context of production, it becomes instructive 
and significant through the way the imagery is used and how it relates to a 
specific historical moment.  Thus, I argue that it is crucial to examine why certain 
imagery recurs, how and where it is mediated, who it is mediated for and when, in 
order to understand the recycling of Cultural Revolution imagery.   
I argue that history should not be ignored even though the phenomenon 
takes place in a contemporary context. This view is attributed to my belief that 
previously acquired knowledge bears on the current interpretation of Chinese 
political posters/images in 21
st
 century.  Because different communities with 
distinctive cultural backgrounds understand Cultural Revolution imagery 
                                            
35 Stuart Hall, "Cultural identity and Diaspora"in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, ed. J Rutherford 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990). 
 
36 Chris Barker and Dariusz Galasiński, eds., Cultural studies and discourse analysis: a dialogue on language 
and identity (London and Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2001), 43. 
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differently, an array of meanings is possible.  Although I recognise that meanings 
are unfixed, polysemic and constructed, these considerations led to my decision to 
analyse the contemporary use of Cultural Revolution imagery in certain unique 
moments in specific cultures and places.  While the region-specific experience of 
Chinese communist propaganda in history played a part in shaping the cultural 
experiences of viewers (for example, older generations in Hong Kong experienced 
Chinese Communist posters during the riots in the 1960s under British colonial 
rule and had an impact on how they think about their culture and identity). As my 
research reveals, the use of Cultural Revolution imagery in Hong Kong as 
symbolising a mainland Chinese ‘Other’ in the post-2003 context is not 
completely removed from the history of its original production (i.e. the era of 
Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China between 1966 and 1976).  
Instead, the history is deliberately recalled and borrowed to reconstruct a new 
Hong Kong identity today.   
The example of Hong Kong also bears out my use of the Derridean notion 
of ‘erasure’ (when a word is written and then crossed out so that both the word 
and the crossed-out version remain visible).
37
  I use this idea to understand the 
Hong Kong use of Cultural Revolution imagery as a problematic in that it brings 
up the inherent ideological difference and conflicts between post-colonial Hong 
Kong and the People’s Republic of China. This culture of the 'Other’ (i.e. 
mainland Chinese revolutionary imagery) is reformulated into a new context in 
contemporary Hong Kong.  In this sense, in Derrida’s terms, there is ‘the 
necessity of returning to them, at least under erasure’ so that certain relevant 
meanings of the past can be borrowed but at the same time irrelevant meanings 
(i.e. the outdated, historically specific information) are acknowledged as 
contradictory due to transformations or changes in circumstance. 
38
  With my use 
of the concept of 'erasure', I point to a complex doubling in the use of Cultural 
Revolution imagery which is complicated by a series of accumulations over time. 
The concepts of différance and ‘erasure’ inform my thesis in significant 
ways.  Consistent with these, the recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery is not 
                                            
37 Jacques Derrida, ed., Of grammatology (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), xv. 
 
38Jacques Derrida, "Letter to A Japanese Friend"in Derrida and Différance, ed. David C. Wood and Robert 
Bernasconi (Warwick: Parousia, 1985), 3. 
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a coincidence.  Such a recurrence or doubling is considered to be constitutive and 
can be deconstructed in order to explore new meanings.  I argue that there can be 
two readings of Cultural Revolution imagery in the contemporary context.  The 
first reading is concerned with the fidelity of a faithful reading of the text and 
following the dominant interpretation (i.e. the reading of these images as cultural 
products of the People's Republic of China between 1966 and 1976).  The second 
reading is to find out what has changed, what has been excluded, neglected or 
repressed within the text in the process of creating rearrangements and 
juxtapositions beyond the original context. 
In exploring the cultural meanings of Chinese political posters and 
imagery with respect to cultural differences, meanings of the images can only be 
activated when the imagery is seen as a component of context-specific cultural 
practices involving human interactions, utilizations and forms of consumption. 
The recycling and consumption of the poster imagery is part of the local culture of 
the cities in the research.  This accords with Hall’s notion of culture as ‘the actual 
grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages and customs of any 
specific society.’
39
  The cultural practices of using Chinese revolutionary imagery 
as a representation of ‘Communist China’, ‘the Cultural Revolution’ and, in a 
broader sense, of ‘contemporary lifestyles’ is located in particular Chinese-
dominated urban areas in Asia.  These are characterised by their novelty at the 
moment of consumption, and are grounded practices of a culture which is 
concerned with, as Barker puts it, ‘shared social meanings’.
40
  Thus, in order to 
understand this ‘Cultural Revolution’ culture it is necessary to comprehend the 
processes of meaning production in which the imagery gives meaning to virtual 
and material objects and social practices.  This thesis follows Hall’s argument that 
popular culture is an arena of consent and resistance in the struggle over cultural 
meaning.  The use of Chinese political imagery in contemporary popular culture is 
mainly tied to commercial activities.  I follow the notion that popular culture is 
constituted through the production of popular meaning in the moment of 
consumption.  Such meaning production is a site of contestation over cultural and 
                                            
39 Stuart Hall, "Gramsic's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity"in Stuart Hall, ed. D Morley and D-
K Chen (London: Routledge, 1996), 439. 
 
40 Chris Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice, Second ed. (London: SAGE, 2003), 7. 
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political values. Thus it is also a site where cultural hegemony is secured or 
challenged (as the examples in Singapore and Hong Kong show).  This thesis 
attempts to reveal the power and the place of popular culture within wider social 
formations in respective locations.  For example, this thesis shows that ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ popular culture in Hong Kong is a site in which opinions on current 
political issues are strategically expressed, and the special Chinese government’s 
tolerance is marked.   
In cultural studies, the signifying practices of language are the processes 
where meanings are produced.  This approach draws on the work of Saussure.  In 
the current study, Chinese revolutionary imagery and the political slogans could 
be seen as signifiers.  For Saussure, the signifier-signified relationship is arbitrary 
because there can be unlimited possibilities in the combinations of the signifiers 
and the signified.
41
  However, this arbitrary character is not unproblematic when I 
applied to my research material.  This arbitrariness suggests that meaning is 
unfixed because it is culturally and historically specific and therefore not 
universal.
42
  But in my findings Chinese revolutionary imagery did carry certain 
aspects of ‘mainland Chineseness’ with it even when it moved beyond its original 
temporal and spatial context.  For example, Chinese communist propaganda was 
understood by the Singaporean-British government as a subversive political threat 
of mainland Chinese communism in the 1950s.  In 2004, Chinese teenagers in 
Beijing used Chinese political imagery produced during Cultural Revolution to 
represent China’s football team in an international tournament.  Both of these 
examples suggest that Chinese revolutionary culture has been understood as an 
indicator of ‘mainland Chineseness’ across time and cultural borders.   
Roland Barthes’s notion of myth could explain this ‘naturalized’ meaning 
of Chinese revolutionary culture.  For Barthes, myth makes certain meanings 
appear as unbreakable and exist as if they were natural.
43
  Barthes suggests there 
is a polysemic nature of signs which allows them to carry many possible 
meanings.  This idea is useful in theorising Chinese revolutionary imagery as a 
carrier of multiple roles and meanings in different cultures and contexts.  
                                            
41 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics , 67. 
 
42 Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice , 90. 
 
43 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (London: Cape, 1972). 
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However, this approach cannot grasp the rich layers of meanings that have 
‘accumulated’ in the posters and related imagery.  Using the University of 
Westminster Chinese Poster Collection as an example, the purpose of bringing 
Chinese political posters into the United Kingdom was to form a collection for 
education and research.  Turning the posters into archival objects added a further 
meaning to their original role as a political tool to promote China.  In a sense the 
new enriched the old in their contemporary role as objects in archives; however, it 
did not completely remove the original nature of the images as ‘political posters’.  
As Chris Weedon, Andrew Tolson and Frank Mort argue: 
Meaning is no longer fixed outside any textual location or spoken utterance and is always 
in relation to other textual locations in which signifier has appeared on other occasions.  
Every articulation of a signifier bears a trace of its previous articulations.  There is no 
fixed transcendental signified, since the meaning of concepts is constantly referred, via 




Thus in this sense, Chinese political posters have become transformed when they 
appear in museums or exhibitions, yet without their previous meaning as 
propaganda being in Derridean terms ‘erased’.  In this sense, Chinese political 
posters were given an academic meaning in the context of European education 
institutions or museums, but whether or not this meaning is received by the viewer, 
who might see the image within other contexts, is totally unpredictable.   
This unpredictability in the generation and circulation of meanings is also 
illustrated in Derrida’s idea of postcards.  Like postcards, Chinese political posters 
might reach people and generate meanings different from those intended.  Thus, 
the intended communication might be dislocated.  This was the result of the 
Chinese political poster as archival material or museum exhibit in Europe.  
Interestingly, some Chinese revolutionary images have been reproduced and 
reworked into postcards by Stefan Landsberger in Amsterdam and Douglas 
Young in Hong Kong.  Although the generation and circulation of these postcards 
could have been arbitrary, people with previous knowledge could still identify the 
postcard images as political posters.  My point here is that although I accept  
Derrida’s idea of the relationship between the signifiers and the signified as 
arbitrary, Chinese political imagery did have more or less fixed meanings and 
                                            
44  Chris Weedon, Andrew Tolson, and Frank Mort, "Introduction to Language Studies at the Centre"in 
Culture, Media, Language, ed. S Hall, et al. (London: Hutchinson, 1980), 199. 
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uses in practice. I borrow Michel Foucault’s concept of discursive practices to 
explain this dilemma.   
Foucault uses the concept of discourse to stress the power of historical 
conditions and authority in the formation of a set of regulated ways of perceiving 
objects.  As Barker defines the function of Foucauldian discursive formation: 
Discourses provide ways of talking about a particular topic with repeated motifs or 
clusters of ideas, practices and forms of knowledge across a range of sites of 
activities…A discursive formation is a pattern of discursive events that brings into being 
a common object across a number of sites.
45
 
In this sense, I identified the transformation of Chinese political imagery from 
modern Chinese political discourse to contemporary Cultural Revolution 
discourse.  In the original context, Chinese political posters were one of the means 
through which repeated revolutionary images were disseminated.  There were also 
the practices of putting up these posters on the walls of public workplaces and 
domestic homes.  But the posters gradually became detached from these original 
practices.  At the turn of the 21
st
 century, Chinese political imagery had become a 
component of a new discourse in which a narrow range of images and slogans 
were chosen, repeated and reworked for the urban consumer culture as 
commodities.  In this way, the pattern of utilizing the images in the production 
and consumption of commodities constructed a new subjectivity through which to 
experience Chinese political imagery.  The Foucauldian notion of discourse and 
discursive practice is useful in the current research in the sense that it offers a 
‘place’ for meanings to be stabilized or shaped temporarily.
46
  But what were the 
forces behind ‘putting together’ the poster imagery with contemporary cultural 




I refer to the concept of articulation - ‘the formation of a temporary unity between 
elements that do not have to go together’- in order to theorize the relationship 
between the signs and practices.
 47
  The culturally constructed representation of 
                                            
45 Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice , 102. 
 
46Ibid. , 110. 
 
47Ibid. , 9. 
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‘Communist China’ with the use of Chinese political imagery was ‘put together’ 
with the capitalist elements of commodification and consumer culture in 
Singapore for particular reasons.  I explore not only how certain images of the 
past are brought into new times and spaces, in new material forms, but also how 
capitalist economics bears on Chinese political imagery.  Here I draw on Ernesto 
Laclau’s idea of articulation.  Laclau argues that there is no essential linkage 
between discursive concepts and they are said to be articulated together due to the 
power of custom and opinion.
48
  For example, Chinese political posters did not 
have to be associated with museums or collecting practices.  They were associated 
as such because at a certain moment the posters were deemed valuable.  As John 
Gittings recalls there was no better way to engage with local culture in 1970s 
China than consuming Chinese political posters.
49
  The value of the posters was 
an outcome of the context-specific temporal connection.  Hall defines 
‘articulation’ as: 
the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain 
conditions.  It is the linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential 
for all time.  You have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or 
made?  The so-called “unity” of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct 




Based on the same notion, Hall suggests that the ‘unity’ of identity is the 
articulation of different and separate elements.
51
 According to Hall, these 
elements do not necessarily go together and could be re-articulated in different 
ways according to other historical and cultural circumstances.  In this sense, 
individuals are the unique historically specific articulation of discursive elements 
that are contingent but also socially constructed.  Under the same logic, ethnic 
identity is also constructed through the operation of discursive practices and 
difference.  Barker defines ethnicity as a ‘relational’ concept so that ‘what we 
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think of as our identity is dependent on what we think we are not.
52
  I argue that 
this relational concept helps in exploring why Chinese political imagery was 
employed in the context of Hong Kong and Singapore.  In the late 1990s, Hong 
Kong and Singapore saw a need to identify themselves in a circumstance when 
their engagement with China was necessary but at the same time frustrating.  
There was a need to consolidate its own cultural identity in this situation.  The 
need for signifiers that could signify mainland China as the ‘other’ pointed them 
to Chinese political imagery.  Thus, the identity formation based on Chinese 
political imagery as the signifier of China was a highly context-specific outcome 
which stresses the relational differences (or similarities) between China and Hong 
Kong/Singapore. 
In this thesis, I embrace Laclau and Hall’s notion of articulation as a way 
to adopt the view that the different uses of Chinese political imagery in different 
contexts (i.e. propaganda in China, collectible in the United Kingdom, commodity 
in Asia) produces different ‘unities’ of elements under specific conditions or 
through a ‘temporary stabilization’.
53
  This ‘unity’ or ‘stabilization’ was 
significant in the sense that it was unique and context-specific, and would never 
be the same as another ‘unity’ elsewhere.  To stabilize meaning for further 
meaning production, Hall argues that a temporary closure of meaning is 
required.
54
  It is because the unlimited possibility of ‘unities’ could be made.  
Thus Hall points out that 
all the social movements which have tried to transform society and have required the 
constitution of new subjectivities, have had to accept the necessarily fictional, but also the 
fictional necessity, of the arbitrary closure which is not the end, but which makes both 
politics and identity possible.
55
   
By the same token, the ‘unity’ of cultural identities produced in the social practice 
of utilizing and consuming the posters was the articulation of distinctive elements 
under specific social, cultural, political and economic conditions.  This involved 
                                            
52 Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice , 250. 
 
53 Ibid. , 107. 
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exploring how various contingent elements and practices are connected through 
the operation of power. 
 
Identity and Globalization 
David Buckingham points out some assumptions about the relevance of the 
concept of identity in understanding young people’s engagement with digital 
media.
56
  Buckingham also draws our attention to at least two levels of meanings 
that the term ‘identity’ implies.  The first is concerned with the individual 
uniqueness that we propose is more or less consistent over time.
57
  This means 
that each of us is different in society.  The second refers to a relationship with a 
broader collective or social group of some kind.  It is about ‘identification’ with 
others whom we propose are similar to us (if not exactly the same) at least in 
some significant way.
58
  In this sense, Buckingham’s notion of identity implies 
both similarity and difference depending on our assumption based on a relational 
association with others.  With this, I understand Chinese revolutionary imagery as 
a visual expression of this relational meaning. 
In referring to Hall’s notion of identity as a way to understand Chinese 
revolutionary imagery as a manifestation of cultural similarity and difference, this 
thesis looks at how Chinese revolutionary imagery is used in certain locations to 
imply both a cultural uniqueness (i.e. youth oriented digital media in urban China, 
the regional linguistic features in Hong Kong, and local specific food culture in 
Singapore) and a relationship between the local with a broader collective group 
(i.e. the world-wide popularity of the Cultural Revolution thematics as evidenced 
in Contemporary Chinese art, auction house sales, collecting and other museum 
practices, and in the presence of Cultural Revolution tourist items in flea markets).   
                                            
56  David Buckingham, "Introducing identity"in Youth, Identity, And Digital Media, ed. D. Buckingham 
(Cambridge & London: The MIT Press, 2008), 1. 
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I recognise that globalisation has destabilised the meaning of Chinese 
political images
59
  through the physical movement of the artefacts from their place 
of origin to other places and their virtual dissemination and circulation.  These 
movements and circulations are closely related to technological transformation in 
different societies, economies and cultures.  The forces of globalisation generate 
increasingly multi-directional economic, social, cultural and political connections 
which provide the conditions for Chinese political images to generate an array of 
differentiated meanings and roles across the world.  In this study, Chinese 
political imagery, imported culture from China, is seen as having been adapted to 
different ‘local’ markets.  In other words, Chinese political imagery as a facet of 
the original Chinese political culture of the 1960s has become disembedded from 
its original location.  Thus the concept of globalisation in this thesis refers us to 
the trajectory of the poster as physically, and subsequently digitally, spreading 
inside and outside China across time, places and spaces.  The transformation of 
population movements, flow of cultural products and electronic communications 
has resulted in an intensification of cultural juxtaposing, meeting and mixing.  
Following Chris Barker, I recognise that contemporary globalisation has increased 
‘the range of resources available for identity construction’.
60
  One of the key 
means of globalizing the flow of cultures and information is the use of new 
technologies and digital media.   
 
The chapters 
Chapter Two provides a detailed account of the methodology used in this thesis.  
It explains how I conducted the research and how I draw upon different methods 
to contend with dynamic situations I came across in the course of the research.  It 
also includes a review of literature.  Chapter Three starts by addressing the 
commodification of Chinese Revolutionary imagery in mobile multimedia 
pictures in Chinese urban culture.  It will show how these pictures are integrated 
with the digital technology in 21
st
 century China.  It throws light on the 
                                            
59 Books on the study of globalization I consulted include: Dani Rodrik, Has globalization gone too far? 
(Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1997)Malcolm Waters, Globalization  (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2001); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making globalization work (London and New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2006); Mervyn  Frost, Global ethics: anarchy, freedom and international relations 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2009)Manuel Castells, Communication power (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
60 Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice , 41. 
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significance of technology, urbanization and the recurrence of former 
revolutionary imagery in the contemporary context three decades or more after its 
original production (1966/1976).  It explores the interactions between this 
contemporary cultural practice and the depoliticisation of the former political 
imagery through which new subjectivities and new sub-cultural identities are 
constructed.  
Chapter Four examines the ways in which Chinese Revolutionary imagery 
was used by Hong Kong designers in the post-1997 Hong Kong context of 
branding initiatives.  It provides a brief historical account to clarify the specific 
experience of Chinese Communist propaganda in Hong Kong during the 1960s.  It 
shows how the people of Hong Kong borrowed certain cultural symbols of the 
cultural ‘Other’ (i.e. mainland China) that fit with their experience in order to 
reconstruct Hong Kong’s relation to the mainland.  This chapter also analyses the 
cultural differences and political tensions in post-1997 Hong Kong with respect to 
its position as a former British colony and its relation with communist China.  On 
the one hand, Hong Kong is a good economic model for China to development its 
market economy.  On the other hand, the use of Cultural Revolution imagery can 
be associated to the wider social context of Hong Kong in which there is social 
dissatisfaction and a mass movement to resist the non-democratic rule of China.   
Chapter Five discusses how Chinese Revolutionary imagery was used in 
commercial spaces in Singapore at the turn of the 21
st
 century.  It offers an 
historical account of the Singaporean government’s suppression of Chinese 
Communist propaganda in the past; but as my research reveals, Cultural 
Revolution imagery, which was banned in the 1960s, reappeared more recently in 
a chain of Mao-themed restaurants.  This chapter shows how Cultural Revolution 
imagery was transformed due to the interplay between various political, economic 
and social forces. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Methodology and Literature Review 
 
 
An interdisciplinary methodology 
The research methods I have adopted in this thesis are predominantly shaped by 
the nature of the research itself which could broadly be described as ‘visual 
culture’, and more specifically, as the transformations of a set of images through 
time and into different contexts.  As mentioned in the introduction, I propose that 
contemporary popular culture based on images from the Cultural Revolution is 
historically constructed, produced and reproduced by people who are themselves 
shaped and constrained by their environments.  Research on this requires an 
understanding of both historical events and current information that is inherently 
marked by spontaneity and ephemerality (i.e. popular cultural products, online 
information and conversations are highly contextual, time specific and can be 
removed anytime).   
This research is informed by a variety of sources which include 
discussions and archival material. Through an engagement with these my specific 
research interests and primary sources of Cultural Revolution imagery were 
established.  I devoted a huge amount of energy to collecting and analysing a wide 
range of texts, including literature on China, Hong Kong and Singapore and works 
on the history of the Cultural Revolution and Chinese political posters.  This 
material was comprised of published and unpublished documents, government 
reports, email messages, newspaper and magazine articles.  I examined historical 
narratives and digital material, as well as secondary sources such as literature on 
the relevant social, cultural and economic developments over time. Together these 
texts provided a wide range of perspectives from which to explore Cultural 
Revolution imagery.  I also gathered web-based material, some of which were 
later used as core primary sources for this research.
61
  This online research was 
                                            
61  I am aware of the concern about classifying primary and secondary sources.  Many sources can be 
considered either primary or secondary depending on the context in which they are examined.  In this 
thesis, the original Cultural Revolution images in political posters produced in the People's Republic of 
China during Cultural Revolution are primary sources from archives and collections.  When these images 
are reproduced in the making of new cultural products and sites consumed and integrated in the popular 
and consumer culture in the 2000s, the new products and sites are classified as further primary. 
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crucial for tracing the contemporary trajectory of images and information across 
different locations, and more importantly, to gather primary sources of emergent 
mobile phone images which are only accessible via the internet.  I also obtained 
plenty of information about Cultural Revolution popular culture products and sites 
in Hong Kong through participant observation techniques and informal 
conversations with individuals.    
The choice of the sites and the concepts around which I structure this 
thesis were predominantly based on the key themes that emerged from the 
empirical materials I collected from both primary and secondary sources.  My 
research interests, the issues I addressed, the encounters with different individuals 
and textual information I gathered established certain boundaries and limits to my 
discussion of the practices of recycling Cultural Revolution imagery within a 
limited time-frame (i.e. 1999-2009).  Before fully laying out the methods and 
techniques, I want to explain the ways in which I classified the sources. 
 
Classifying sources 
The empirical material, on which this thesis is based, is categorised as either a 
primary or secondary source.  The distinction between primary and secondary is 
contextual and needs further clarification due to the multi-layered structure of 
image-making and issue of reproduction. There are two distinct types of primary 
sources that I use in this research.  The first of these is comprised of artefacts, 
documents and other sources of information such as daily objects including 
posters, handkerchief, toys, story books and photographs that were created at the 
time of the Cultural Revolution during the 1960s and 1970s.  I obtained most of 
these primary sources from the University of Westminster Chinese Poster 
Collection.
62
  These materials serve as original sources of information and act as 
essential reference points from which to uncover the historical links between 
cultural practices from different contexts.  Since the late 1990s, the digital images 
of Chinese political (propaganda) posters have been reproduced and displayed on 
websites.  These are classified as digital primary sources, which play a similar 
                                            
62 The collection will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.  One significant dimension of the archival 
research is that these sources are geographically distant from the original source of the objects, i.e. 
University of Westminster Chinese Poster Collection houses posters textual materials and visual objects 
from the 1960s and 1970s China. 
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role to the physical primary sources from physical collections.  This source of 
material can be retrieved via the internet as long as these materials remain on the 
relevant websites.  I used the online resources of the University of Westminster 
Chinese Poster Collection
63
 and Stefan Landsberger’s Chinese Propaganda Poster 
Pages
64
 to trace the original sources of images used in contemporary cultural 
products.   
The second type of primary source refers to those cultural products or sites 
in which the original images or artefacts function beyond their original context of 
production.  Such primary sources include contemporary cultural products and 
sites, both physical and virtual.  The physical products and spaces I gathered or 
visited in Hong Kong are classified as primary sources.  These cultural products 
and sites are the core source of this research through which the contemporary 
practices of recycling and consuming Cultural Revolution imagery can be 
explored.  The virtual primary sources I used in this research include mobile 
phone pictures and photographs circulated via Chinese websites on the Internet, 
and company website of the theme restaurant in Singapore.  With respect to 
mobile phone pictures produced in China, online research is the only way to 
access these recent ‘hi-tech’ cultural products.
65
  As the form of this cultural 
product is intrinsically virtual and digital, these mobile phone pictures and the 
websites where these pictures are advertised are considered to be primary sources.  
The House of Mao restaurant in Singapore was closed down in early 2003 before 
this research commenced in November 2003, therefore the websites of the 
corporation and the designer serve as primary sources in this research.  I made the 
decision not to exclude it because the emergence of this theme restaurant in 
Singapore between 1999 and 2003 added a significant dimension to my research.  
This was ostensibly the first Mao restaurant in Singapore and it was widely 
advertised.
66
   
                                            
63 Accessible at www.china-posters.org/ and www.home.wmin.ac.uk/china_posters/ 
 
64 Available at www.iisg.nl/landsberger/ 
 
65  Though these products can be seen via the websites, only the subscribers of Chinese mobile phone 
networks residing within mainland China (excluding Hong Kong) can download these products, which 
presented a methodological challenge and limited my engagement with the material to the web. 
 
66 House of Mao restaurant was written about as a novelty in ID Magazine in Singapore in April 1998, in 
Space Magazine in Singapore in October/November 1998, and in Expat Magazine in Singapore in 
February 1999.  
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The secondary sources I used in this research refer to any sources which 
offer analysis, interpretation or evaluation of the original information.  These 
include articles in popular magazines and literature on the Cultural Revolution 
and major studies on China, Hong Kong and Singapore.  Popular magazines 
which reported and commented on the cultural products and sites in Hong Kong 
and Singapore are considered as secondary sources since these provide 
generalised and subjective accounts of the phenomena.  Publications and 
academic works on the study of China, Hong Kong and Singapore are secondary 
sources because these are analyses of past events or phenomena.  Exhibitions of 
Chinese political (propaganda) posters are classified as secondary sources 
important in the contemporary circulation and display of the original artefacts that 
I visited during my research.   
The online conversations and email messages with Ed Poole, the designer 
of Mao restaurants in Singapore are also considered as further sources providing 
information of a past and irretrievable event, and these are, practically speaking, 
the closest I could come to the original source.  Exhibitions of Cultural Revolution 
relics and literature on the history of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, which 
provide current interpretations of relics and historical details of events, are also 
considered as important sources. Informal conversations and discussions I had 
with the owner of the People’s Recreation Community and the designer of G.O.D. 
in Hong Kong during my fieldwork are also important sources for understanding 
decision-making in the design process. 
 
Research structure, methods & techniques 
In this section I describe how the thesis is structured, the ways in which I gathered 
data for analysis, and the methods and techniques I adopted in the process of the 
research.  The structure of this thesis in terms of choice of location is informed by 
the nature of Chinese political posters as objects which ‘travel’ through times and 
spaces.
67
  Besides using the original source of images from poster collections, the 
primary sources of this research are cultural products and sites which draw on 
                                            
67 The founding of University of Westminster Chinese Poster Collection in London is a manifestation of the 
physical movements of artefacts from China to Europe.  The viewing of these artefacts in a context 
beyond their original time of production marks the passage of time and transforming meanings of these 
artefacts in a different era. 
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Cultural Revolution images in their production in the new millennium.  I gathered 
these primary sources in various specific ways.  The methods and techniques I 
used include archival research and exhibition visits, informal discussions and 
conversations, observation techniques such as participant observation, online 
research via the Internet, as well as reading and analysing a wide range of written 
sources.  
My research interests and conceptual ideas on this topic were established 
first of all through my archival research and exhibition visits in London — far 
from the object of research — during which I encountered the first group of Hong 
Kong students with whom I had informal discussions.  In adopting this approach 
to Chinese political posters as an object of study, I primarily drew on Derrida’s 
idea of postcards and postal systems, that meanings can never be fixed since 
‘meanings circulate without any absolutely authorized source or destination’ due 
to the mobility of postcards, and also following Roland Barthes’s idea of 
polysemic signs in which ‘signs carry many potential meanings’ and therefore 
‘texts can be interpreted in a number of different ways.’
68
  With this, I understand 
archival objects based on the idea that ‘it is the readers of texts who temporally 
“fix” meaning for particular purposes’ therefore ‘interpretation of texts depends 
on the readers’ cultural repertoire and knowledge of social codes.’
69
  Such an 
approach requires analysis both of the artefact itself and social experience of these 
images and objects in real life, which vary from individual to individual and 
across cultures and contexts.  This approach also requires particular attention to 
any changes in the meanings of images and objects across time and place.  I 
approach each of these dimensions in specific ways.  First of all, I consider the 
existing location of the artefacts within a trajectory that moves through time and 
place, and which uncovers an aspect of Cultural Revolution imagery posited 
within the global flow of culture; thus informing my study of Cultural Revolution 
imagery as a topic of area studies.  I regard the artefacts as specific cultural 
products through which wider cultural, social and political circumstances of a 
specific time can be explored.  I use the different kinds of cultural products 
                                            
68 Quotes from Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice , 94 and 98. 
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produced in different historical moments to structure the thesis with an aim to 
reveal the interactions between cultural forms, cultures and histories.   
I treat Cultural Revolution imagery as ‘texts’ which are interpreted by 
different groups, and in doing so, highlight the tensions in cultural differences 
between Hong Kong and mainland China in the post-handover era.  Inspired by 
my first visit to the Chinese Poster Collection in London and my discussions with 
Hong Kong students, I study Cultural Revolution imagery through certain themes 
such as British colonialism in Asian Chinese regions such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
My fieldwork and online activities offered me plenty of chances to talk to 
people, obtain consumer items, engage with the real life situation, access new 
digital products and revisit consumer products of the past.  These activities 
availed the substantive data for this thesis.  My initial approach was triggered by 
early informal discussions and archival research on Cultural Revolution images; 
and the choice of locations for fieldwork was informed by my analysis of the 
artefacts as objects that ‘travel’ through social practices, and certain themes 
emerged from my informal discussions with different individuals, such as my 
initial encounter with the collection at the University of Westminster.
70
   My 
fieldwork gave me the opportunity to gather most of the data for Chapter Three 
and some information for Chapter Two and Chapter Four. I had numerous 
informal conversations, some interviews and observed a wide range of everyday 
practices in diverse environments, including exhibitions of Hong Kong culture 
and history in museums, communal areas and university libraries, shopping malls 
in the commercial and business districts in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
contemporary art galleries in central business districts, street corners of major 
commercial districts, chain-stores selling lifestyle products, and small shops with 
trendy popular cultural products.  These spaces were full of urban consumers and 
young individuals.  However when we acknowledge that Cultural Revolution 
                                            
70 My first encounter with Chinese political posters took place in a scheduled visit to the University of 
Westminster Chinese Poster Collection in the summer of 2003.  I was with a number of students from 
Lingnan University of Hong Kong visiting the posters in Collection.  This visit was significant to the 
current research because it was the particular moment that a group of young Hong Kong Chinese activated 
the meaning of the poster from a cultural perspective which was complicated by the blurred boundary 
between the post-colonial British cultural legacy and the post-1997 political influence of the People’s 
Republic of China on Hong Kong.  The People's Republic of China officially reclaimed Hong Kong as 
part of the territory on 1 July 1997. 
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imagery was first produced and consumed in the 1960s and the original target 
viewers of that generation are now mostly in their fifties or older, it is clear that 
there is a major difference between how the two different generations understand 
the same set of images.   
Most of my particular observations, informal conversations and interviews 
with individuals came from two major sources: working in the arts and culture 
sector, and visiting a wide range of local cultural and commercial spaces.  I 
worked in a Chinese furniture store in a high-end shopping mall and an antique 
Asian fine art shop in Hong Kong.  This job offered me significant opportunities 
for getting to know some of the key individuals in this area of research including 
the specialist of Contemporary Asian Art Department at Sotheby’s Hong Kong 
and the CEO and Design Director of G.O.D.  In my visit to an upstairs business 
space in Causeway Bay I met the owner of the People’s Recreation Community 
who is also the designer of most of the Cultural Revolution products in the shop.  
My job and connections also allowed me to visit some commercial art galleries in 
Hong Kong which trade in contemporary Chinese art inspired by the history and 
culture of the Cultural Revolution.   
My countless informal conversations and interviews with these individuals 
serve as important sources of information for this research.  In the informal 
conversations I had, no predetermined questions were asked in order to remain as 
open and adaptable as possible to the interviewees’ background and priorities.  
However, I recognise that the place where the conversations took place, i.e. in art 
galleries which buy and sell contemporary Chinese art and inside the shops owned 
by the interviewees, may have indirectly shaped the topics discussed.  I conducted 
three interviews with the three individuals mentioned above respectively during 
my fieldwork in Hong Kong. These interviews were semi-structured and open-
ended with a similar set of open-ended questions were asked to all interviewees in 
order to facilitate faster interviews that can be more easily analyzed and 
compared.
71
  My interview questions for the designers had the general goal of 
                                            
71 In formulating the ideas for these interviews, I also drew upon my knowledge and experience gained from a 
qualitative research training course which provided practice in applying qualitative research theory to 
practical situations.  Due to the different professional backgrounds of the individuals, it was not possible 
to formulate a set of standardized questions for all of them.  Questions about design logic and the 
popularity of products were posed to designers, whereas questions about general trends in art scenes were 
posed to the Chinese art specialist from Sotheby’s Hong Kong. 
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revealing the interactions between design, culture and politics, as well as showing 
the gap between current Hong Kong culture and Cultural Revolution culture.  In 
adopting this approach, I drew on Hall’s argument in which he contends that 
popular culture could be a site of consent and resistance in the struggle over 
cultural meanings.
72
 To tie in Hall’s concept, I also quote from Geremie R. Barmé, 
that ‘unbridgeable gap between those who had lived through the Mao years and 
those who had not’ and ‘the [Mao] Cult provided a common ground and a hazy 
realm of consensus in a society in which the generation gap was increasingly 
making its impact felt’ to understand Hong Kong’s situation as being different 
from China.
 73
   However in using this semi-structured approach, I attempted to 
make these interviews as open and adaptable as possible to deepen the scope of 
my overall understanding and enrich my view of the field.  For the online of the 
conversations and interviews I applied the same approach.  I found that both 
formal and informal conversations provided fruitful insights.  The more formal 
interviews produced significant information concerning the design logic behind 
the cultural products, which could not be obtained otherwise from other sources.  
Yet, the informal conversations yielded more unguarded and spontaneous insights.  
These conversations and interviews significantly enlighten the arguments in 
Chapter Three where I discuss Cultural Revolution popular culture in relation to 
the shaping of Hong Kong cultural identity. 
 
Museums and exhibition visits 
Altogether I visited nine museums in Hong Kong, Beijing, Guangzhou and 
Singapore respectively, during which I made participant observations, had 
informal conversations with countless people during which I made participant 
                                            
72 Stuart Hall, "Culture, the Media and the Ideological Effect" in Mass Communications and Society, ed. J 
Curran, M Gurevitch, and J Woolacott (London: Edward Arnold, 1977); Hall, "Gramsic's Relevance for the 
Study of Race and Ethnicity" Stuart Hall, "Encoding/Decoding" in Culture, Media, Language, ed. S Hall, et 
al. (London: Hutchinson, 1981). 
 
73 Barmé, Shades of Mao: the posthumous cult of the great leader , 48. 
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observations and had informal conversations with countless people.
74
  Among the 
museums I visited were the Hong Kong Heritage Museum, the Hong Kong 
Museum of History, the Hong Kong Museum of Art, G.O.D. Street Culture 
Museum, the National Museum of China, China Fine Arts Gallery, the 
Guangdong Museum of Fine Arts, the National Museum of Singapore and the 
Asian Civilizations Museum.
75
  The information about the history and cultural 
practices of the past in each of these localities informs the background knowledge 
that is so crucial to this research, through which comparisons and contrasts across 
time and cultures are made possible.  I also visited exhibitions that held Cultural 
Revolution relics in the United Kingdom.
76
  I assisted intensively in curating an 
exhibition of Cultural Revolution imagery called The Political Body in which 
around thirty original Chinese political posters between the 1950s and 1970s were 
faithfully reproduced for gallery display and also used in the exhibition 
catalogue.
77
  I also conducted three gallery talks at the exhibition which enabled 
me to hear how visitors from different backgrounds thought about the posters.   
These experiences and exhibition visits informed my research in a number 
of ways.  First, the exhibitions in the United Kingdom demonstrated the value of 
                                            
74 The exhibitions of Hong Kong cultures and history I visited include: “The Golden Age of Couture: Paris 
and London 1947–1957” (30 May 2009 - 28 September 2009), “The Ancient Olympic Games” 
(3 August 2008 - 24 November 2008), “Riding a Melodic Tide – The Development of Cantopop in Hong 
Kong” (11 November 2007 - 4 August 2008), “Fashion Attitude – Hong Kong Fashion Design” 
(19 August 2007 - 31 March 2008) and “Beyond the Museum: Hong Kong Toys” (8 May 2007 - 
2 July 2007) of Hong Kong Heritage Museum; “Louis Vuitton: A Passion For Creation” (22 May 2009 – 
9 August 2009) of Hong Kong Museum of Art; “Impressions of the East: The Art of George Chinnery” 
and “East Meets West: Cultural Relics from the Pearl River Delta Region” (2005) of Hong Kong Museum 
of History; Singapore Biennale 2006 (4 SEPT 2006 - 12 NOV 2006) of National Museum of Singapore. 
 
75 The address of the museums I visited: Hong Kong Heritage Museum, 1 Man Lam Road, Sha Tin, Hong 
Kong; Hong Kong Museum of History, 100 Chatham Road South, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong; 
Hong Kong Museum of Art, 10 Salisbury Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong; G.O.D. Street 
Culture Museum, JCCAC L2-06, 30 Pak Tin Street, Shek Kit Mei, Hong Kong; China Fine Arts Gallery, 
Beijing City, Dongcheng District, May 4th street, #1, The People's Republic of China; Guangdong 
Museum of Fine Arts, 38 Yanyu Road, Er-sha lsland, Guangzhou, the People's Republic of China; 
National Museum of Singapore, 93 Stamford Road Singapore 178897; Asian Civilizations Museum, 1 
Empress Place Singapore 179555.   
 
76 The exhibitions of Chinese political posters in the UK that I visited include Art for the Masses: 
Revolutionary Art of the Mao Zedong Era 1950-1976 held at National Museum of Scotland, Edinburgh, 
UK (May 2003-March 2004) and the Political Body: Posters from the People's Republic of China in the 
1960s and 1970s at Brunei Gallery, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London (April – June 2004).  The latter was an exhibition I assisted 
with its production.  There is also an exhibition of Mao badges called Icons of Revolution: Mao badges 
then and now organized by The British Museum (9th April and 14th September 2008). 
 
77 The Political Body: Posters from the People's Republic of China in the 1960s and 1970s (15 April – 25 
June, 2004), Brunei Gallery, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.  It was curated 
by Katie Hill.  It also toured at Oriental Museum, Durham (16 Jan-17 Mar, 2005) and Museum of East 
Asian Art, Bath (26 Apr-14 Aug, 2005). 
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Cultural Revolution objects, and related history, as a subject for study in European 
culture.  Second, the rather brief and general, if not completely absent, 
information on Cultural Revolution culture and history given in museums in 
China, Hong Kong and Singapore that I observed during my visits created a 
significant point of comparison with the many more exhibitions of Cultural 
Revolution relics held in the United Kingdom. My museum visits in general 
highlighted the significance of the cross-cultural dimension of using Cultural 
Revolution relics and their related history, and the extent to which their meanings 
are context-specific.   
In addition to the more structured visits to galleries and museums, I also 
spent much of my time as a participant observer holding informal conversations 
with consumers of Cultural Revolution popular cultural products in the street and 
customers in the Cultural Revolution theme café, vendors and consumers in street 
markets such as Panjiayuan Market in Beijing, Huahan Antiques and Jade Market 
in Guangzhou, and speaking with people in the Mao memorabilia shop in Lascar 
Row in Hong Kong.  I had casual conversations in many situations and noted 
down those responses that differed from existing findings.  I used the information 
gathered from these observations and conversations to inform my argument about 
the Cultural Revolution popular culture as urban, touristic, and youth-oriented. 
In this early phase of my research, I closely studied a large number of 
political posters (xuanchuanhua) at the Poster Collection at the University of 
Westminster.
78
  Through this careful examination, I identified patterns, themes 
and artistic styles in pictures produced in specific periods and contexts.
79
  I drew 
on John Gittings’s experience and knowledge that ‘Chinese posters and similar art 
forms during the Cultural Revolution and afterwards were closely related to 
current political and social themes, which often had a very short life span.’
80
  I 
identified key visual features of posters produced at a specific time to support my 
                                            
78 In the years between 2003 and 2006 I examined around seven hundred posters stored in the University of 
Westminster Chinese Poster Collection.  The collection at that time located at 100 Park Village East NW1 
in the Centre of the Study of Democracy. 
 
79 For example, the images which became the key part of my research were mostly taken from those produced 
at the outset of the Cultural Revolution (1966-67). 
 
80 Gittings, "Excess and Enthusiasm" 27-46. 
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research argument regarding the selective use of Cultural Revolution imagery in 
the urban contemporary phenomenon. 
Apart from examining the posters themselves as primary sources of 
research, I also recognised the Collection at the University of Westminster as an 
aspect of British colonialism in recent history.  By considering Chinese political 
posters as an object of research and study, I also came to see the role and nature of 
collections in the United Kingdom as a product of globalisation and a site where 
‘new’ subjectivities were formed.  Gittings, founder of the Chinese Poster 
Collection, saw Chinese propaganda posters as valuable sources through which to 
understand China at a time when travelling in China was much more restricted 
than as it is now.
81
  Gittings began the collection when he first visited China in 
1971.  The collection itself was a result of a global flow of culture, cultural 
objects and images.  The cultural meaning of the posters as archival materials in 
Europe is this utilized, organised and shaped by institutional practices and the way 
intellectuals have framed different ways of seeing. The exhibition ‘Political Art 
and Popular Culture in China’ held at the Regent Street building of PCL in April 
1979 was one of the first exhibitions of Chinese political posters at the time.  The 
posters had been widely used as teaching materials in Chinese language classes.   
With his Chinese Visual Arts Project at the Polytechnic of Central London 
(PCL), Gittings was playing a role in actively using the posters in the collection as 
objects for education and research.
82
  In November 2005, I visited Stefan 
Landsberger’s Chinese propaganda poster collection in the Netherlands.
83
  This 
collection was housed at the International Institute of Social History in 
Amsterdam.  Landsberger, the collector and founder of the collection, also saw 
the posters as good examples of illustration history for teaching and research 
purposes.  Here I recognised the relationship of culture and power in the domains 
                                            
81 Gittings travelled to China towards the end of Cultural Revolution in the early 1970s. After working as a 
lecturer at Central London Polytechnic (later become the University of Westminster) Gittings became the 
China correspondent of The Guardian Newspaper for many years.  See Ibid. , 27-46.  
 
82 In the Chinese Poster Collection, documents of Chinese Visual Arts project mentioned poster exhibitions as 
a way to engage students of Chinese studies with the subject of Chinese political art.  Materials such as 
photographic slides and photographs on cardboards are also held in the collection used as teaching 
materials for Chinese studies by teachers at the former Polytechnic of Central London (today’s University 
of Westminster). 
 
83 Stefan Landsberger’s Chinese propaganda poster collection is a private collection which is physically 
preserved using the technology available at International Institute of Social History, Cruquiusweg 31 
1019 AT Amsterdam, The Netherlands.   
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of culture (i.e. education and museums) in the sense that cultures of the ‘Other’ 
were still utilized in the formation of ‘new’ subjectivities.  This understanding of 
the collections and exhibitions raised questions about the different roles and 
cultural meanings of propaganda of China in the past across time and space.  In 
looking at the poster as an object of study by British colonial powers attempting to 
understand China, I developed an interest in focusing on the relationship between 
the Chinese cities influenced by British colonialism and Chinese revolutionary 




In addition to conducting research on the artefacts in physical spaces, I devoted 
considerable energy into gathering internet-based material as a primary source.  
My web-based research aimed at exploring the online circulation and 
consumption of Chinese revolutionary imagery in contemporary Chinese culture.  
Using the Internet I obtained the major primary source of new digital cultural 
products that are specific to the post-2000 era in China. In adopting this approach, 
I drew on the reports published by the China Internet Network Information Centre 
that provided statistics that pointed to the rapid development of new information 
technologies and their increasing social prevalence in China particularly since the 
early 2000s.
84
  The reports also indicated the important role new information 
technologies, such as the Internet and telecommunication devices, plays in 
contemporary Chinese urban culture. Therefore, when I used the internet as a 
research tool I wanted to explore any new technological forms of circulation of 
Cultural Revolution imagery.   
Such an approach requires a concerted effort to engage regularly with 
online discussions and information, both social and political, regarding the 
popular use of Cultural Revolution culture.  I looked into countless Chinese, Hong 
Kong and Singaporean websites such as blogs, online magazines, news, etc. in 
relation to local new technological products and cultural trends.  At the same time 
                                            
84 Reports I have read include, but are not limited to, the following: Internet Statistics, The 5th Survey Report 
(China Internet Network Information Center,  2000 [cited 15 June 2009]); available from 
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/download/manual/en-reports/5.pdf.; Internet Statistics, The 9th Survey Report 
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I also paid attention to any kind of circulation and consumption outside Chinese, 
Hong Kong and Singaporean cultures.  With this, I am aware of the nature of the 
Internet via the World Wide Web is not free from censorship exercised by 
governments of different countries. Although I am able to access different cross-
cultural information via the World Wide Web (hereafter referred to as ‘the web’), 
it does not necessarily mean that the web leads to a homogeneous way of 
consuming the same set of materials.   
For example, Chinese mobile phone pictures produced by local internet 
service providers for mainland Chinese subscribers are not available for people 
outside China to download.  I used the internet as follow-up device to further 
investigate sources gathered by other research techniques, to explore linkage 
between the sources and cultures and to obtain the most up-to-date information. In 
adopting the internet, my choice of search engines attended to the fact that certain 
search engines, which are written in local language, may be better suited than 
others in accessing local-specific information.  I recognised that certain search 
engines and cultural practices were more popular in certain regions and some 
search engines were exclusively for local information.  I attempted to cover as 
many search engines as possible and carry out keyword searches in both Chinese 
and English on certain search engines to research particular locations.  These 
included Yahoo, Google, MSN, AOL and ASK because these were the five most 
common search engines on the Internet in general.  Specific to my research on 
China and Hong Kong, there are eighteen search engines which cover 90% of 
consumption of the market in these respective areas.
85
  The local search engine 
www.singaporesearchengine.com was particularly useful for researching 
Singaporean culture.  I particularly looked at the ways in which people engaged 
with the imagery.  I carried out keyword searches, including ‘Chinese 
propaganda’, ‘Cultural Revolution’ and ‘Chinese political art’, using over twenty 
search engines in the years between 2004 and 2009.  I looked for the imagery 
according to the above keywords by using the ‘image search’ function available in 
                                            
85  The search engines for my research on China and Hong Kong included: www.baidu.com, 
search.china.com/search, www.google.com/CN, so.163.com, www.msn.com.cn, www.yisou.com, 
cha.sina.com.cn, cn.search.yahoo.com, dir.sogou.com, i.tom.com, www.zhongsou.com, 
search.msn.com.hk, www.google.com.hk, cd.openfind.com.tw/HK, timway.com/main.php, 
search.sina.com.hk, hk.search.yahoo.com, www.y28.com/index.php. 
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the search engines.  This was useful to find out different kinds of practices that 
had involved or cross-cut the circulation of Chinese revolutionary imagery.   
My online research was not without difficulties.  Since the information 
circulated on the Internet is highly reflected of the most heated topics at any given 
time, resulting in a situation where the life of each search result could be very 
short.  It was meant to be so in order to keep the information as current as possible.  
This brevity of existence was a constraint on making a critical analysis of any 
kind of Chinese political poster consumption singularly or in constellation as a 
trend or a lifestyle.  The problem was that by the time I retrieved certain searches, 
the object of the search might have been removed from the Internet because it was 
already seen as old and unfashionable.  This ephemeral character of online 
existence, and the abundant variety of information available on the Internet, made 
it almost impossible to track down all transactions in relation to Cultural 
Revolution imagery.  This limitation of online research partly informs the overall 
research methodology of this thesis, which focuses on the study of Cultural 
Revolution imagery in specific periods of time in particular places or spaces.  
Even though online information can be gone anytime, its temporary emergence 
suggests its significance under specific environments. 
The brevity of existence of certain findings and the relatively long life of 
others could be the indicators of the latest cultural role of Cultural Revolution 
imagery or posters at that moment.  In general, the short/long life of certain online 
cultural practices in relation to the utilization and consumption Chinese 
revolutionary imagery made it unavoidable that this thesis itself was by definition 
‘historical’.  In addition, the nature of an online research itself is already limited to 
looking at the specific groups of ‘netizens’ who had the privilege to access new 
information technologies.  I also recognised that the prevalence of Internet usage 
was predominantly an urban phenomenon.  As Barker points out, ‘cities are the 
electronic hubs of a new global information economy’ and ‘urban areas are the 
nodal points of social, technological, cultural and economic networks’.
86
   
What Barker describes here was particularly true to the rapid development 
of new information and telecommunication technologies in China since 1990s.  
From the year 2000 onwards, there had been a dramatic increase in the number of 
                                            
86 Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice , 369.  
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mobile phone and Internet users.  This unprecedented phenomenon marked a 
typical context-specific feature of China’s urban city culture in the 2000s.   Thus, 
the newly emerged information and mobile telecommunication technologies in 
China in the 2000s were of particular cultural significance which could be not 
compared to other places, particularly in the Western world, where such 
technologies had already been integrated with the local cultural practices for a 
much longer time.   
I use my analysis of web-based materials to reveal that there was a 
particular way of circulating and consuming Chinese revolutionary imagery in 
Chinese urban communities which was not as common in Hong Kong and 
Singapore.  For example, there are many specific websites in China which at the 
same time disseminate news of current political, social, cultural and technological 
issues as well as provide a large quantity of digital items that can be downloaded; 
while there are not as many similar websites in Hong Kong and Singapore.
87
 
It was a highly context-specific phenomenon in China in 2004 at the time 
when mobile phone text messaging had become socially prevalent in urban cities 
which had never happened in China before.  Multimedia virtual message products 
were available in China for the first time in 2002 when a number of internet 
service providers emerged.  Comparatively speaking, the use of the Internet and 
mobile phones had long been prevalent in Hong Kong and Singapore.  However 
similar kinds of mobile phone multimedia products were not as popular in Hong 
Kong and Singapore at that specific period of time. Moving images were 
commonly downloaded from the internet to computers, but not to mobile phones.  
In my examination of the websites of multimedia virtual product providers in 
China, such as tom.com, caishou and sohu, Chinese revolutionary images were 
digitally reproduced and appropriated into MMS products.  This service was only 
available for mainland Chinese mobile phone users (excluding Hong Kong).   
This finding was decisive because it proved, once more, the ways in which 
people consumed Chinese revolutionary imagery were not necessarily the same in 
different Chinese-dominated places.  This was significant for the research in the 
way that it revealed differences in how the imagery was engaged and thus how 
particular cultural meanings were formed in local cultures.  More significantly, 
                                            
87  Websites in China which provide mobile phone pictures usually provide thousands of downloadable 
entertainment items.  For an example of websites please refer to those mentioned earlier in footnote 79. 
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this research on contemporary cultural practices in the ‘new’ China, and capitalist 
Chinese cities like Hong Kong and Singapore, could explore the particular layer 
of cultural meaning of Chinese revolution imagery that was absent or inapplicable  
in the Western world.  As mentioned earlier, this research was initiated by a 
context-specific tension and contradiction between Hong Kong and mainland 
Chinese cultures.  This made the local Hong Kong consumption of mainland 
Chinese cultural symbols in the 2000s a site of contestation and negotiation.  
Interestingly, by the time Cultural Revolution images emerged in China as 
fashionable MMS pictures, Cultural Revolution images also appeared in Hong 
Kong as tourist souvenirs and lifestyle products or spaces.  The ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ trend in China and Hong Kong consumer culture kicked off at the 
time when the famous ‘Mao’ theme restaurant in Singapore closed down in 2003.  
This ‘Mao’ restaurant was the first of its kind in Singapore when it opened in 
1998.  All these similar yet local-specific phenomena took place at the turn of the 
21
st
 century in China, Hong Kong and Singapore in a way that showed a pattern 
which was context-specific to urban Chinese-dominated city cultures in Asia.  
This pattern itself was a novelty because Chinese communist culture had been 
seen as ‘negative’ and ‘inapplicable’ to the economic growth based on capitalist 
ideology. 
 
My personal journey 
My encounter with the Chinese Poster Collection at the University of Westminster 
and the undergraduate students from Hong Kong opened me to the changeable 
nature of the meanings of Chinese political posters when they appeared as 
artefacts.  The students’ response, from a Hong Kong perspective in the 21
st
 
century, offered me an alternative reading, which was distinct from the angle 
offered by many books on the history of Cultural Revolution art from the 
mainland or Western perspectives.  Nicholas Royle’s essay ‘Blind Cinema’ in 
Screenplay and Essays on the Film: Derrida, which paved the way for certain 
ideas in this thesis, addresses the unpredictability of the shifting meaning of a 
particular image or moment: 
There is no deconstruction without surprise.  When does it happen? Integral to Derrida’s 
thinking about the ghostly and unforeseeable is a logic of delayed effect, deferred 
meaning, after-effect or in French après coup.  Deconstruction involves thinking in terms 
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of a sort of time-bomb.  You never know when or how the meaning or significance of a 
particular image or moment in “real life”, or in a film, might emerge or change.
88
 
A particular image can be in a different form, in a different time and space, and 
this determines how the meanings of an image will transform.  This aroused my 
interest in how the meanings of Chinese communist propaganda are changed after 
three decades or more in the same place of production, and paved the way for my 
study of Cultural Revolution imagery in 21
st
 century Hong Kong and Singaporean 
popular cultures.   
Hong Kong and Singapore are both Chinese-dominated city-states which 
share a lot in common.  For example, the majority population in both cities is the 
ethnically Chinese, whose ancestors originally came from mainland China.  The 
cities are both former British colonies.  British colonial rule and its aftermath were 
influential in establishing and consolidating the capitalist economies of Southeast 
Asian cities which continued in the post-colonial era.  Hong Kong and Singapore 
both had unique but similar experiences with the spread of Chinese ‘Maoist’ 
communist propaganda under the suppression of the British government.  This 
had a considerable impact on the development of the local sense of awareness 
among the settlers in Hong Kong and Singapore.  The unique founding history of 
the Republic of Singapore was closely related to the Chinese student and labour 
movements which were believed to be supported by the Chinese Communist Party.  
The point here is that the historical connection with Chinese political imagery in 
Singaporean culture might have an impact on how the people viewed the imagery 
in the late 1990s/early 2000s.   
 My research on the historical and cultural connections between China, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, the history of Chinese revolutionary posters, and 
cultural theory was further developed by extensive consideration of texts from the 
Southeast Asian, China and Hong Kong sections in the libraries.  The libraries I 
visited included the British Library, and university libraries in the United 
Kingdom and Hong Kong such as the School of Oriental and African Studies, the 
University of London, the University of Hong Kong, and the Baptist University.  
To view television programmes and films about the riots in Hong Kong in the 
1960s, produced by the British Colonial government, I visited the Hong Kong 
Film Archive once a week from August to October in 2009.  These visits gave me 
                                            
88 Royle, "Blind Cinema" , 12. 
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general background information on the Hong Kong and Singaporean film 
industries.  Through this, I realised a close relationship between Hong Kong and 
Singapore in terms of the connections between the Shaw’s Brothers film studios 
in the respective cities, but only a few film co-productions could be found 
between Hong Kong and China.  These visits offered me a basic understanding of 
the three places in terms of local culture, history and the movement of culture and 
people between these places. 
This research was initiated by a tension I experienced when looking, from 
a post-1997 Hong Kong perspective, at a Chinese political poster made by a 
Maoist in Hong Kong in the 1960s.  With this I recognised that Cultural 
Revolution imagery was meaningful in the sense that it marked the context-
specific cultural meaning of the poster in relation to Hong Kong identity in the 
year of 2003.   
Any methodology necessarily has its own limitations.  My choice of 
research methods and techniques, as well as my encounters with empirical 
materials, limited the themes and cultural forms I discuss in this thesis.  The 
choice of geographical locations, the principle of looking at contemporary 
circulation of Cultural Revolution imagery in its origin of production, and in 
locations which have been influenced by both the spread of Chinese communist 
ideologies and British colonial rule restricted the locations I discuss.  From the 
vast number of possible images, I generally selected the most repetitive images, 
which may restrict other less repetitive images to be fully discussed in current 
study.  Inevitably, the materials I found were not and could not be comprehensive.  
Some data was not obtainable without the use of internet and web-based materials 
due to the fact that the phenomenon took place prior to my research period.  Some 
of my source material may not be as trendy as it once appeared due to the 
inevitable brevity of commercial consumables, yet my discussions mark the 
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Literature Review 
 
A visual culture perspective 
With a research focus on Cultural Revolution imagery, this thesis is a study of the 
construction of new media and popular culture in everyday life in specific periods 
of time, in specific places.  This is a project that regards Cultural Revolution 
imagery as the focal point in cultural processes through which meaning is made in 
specific cultural contexts.  This perspective is influenced by my reading of Fredric 
Jameson’s work on the idea of the cultural turn. Jameson wrote: 
The very sphere of culture itself has expanded, becoming coterminous with market 
society in such a way that the cultural is no longer limited to its earlier, traditional or 
experimental forms, but it is consumed throughout daily life itself, in shopping, in 
professional activities, in the various often televisual forms of leisure, in production for 
the market and in the consumption of those market products, indeed in the most secret 




Because Cultural Revolution imagery is commodified in Chinese-dominated 
urban culture, Jameson's idea of considering consumerism as contemporary 
culture is useful in analysing the phenomena in this thesis.  The visual culture 
perspective I adopt in this thesis follows Margaret Dikovitskaya’s view on a 
cultural turn in the study of images: 
The cultural turn brought to the study of images a reflection on the complex 
interrelationships between power and knowledge.  Representation began to be studied as 
a structure and process of ideology that produces subject positions… the work of art came 
to be seen as a communicative exchange.  As a result, the concept of autonomy of art was 
replaced by the concept of intertextuality.
90
 
This thesis sees Cultural Revolution imagery as visual representation which is 
embedded in cultural practices and closely related to the formation of subject 
positions, identifications and cultural identities across locations.  Dikovitskaya’s 
book Visual Culture: The Study of the Visual after the Cultural Turn is useful in 
clarifying the inherent nature of visual culture as an interdisciplinary field of study.  
                                            
89Fredric Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983-1998 (London Verso, 
1998), 111. 
 
90 Margaret Dikovitskaya, Visual Culture: the study of the visual after the cultural turn (Cambridge and 
London: The MIT Press, 2005), 48-49. 
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For example, Janet Wolff argues that the textual analysis of the visual is better 
integrated with sociological analysis:
91
 
parallel experience and parallel dissatisfaction with two traditions: first, a sociological 
tradition that looks at cultural institutions and cultural processes but never pays attention 
to the text … and which is agnostic about aesthetic question; and second, textual analysis 
mainly in the humanities, which for the most part pays no attention to institutions and 
social processes, but concentrates on readings – however interesting but nonetheless just 
readings – of texts and images.  My argument has been that the best kind of work in 
visual studies manages to do both of those things and to integrate them.
92
 
Wolff's proposal for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the visual is 
useful in my research because the meaning of Cultural Revolution imagery, I 
argue, does not fully emerge on its own but only when differences are identified 
in cultural practices by people from different cultural backgrounds.  As 
Dikovitskaya further explains: 
Visual culture – the study of representations – pays close attention to the image but uses 
theories developed in the humanities and the social sciences to address the complex ways 
in which meanings are produced and circulated in specific social context.
93
 
The reason why I use both a semiotic approach as well as cultural and critical 
theories to analyse Cultural Revolution imagery is mainly to engage with the 
complexities involved in the circulation of images in different times and spaces 
which are historical and cultural specific.  Its circulation in new popular cultural 
forms such as mobile phone pictures, lifestyle products and themed commercial 
spaces are all specific social spaces in particular locations.  Thus, in this sense, 
these commercial Cultural Revolution products, in a context a few decades after 
they were originally produced, can be considered as new cultural formations 
which mark not only the transformation of visual meanings but also socio-
economic transformation today.  As Dikovitskaya writes: 
The object-based theory of material culture posits that artefacts are primary data for the 
study of culture and that they should be used as evidence rather than illustrations; it thus 
deals with objects such as pieces of furniture because they have symbolic meaning or 
                                            
91 Janet Wolff is the director of the Rochester Visual and Cultural Studies Programme (1991-2001), the 
associate dean of the School of the Arts at Columbia University (2001-2005) and currently the Professor 
at Centre for Interdisciplinary Research in the Arts, University of Manchester (2006 – present). 
 
92 Dikovitskaya, Visual Culture: the study of the visual after the cultural turn , 276-277. 
 
93 Ibid. , 53. 
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symbolic capital in the antebellum United States… Visual culture pays special attention 
to the study of modern manufactured goods (thus distinguishing itself from art history).
94
 
It is important to note that the circulation of Cultural Revolution imagery as a 
commercial product is such a complex phenomenon which is closely related not 
only to regional socio-cultural practices but also to differences within these 
practices.  Through analyzing a similar set of images which are appear in different 
kinds of practices across locations, contemporary relations and tensions between 
the PRC, Hong Kong and Singapore can be explored.  W.J.T. Mitchell posited 
that visual culture is about the social formation of the visual field, or visual 
sociality: 
Society as designating the whole realm of relations among persons, classes, groupings, 
i.e., so-called face-to-face relations, or immediate relations.  Culture is the structure of 
symbols, images, and mediations that make a society possible...society consists in the 
relations among people, culture the whole set of mediations that makes those relations 
possible - or (equally important) impossible.  Visual culture is what makes possible a 
society of people with eyes.
95
 
These relations between peoples and groups in the consumption of images are 
mediated heavily by new technologies.  For example, using a mobile phone to text 
a Cultural Revolution picture, which used to be disseminated by physically 
travelling with political posters between different locations, makes circulation of 
the same imagery much quicker than ever before.  Designers from Singapore went 
to China to research and gather revolutionary relics, and then reproduced them as 
digital images.  Walter Benjamin's conclusion in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’ is about the change in the perceptions of people living 
through the historical and cultural transformations of the past century.
96
  Thus, 
following Dikovitskaya, my study of the visual pays attention to how images are 
embedded in the contemporary use of technologies, how it is integrated in daily 
practice and how culture and relations between people are mediated:  
[t]he latest developments in digital technology caused the immense cultural changes 
throughout the world that earned the visual a pre-eminent place in our everyday life.  This 
explains visual culture’s preoccupation with analysis of events in which the consumer 
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interacts with visual technologies in search of pleasure, information, or other 
edification…visual culture needs to position itself as a critical study of the genealogy and 
condition of the global culture of visuality.  Globalization in its various forms – global 
TV channels and programs, global visual infrastructures such as cable and satellite, and 
the World Wide Web - is one of the key features of our lives.
97
 
Thus, by using a visual culture perspective, this thesis  
stresses the importance of contemporary visual technologies.  It sheds light on those 
things that were noticed only in passing in the standard histories of culture but which had 
an enormous impact on our current condition.  This new historiography requires an 
interdisciplinary methodology, one that has developed through its reflection on objects 
falling between the cracks of compartmentalized disciplines and through its use of cross-
fertilizing technologies that originated in discrete research areas.
98
 
However contemporary it is, the meaning of the Cultural Revolution imagery in 
21st century popular culture is a result of meanings shaped by previous 
experiences accumulated across the years.  Using the Hong Kong case as example, 
it is neither the historical nor the contemporary meaning that completes the 
meaning of Cultural Revolution imagery, but instead, the images become 
meaningful through both their historical references and their relevance to current 




[f]or me, this is what visual culture is all about: how these different notions of power and 
knowledge change across different strategies of visualization and expression, and how 
they are imbricated with one another in different complex ways in different, relatively 
distinct, historical eras.  This phenomenon is not peculiar to twentieth-century culture; I 
don’t think the audiovisual culture of the twentieth century can be made sense of without 
contrasting it with what came before.
100
 
To gather the above points from a visual culture perspective, my study of Cultural 
Revolution imagery provides a close examination of the visual, including both 
images and artefacts, and looks at how it has been integrated within the cultural 
practices of different societies in different historical moments.  In an era 
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significantly influenced by the role of new technologies in daily life, it pays 
attention to the impact of technologies in mediating visual experience. 
 
Chinese modernization and postmodernism 
Rapid changes in China after Mao's death had a direct impact on research, and 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s emphasis has been placed almost exclusively 
on understanding the most recent conditions in China.  However, as my research 
reveals, traces of the culture of the Cultural Revolution have never been 
completely removed from Chinese societies.  Using mobile phone pictures as an 
example, political pictures produced during the Cultural Revolution are still 
circulated in current Chinese urban popular culture.  With this, I argue that the 
study of the Cultural Revolution is by no means irrelevant to understanding the 
changes in China in the 21
st
 century.  While the major themes of political posters 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) – smashing the old and establishing 
the new as well as modernising the country – are evident in today’s China (for 
example Beijing's cityscape is now dominated by high-rise new buildings 
designed by foreign world-renowned architects after traditional hutong villages 
are demolished), I argue that the study of the culture and practices of the Cultural 
Revolution is highly significant in the study of contemporary China, in which 
apparent social and economic changes are the results of the party's principles over 
a long period of time.   
Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, Andrew Walder, in ‘The Chinese 
Cultural Revolution as History: An Introduction’, point out that research on has 
shifted dramatically over time largely due to changes in China.  The authors point 
out that the landscape for the research on the Cultural Revolution has shifted 
dramatically.
101
  The series of radical political campaigns that started around the 
mid-1960s, had an strong effect on the scholarship about China.
102
  However, the 
study of the Cultural Revolution no longer holds such prominence in 
contemporary studies of China: 
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For more than a decade [the Cultural Revolution] was the most topical of subjects, highly 
relevant to questions about the nation’s current condition and future prospects.  But after 
Mao’s death China’s unfolding transformation redirected the attention of the field: first to 
the tumultuous events from the Democracy Wall movement of 1978 to Tiananmen 
Square in 1989, and then to the accelerating economic and social transformation of China 
into the present country.
103
 
One of the features of the new scholarship on the Cultural Revolution in the post-
Mao era is ‘the relentless demand for a present-centred kind of “relevance”: the 
need to understand where China is today and where it will likely go in the 
future.’
104
  This approach to contemporary Chinese studies makes the study of the 
Cultural Revolution less relevant because 
China has changed so rapidly that events even a few decades old soon appear irrelevant to 
the present.  Leadership splits and manoeuvrings in the late Mao period seemed 
increasingly arcane in a rapidly unfolding political scene under Deng Xiaoping and his 
successors, with most of the principals long since imprisoned or dead.  The subject 
seemed even more remote in the post-Deng, post-Jiang era.
105
 
Although dramatic transformations have clearly occurred in China, a similar set of 
aims can be seen to explain both the changes that took place during the Cultural 
Revolution and in the post-Mao era.  
One obvious example of such a continuity is the goal of modernizing 
China.  Coak Barnett and Ralph Clough point out that the post-Mao reforms are 
developed on policies previously established: 
The drive to achieve “Four Modernizations” by the end of this century calls for far-
reaching changes in China’s agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and 
technology.  Zhou Enlai first articulated the general goal of modernizing China in these 
four areas in the mid-1960s and then again in the mid-1970s, but opposition from China's 
radicals prevented any basic policy shifts until after Mao's death.  Major changes began 
when Deng Xiaoping emerged as the dominant figure in China’s leadership in late 1978; 
the introduction of sweeping reform policies accelerated thereafter, especially after Deng 
had consolidated his political position during the period 1978-1981; and these reforms 
have been steadily broadened ever since then.
106
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These authors point out that these reforms after 1978 were well-rooted in the 
earlier periods before and during the Cultural Revolution, but in the present era 
these former policies continue with a shift in focus.  That is, the set of policies 
used to be based on revolutionary struggle and ideological transformation during 
the Cultural Revolution, but now political stability and economic development 
have become the priorities.
107
  In his essay published in 1988, Denis Fred Simon 
points to the long standing determination in China to modernize which was 
expected to keep going until the 21st century. It is worth quoting Simon here at 
length: 
Faced with the reality of a backward and generally inefficient domestic science and 
technology (S&T) system, leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been 
engaged in an all-out effort to restructure their research sector and to modernize 
indigenous S&T capabilities.  This effort, which actually has its roots in the 1956 
Twelve-Year Science and Technology Plan formulated under the direction of former 
Premier Zhou Enlai and Marshall Nie Rongzhen, has undergone a number of significant 
changes in focus and direction since its resurgence in early 1978.  Nonetheless, a number 
of themes have remained constant, the most outstanding one being the drive to improve 
the links between research and production.  The Chinese leadership recognizes that 
without significant contributions by the S&T sector to industry, agriculture, and national 
defence, it will be hard to sustain the long-term momentum of their modernization 
program and difficult to attain their goal of quadrupling the gross value of industrial and 
agricultural output by the year 2000.
108
 
By acknowledging both changes and continuities, and the visual traces of the 
culture of the Cultural Revolution, I argue that the China of the 21st century 
cannot be understood without connecting it to aspects of the Cultural Revolution, 
and even earlier.   
 
Postcolonial hybridity and cultural identity 
Postmodernism is another area closely related to the current research.  The 
features of postmodern culture could be summarised as ‘the blurring and collapse 
of the traditional boundaries between culture and art, high and low culture, 
                                            
107 Ibid.  
 
108 Denis Fred Simon, "The Evolving Role of Reform in China's S&T System: A Critical Assessment" in 
Changes and Continuities in Chinese Communism: Volume II: The Economy, Society, and Technology, ed. 
Yu-ming Shaw (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), 244. 
 
Chapter Two 
 - 57 - 
commerce and art, culture and commerce.’
109
  The cultural products and 
phenomena studied in this research are in some respects marked by these features.  
For example, the prevalence of popular culture and the intense commodification 
of culture in Hong Kong has meant that the distinction between high and low 
culture is no longer viable.  The auctioning of Chinese contemporary art in Hong 
Kong since 2004 is a good example of illustrating the collapse of the boundary 
between commerce and art.  But what is an even more useful concept from 
postmodernist theory for this research is the notion of historical blurring.  With 
this, Chinese revolutionary commodities in the 2000s in China, Hong Kong and 
Singapore could be seen as the rearrangement and juxtaposition of signs, 
previously isolated, to produce new cultural meanings in the present.   
A characteristic of postmodern culture is a ‘self-conscious intertextuality’ 
which refers to the ‘cultural self-consciousness about the history and functions of 
cultural products’.
110
  This idea challenges Jean Baudrillard’s notion of a 
‘superficial’ postmodern culture in which only the sign has an exchange value, 
while the value of a commodity is determined not by its use-value but signs.  The 
examples of new popular cultural products that I examine (i.e. digital mobile 
phone pictures, lifestyle products like note pads and underpants, theme restaurants) 
show how Cultural Revolution imagery is now detached from its original framing 
(e.g. Chinese political posters from the 1960s) and transferred to various kinds of 
contemporary cultural forms in which traces of history are also transferred and 
borrowed in the 21
st
 century.   
Though he sees postmodernism as implicated in the loss of historical 
understanding, Jameson points us to the historical reality in postmodern culture 
which represents a cultural style of late capitalism in a new global space.
111
  I 
work with Jameson’s idea to question the extent to which the process of meaning 
making in the contemporary juxtaposition of Chinese revolutionary imagery 
involved historical understanding.  For example, in Chapter Four, I discuss an 
example of a note book product called ‘The Little Red (Note) Book’.  In an 
advertisement of this note book product, a typical Cultural Revolution image of 
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the Red Guard has been altered to depict a recent demonstration in Hong Kong 
which protested against the legislation of Article 23 of Basic Law which could 
result in losing the freedom of expression.  In this way, the past and present were 
at the same time represented by a single image, which was ‘double-coded’.
112
  
More significantly, the image of the Red Guards demonstration not only signified 
the history of China, but also the present in Hong Kong.  There might be the 
common elements, i.e. the similarities between the Red Guard movements and the 
Hong Kong march, and the particular context in post-1997 Hong Kong that made 
the image cultural specifically meaningful.  I argue that the Red Guard image used 
in the Hong Kong stationary product, in that particular context, is not simply 
superficial pastiche.  Instead, the specific meaning of the mass movement 
represented by the Red Guard image does correspond to the current social issue.   
In this sense, I reject the Baudrillardian version of a superficial, depthless 
postmodernism.  Instead, I see the consumer as creative in that the rearrangement 
of existing elements, previously unconnected or connected, in postmodern culture 
involve active creativity in the process of selection and recombination into new 
meanings.  Here the producer of the note book product was himself a creative 
reader of the image of Red Guard.  My view parallels Linda Hutcheon’s 
suggestion that postmodernism ‘takes the form of a self-conscious, self-
contradictory, self-undermining statement which commits to ‘doubleness’ or 
‘duplicity’.
113
  I took Hutcheon’s view on historical consciousness which implies 
an active engagement and a ‘self-reflexivity’
114
 with other cultural codes in search 
of ‘self-contradictory’ differences with others. 
The study of the ‘new’ meaning of Chinese political posters and imagery 
in Asian Chinese cities also makes the colonial history and postcolonial culture of 
Hong Kong and Singapore relevant.  As mentioned earlier, the British colonial 
governments introduced a capitalist system underpinned by a commodity logic 
which created differences from mainland China.  To borrow the concept of 
hybridity, the British colonial past produced cultural mixing, increased boundary 
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crossing and the emergence of new forms of identities.
115
  But as the current study 
shows, this kind of mixing and crossing was not the same as the elimination of 
cultural boundaries.  More importantly, cultural differences and similarities were 
reflected in local cultural practices.  
In Hong Kong and Singapore, these differences in relation to mainland 
Chinese culture had been established for decades under different political and 
economic systems.  Thus, a ‘Cultural Revolution’ theme in the postcolonial 
popular culture of Hong Kong and Singapore was itself a hybridity.  The product 
drew not only on representations of the past and present, but also on an ethnic 
‘other’ through which contradictory feelings and cultural difference were 
constructed.  However, I argue that this did not simply refer to, in Edward Said’s 
terminology, the binary positionings of self/other, past/present, 
capitalist/communist indicated in the positional superiority and hegemony of the 
postcolonial/capitalist difference.
116
  Instead, I argue that this question of cultural 
differences between Hong Kong/Singapore and China at the turn of the 21
st
 
century is a key component in new identity formation.  In the rearrangement and 
juxtaposition of the signifier of China’s past (which also signifies China’s present) 
in its local urban cultures, it is both an engagement and disengagement at the 
same time, and producing a self-consciousness of cultural difference.  The ‘Mao’ 
restaurants in Singapore, for example, could be seen as a popular cultural form 
which constructed a new form of identity forged by a shared concern for a closer 
relationship after the 1997 economic crisis.   
Hong Kong Chinese have developed their own hybrid cultural forms along 
with political and cultural discourses of ‘Hong Kong as a British Colony’ before 
1997 and ‘HKSAR of China’ after 1997.  In some circumstances it involved an 
identification with ‘Westernness’, and at other times with aspects of Chinese 
culture. The year of 1997 and 2003 opened up ambiguities and insecurities around 
those points of identification.  Since 1997, Hong Kong is no longer a British 
colony while the legacy of British colonialism remains.  The Basic Law, which 
was drafted by the Chinese and British governments, became the constitutional 
document of post-1997 Hong Kong.  In the pursuit of economic growth, Hong 
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Kong could have gradually identified more with a Hong Kong Chinese identity.  
However, in 2003, the Article 23 incident shook the confidence of people in Hong 
Kong regarding their democratic safeguards.  On the one hand, some Hong Kong 
Chinese identified with China as a legitimate motherland; on the other hand, they 
wanted to remain within the boundaries of Hong Kongness, the place of their birth 
and upbringing within a British political system which allowed a certain degree of 
democracy.  This shifting allegiance was forged strategically, and was further 
complicated by cultural differences particularly among young Hong Kong 
Chinese.  My work looks at the role of Cultural Revolution imagery in Hong 
Kong as the available source and site through which the practices of switching 
identification between Hong Kong and mainland cultures was marked.  Under 
certain conditions Hong Kong people might identify themselves with mainland 
Chineseness and argue that Hong Kong was legitimately a part of China.  Yet in 
the context of a discussion about democracy, they might speak from the position 
of Hong Kong as being protected by Basic Law agreed by China and the United 
Kingdom, and argue against the lack of human rights in China.  My Hong Kong 
example particularly shows the capability of persons to move across discursive 
and spatial sites of activity which address them in different ways:  
 mainland Chinese imagery from 1967 as a metaphor for the Hong Kong 
demonstration in 2003,  
 the commodity highlights the way Hong Kong as a capitalist society is 
organized according to a dominant mode of production centred on 
commodification and the pursuit of profit. 
In this context, the social position of the Hong Kong Chinese in the post-1997 
context has particular significance.  They are arguably ‘special’ by virtue of living 
across cultural boundaries between capitalism and communism, and yet within the 
boundary divisions are blurred by the hybrid nature of the Basic Law which was a 
combination of both the Chinese and British ways.  The contradictory subject 
positions in Hong Kong are the outcome of the proliferation of discursive 
resources stemming from different conventions, sites and practices that are in 
contradiction with each other. (i.e. Cultural Revolution imagery, the Cultural 
Revolution demonstration, British tolerance of demonstration) 
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As Homi Bhabha suggests, all cultures are zones of shifting boundaries 
and hybridization, which are never fixed.
117
  Also, engaging with Hall’s argument, 
popular culture is a site of consent and resistance in the struggle over cultural 
meanings and a site where cultural hegemony is secured or challenged.
118
  Here I 
use the concept of hybridity specifically as a device to capture cultural changes by 
way of a temporary stabilization of cultural categories.  This is a strategic identity 
constructed in the site of popular culture and urban consumption culture.  In 
cultural studies, there is an exploration of how people turn mundane products into 
popular culture serving their interests.  To integrate these viewpoints, I understand 
the examples discussed in the following chapters as the outcome of an interplay 
between different forces which include the changing relationships between China, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, economic concerns, social hopes and a political 
awareness. 
I will now summarise some crucial points which constitute the 
methodology of this thesis.  The concept of articulation refers to the form of 
connection that can make a ‘unity’ of two different elements under certain 
conditions.  It is the linkage which is not necessary determined, absolute and 
essential for all time.  My thesis is about the unique ‘unity’ of Chinese 
revolutionary imagery and practices of consumption which was ‘put together’ in 
Chinese-dominated cities/state in a specific context (i.e. at the turn of the 21
st
 
century).  The linkage between the imagery and the practices was not necessary in 
the sense that any kind of imagery could have been used in mundane commodities 
such as restaurant decoration, postcards, notebooks, etc.  Chinese revolutionary 
imagery was used as a representation of China.  In what circumstances could such 
connections be forged when the articulation of Cultural Revolution imagery could 
be re-articulated in a wide range of ways?  The examples in my work show how 
Cultural Revolution imagery was articulated uniquely in different Chinese-
dominated regions which were somehow overlapping with each other.  These 
were specific, historical ‘articulations’ of a particular set of Cultural Revolution 
imagery.  Why did those images emerge in those locations during a specific 
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period of time and how were the respective practices unique?  How were various 
contingent practices ‘put together’ through the operation of power? 
 
Communist images in capitalist cultures 
Although some postmodern theorists suggest a loss of historical understanding in 
postmodern culture, I reject this pessimistic view because drawing on previously 
unconnected cultural codes does not rule out the potential of a historical 
understanding.  More importantly, even if an historical understanding does not 
concern a certain group, the use of imagery of the past still produces a potential 
impact on those who have lived through that particular past.  I argue that the 
‘unity’ of Cultural Revolution imagery and previously unconnected cultures was 
not totally arbitrary in the sense that the Cultural Revolution imagery did have 
fixed meanings and historical uses (i.e. the spread of the imagery in colonial Hong 
Kong and Singapore and the continual cultural meaning of Mao as the founder of 
the PRC).  It was a practice in which the meaning-making process was based on a 
productive tension: the previous ‘inferior’, non-capitalist China (as symbolised by 
Cultural Revolution imagery) was now reconstructed as being integrated in a 
capitalist consumer culture, while China retained its one-party rule of the Chinese 
communist party. In this way ‘Chinese communism’ was put under ‘erasure’ 
which was at one and the same time useful, necessary, inaccurate and mistaken in 
the diasporic Hong Kong and Singaporean cultures.  
What has been discussed here concerns the understanding of Chinese 
revolutionary imagery in Hong Kong and Singaporean commercial popular 
cultural products as unique, historically specific articulations of meanings which 
reflect cultural difference.  But what was the place of the ‘new’ circulation of this 
imagery in urban China?  Some may propose that this would be less complicated 
than the Hong Kong or Singaporean phenomena.  But I argue that the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ trend in mainland Chinese urban culture was not less problematic.  
Barmé has discussed in detail about a nationwide revival of interest in Mao 
Zedong’s words and images in China since the late 1980s.
119
  The keyword 
‘revival’ implies that there were two separate sets of historically specific practices 
of those words and images.  The first took place in the original context in China 
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between the 1960s and 1970s when a variety of cultural forms were produced to 
promote and consolidate the political agenda of the ruling party, the Chinese 
Communist Party.  During this period, culture in China (from pictorial art, films, 
performing art, music to daily objects including vases and calendars) was visually 
dominated by images of Mao Zedong, the Red Guards, the People’s Liberation 
Army and other key social groups such as the peasants and workers.  Most of 
these visual images were given taglines either to mobilise the people of the whole 
country with specific common goals, for example, ‘Industry learns from Daqing, 
agriculture learns from Dazhai’ (Gongye xue Daqing, Nongye xue DaZhai) and 
‘Smash the Old Four’ (po Sijiu); or to provide generic nationalistic slogans, like 
‘Serving the people’ (wei renmin fuwu), in order to maintain social stability.  
Among the various forms, the role of the pictorial art on posters was particularly 
significant.  The posters themselves were temporary articulations of meaning 
through which the relationship between the people and the party/country was 
constituted and maintained, and social practice was regulated.  Posters were the 
easiest form of Chinese political art that could be physically obtained when 
movies or performing arts were constrained by the availability of cinematique or 
theatre.   
Barmé’s idea of a revival of Mao Zedong’s words and image refers to the 
‘non-official’, ‘spontaneous’ and ‘mercantile’ use Mao Zedong’s image and 
famous slogans in the 1990s.
120
  Mao Zedong’s image and other revolutionary 
images were repetitively reproduced in consumer objects.  Barmé points out that 
this practice ‘capitalized on China’s new teeny-bopper and youth culture market’ 
in which ‘consumers of Mao products were adolescents or people in their early 
twenties who were unfamiliar with the Mao era’.
121
  The ‘unbridgeable gaps’ 
between the old and young generations implied an inevitable difference in the 
interpretation of Chinese Revolutionary imagery.  As Evans and Donald point out:   
[l]ooking at the posters now, three decades or so after their production, evokes a range of 
contradictory responses.  For many people who lived through the experiences graphically 
represented in the posters, these images are harrowing reminders of a painful past.  
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Although revolutionary representations often seem to be forgiven the specificities of 
history…such images can have horrific resonances.
122
 
In this sense the images of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolutionary era could 
have two major cultural meanings in the urban Chinese context of the 1980s.  The 
first is that the images might arouse ‘horrific resonances’ for those who lived 
through the ‘Mao’ years.  The second is that the images might be attractive signs 
for consumption.  As Tao argues, this kind of commodification of revolutionary 
culture/discourse is an aspect of the ‘Chinese postmodern condition’ because 
‘there are no clear distinctions between modern culture and traditional, 
revolutionary culture and commercial culture’ in the commercialized 
revolutionary culture.
123
  Tao regards this kind of cultural practice as a mark of an 
historical blurring of a postmodern culture, and adopts the view that postmodern 
culture is marked by a collapse of traditional boundaries between culture and art, 
high and low culture, commerce and art, and culture and commerce.
124
  However, 
the use of the term ‘postmodern’ to describe China’s situation since 1990s is not 
without criticism.   Dirlik and Zhang point out that the uneven economic, social 
and political development in China makes the use of the term ‘postmodern’ only 
applicable to a limited sector of society.
 125
  Instead, Dirlik and Zhang describe 
that China is marked by ‘the coexistence of the precapitalist, the capitalist, and the 
postsocialist economic, political and social forms represents a significant 
departure from the assumptions of a Chinese modernity, embodied above all in 
the socialist revolutionary project.’
126
  Dirlik and Zhang point out that ‘the 
unevenness of regional development in China’ is reconfigured by ‘the 
incorporation of China into a global economy which both nourishes and generates 
differences on the same national terrain’.
127
  Due to the uneven distribution of 
resources, I argue that these ‘differences’ lead to an identification of an urban 
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Chinese identity which is marked by commodity culture and rising economic 
prosperity.  On the one hand, there is a contradiction between the urban and rural 
identities in China.  On the other hand, as Dirlik and Zhang continue, there are 
contestations and contradictions between different Chinese identities around the 
world, i.e. not only the PRC, Taiwan and Singapore but also the stateless Chinese 
ethnicities encompassed by the term ‘diaspora’.
128
  What is particularly significant 
is that these contestations and contradictions between the different kinds of 
Chinese were a unique phenomenon since the 1990s when China’s economic 
increased.  Against this background, my research looks at the engagement of 
regional Chinese cultures with mainland Chinese cultural symbols, as well as the 
commodification of these symbols in China through the use of new technologies.   
 
The transferability of Cultural Revolution imagery 
Chinese political posters are usually regarded as a kind of propaganda produced 
by the Chinese Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China.  The primary 
sources used in this thesis are posters of this kind produced in the 1960s and 
1970s.  The use of art for propaganda by the Chinese Communists can be traced 
back in both the resistance movement against the Japanese in the 1920s and 1930s 
as well as the communist revolution against the Kuomintang in the 1940s.  A 
particular emphasis on the use of the visual is due to the fact that there was a large 
illiterate population in the rural areas and the support of this population was the 
key for the communist eventual success.
129
  This art form produced in communist 
China was based on the theoretical basis and principles set out in Mao Zedong’s 
famous “Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” in May 1942.
130
  
These talks set out the major principles for the production of socialist art and 
literature in communist China that were followed until the opening of China in the 
early 1980s.  Mao Zedong laid down the principle that literature and art must 
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‘serve the people’ which was the major reason why he suggested that political art 
must draw on current art forms which were already familiar to the people.
131
  
Political posters produced by the Chinese Communist Party of China are called 
‘xuanchuanhua’ in Chinese which literally means ‘propaganda picture’.  Gittings 
provides a detailed account of the nature and function of Chinese political posters 
in the People’s Republic of China: 
The term xuanchuanhua was appropriated to describe the new mass-produced 
propaganda posters only after 1949. Many were specially composed to suit the new 
medium, but posters continued to reproduce compositions originally designed in one of 
the other forms, particularly modern-style New Year prints and the popular illustrated 
strips that are also available in smaller book-form versions. Propaganda posters are also 
known as "placard pictures" (zhaotiehua), meaning a picture that seeks attention and is 
attached to some object -- an apt description for posters designed to be pinned or glued to 
walls.
132 
As Gittings points out, Chinese political posters were a unique art form because 
they transformed traditional art forms such as New Year prints, cartoons, 
woodblock prints, etc.  The name in Chinese implies not only the function to 
‘propagate’ but also the social practice of producing posters and putting them on 
walls.  Thus, the meaning of Chinese political posters was also defined in relation 
to the specific social practice in its original context.  As Gittings points out, 
Chinese posters and similar art forms during the era of the Chinese Revolution 
were closely related to current political and social themes which often had a short 
life span and therefore could be dated with precision.
133
  Gittings gives examples 
such as a poster bearing the slogan ‘Chairman Mao is the reddest reddest red sun 
in our hearts’ which belongs to the period between 1966 and 1967, and posters 
with the theme of foreign struggle referring to the Hong Kong riots (Our victory is 
certain, so is defeat for the Hong Kong British [Women bi sheng, Gang Ying bi 
bai]) which also dates from these years.
134
 (Figure 36) 
Since Chinese political posters have often been regarded as pure 
propaganda, it makes a discussion on the definition of the term ‘propaganda’ 
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necessary.  Randal Marlin argues that the definition of the term ‘propaganda’ is 
not settled and there are many definitions.
135
  As Marlin writes: 
There are many definitions, explicit and implicit, of the term “propaganda”.  In some 
ways the term has been discredited for serious analytical purposes, but it continues to be 
part of the arsenal in wars of words.  It is common to identify an opponent’s 
communications as propaganda, while maintaining that only one’s own side is telling the 
truth.  There is a strong association, in English-speaking countries, between the word 
“propaganda” and the idea of lying or deception…In Latin countries, where 
“propaganda” means advertising, the word has no negative associations, although it is, of 
course, likely to be affected in time by one’s perceptions of what is 
propagated…Politicians and bureaucrats generally avoid using the term to describe their 
own activities, tending to reserve it for those of their opponents, although the difference 
may not be perceptible to an unbiased third party.
136
  
For this reason, this thesis prefers the use of the term ‘Chinese political posters’ 
instead of ‘Chinese propaganda posters’ to avoid the unnecessary negative 
connotation when I refer to the original artefacts.
137
  However, a more significant 
point can be made beyond this discussion: Cultural Revolution imagery is now 
detached, removed and thus transfer from one medium to another.  When I refer to  
the original artefacts as political posters, this is to emphasise the physical form of 
Cultural Revolution imagery during specific historical moments (i.e. the 1960s 
and 1970s).  Furthermore, as my research reveals, mobile phone pictures, lifestyle 
products and theme restaurants are all new cultural forms which use the same 
imagery which is edited in various ways.  The following chapters provide detailed 
accounts of the historical backgrounds of specific locations (i.e. China, Hong 
Kong and Singapore) and the new cultural forms and practices of Cultural 
Revolution imagery.  With these I argue that the contemporary (re)emergence of 
Cultural Revolution imagery evidences how Cultural Revolution imagery is itself 
an entity which exists on its own terms.  As my research reveals, Cultural 
Revolution imagery can be flexibly transferred to different physical and virtual 
forms and its meaning varies according to cultural contexts, local practices which 
are shaped by historical backgrounds of respective locations.  It is the 
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transferability of Cultural Revolution imagery which continues to play a role in 
mass communication in contemporary urban popular culture. 
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Chapter Three 
Cultural Revolution imagery as mobile phone text pictures: 





‘Whether or not the numerous problems confronting our economic construction can be 
effectively resolved depends on whether or not major breakthroughs can be achieved in 
scientific and technological areas.  Similarly whether or not our economic development 
can keep forging ahead also depends on the most profound source of stamina, namely 
scientific and technological development.’
138
 
(Premier Zhao Ziyang, March 1986) 
 
‘We should … recognise the tremendous power of information technology and vigorously 
promote its development. The melding of the traditional economy and information 
technology will provide the engine for the development of the economy and society in the 
21st century.’
139
   




In 2008, the Beijing Olympics commenced with an opening ceremony marked by 
the spectacular use of high technologies.   Massive digital screens and projectors, 
fireworks, and other audiovisual technologies were widely used to celebrate the 
fulfilment of a dream that China aspired to for a hundred years (bainian 
mengyuan).
140
  This chapter explores the newly emergent phenomenon of mobile 
phone picture messaging with a specific focus on the digital reproduction and 
appropriation of Cultural Revolution imagery by commercial dotcom enterprises.  
                                            
138  "Zhao Ziyang Delivers Work Report at NPC Opening (Four Session of the Sixth National People's 
Congress, March 25, 1986) , The PRC,"  (Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 1986)., K1-28. 
 
139 Jiang Zemin in a speech at the World Computer Congress 2000 in Beijing, quoted after A. Lin Neumann, 
The Great Firewall (Committee to Protect Journalist,  2001 [cited 12 December 2009]); available from 
http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2001/China_jan01/China_jan01.html. 
 
140 Xue Li, Bainian mengyuen zhe yi tian (The Day that China's 100-year Dream Has Come True) [Online] 
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It is a phenomenon which has become more socially prevalent since 2004, if not 
earlier, at a time when mobile phones were becoming more affordable to urban 
middle-class educated consumers.  It discusses how Cultural Revolution imagery 
re-enters mass consumption three decades or more after its original production in 
the form of political posters.   
Using technology to modernise the country is not exclusive to the post-
Mao era.  In 1963 Zhou Enlai already called for scientists to realise ‘the Four 
Modernizations’ at the Conference on Scientific and Technological Work held in 
Shanghai. The People's Republic of China has always considered technology as 
the key to achieve modernisation, social development and economic growth.
141
   
The general goal of modernizing China was articulated twice by Zhou Enlai, the 
first Premier of the People’s Republic of China, first in the mid-1960s and again 
in the mid-1970s respectively.
142
  As manifested in many posters produced in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the future of China has always been visualised in 
scenarios featuring sophisticated machinery and computers, spurring great 
infrastructure and high productivity.  (Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3) Even in the 
post-Mao era, the goal of modernizing China has remained unchanged with the 
continual promotion of the development of new technologies.
143
  Against this 
background, the 1990s has seen the Chinese government’s particular support and 
promotion of the development and social use of internet and mobile 
telecommunication technologies.  Thus, the more prevalent social use of the 
internet and mobile phone in today's China is an outcome of the Chinese 
Communist Party's long-term goal of modernising China.  In other words, the 
newly emergent practice of mobile phone message ‘texting’ and sending digital 
                                            
141 The development of technology and plans of modernization during Mao’s era were complicated by the 
changing relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s.  The focus of this 
chapter is not on whether or not technological developments were successfully implemented, but rather on  
the early Sino-Soviet collaboration in the development of science and technology in the PRC in the 1950s. 
The vision to use technology to modernise China has already become apparent to some important CCP 
members.  See Yuan-li Wu's "Economic Reform and Foreign Economic Relations: Systemic Conflicts in a 
Theoretical Framework"in Changes and Continuities in Chinese Communism: Volume II: The Economy, 
Society, and Technology, ed. Yu-ming  Shaw (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988), 188-229; also 
read A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough, "Introduction"in Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and 
Development, ed. A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986), 1-
12. 
 
142Barnett and Clough, "Introduction" , 1. 
 
143 According to Barnet and Clough, Deng Xiaoping recognised the importance of encouraging intellectuals’ 
creativity and mobilizing their talents, especially China’s scientific and technical experts, to support 
China’s modernization.  See Ibid. ,7. 
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picture messages is a phenomenon through which Chinese modernization in the 
21
st
 century can be understood.  Text messaging, also known as ‘texting’, refers to 




Some of these mobile phone pictures, which are produced by corporations 
as virtual consumables, are adaptations of political pictures that were prevalent 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  This kind of ‘high tech’ borrowing, 
recycling and consumption of the culture of the revolutionary past is significant 
not only for understanding 21
st
 century China.  More significantly, it offers a 
window of opportunity to investigate the nature of the Chinese revolution based 
on an obsession with ‘modernisation’, which has always been the national goal of 
the People’s Republic of China. This phenomenon seems contradictory to the 
post-Mao era Chinese Communist Party's renunciation of the destruction caused 
by the radical Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976.
145
  In addition, 
socially speaking, the Cultural Revolution has been, and still is, a taboo not to be 
openly discussed.  In this sense, the recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery in 
the form of mobile phone picture messages is a complex and seemingly 
contradictory phenomenon in 21st century China.  It is an outcome of new 
technological developments that have been encouraged by the Chinese 
Communist Party.  Yet mobile phone text messaging helps circulate the visual 
culture of a past denounced and suppressed by the authorities.   
This chapter considers this contemporary recurrence and circulation of 
Cultural Revolution imagery as a mass culture, which is in many ways similar to 
the mass consumption of political images and sloganised culture during the 
Cultural Revolution, particularly during the historical moments when young Red 
Guards were enthusiastically engaging in activities in relation to the production, 
display and consumption of political posters.  At the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966 countless posters were produced to disseminate political 
campaigns which appealed to a predominantly young audience.  Some thirty years 
                                            
144 While ‘text messaging’ usually refers to messages sent using the Short Message Service (SMS), this 
technology has been extended to include messages containing image, video and sound content (known as 
MMS messages). Written messages are referred to as ‘text messages’ and messages containing images are 
usually referred to as ‘picture messages’. 
 
145 After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China turned away from the focus on revolutionary struggle and 
ideological transformation that characterised the Maoist era in favour of political stability and economic 
development.  See Barnett and Clough, "Introduction" , 1. 
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later in the post-2000 era, these pictures are still consumed by the youth of the 
People's Republic of China, but their visual forms and the media are completely 
different.  These digitised Cultural Revolution images, which are usually given 
contemporary taglines, are consumed and exchanged through new media and 
communication technologies.  They are one aspect of a new mass culture using 
telecommunication technology in everyday life and an unprecedented mass 
consumption of the images of the past. 
Mobile phone text messaging, and other kinds of new technologies closely 
linked with the everyday life of many urban Chinese people today, is significant 
for understanding Chinese modernization in the first decade of 21st century.  
Dirlik and Zhang offer a useful lens to understand the mobile phone circulation of 
Cultural Revolution imagery in 21
st
 century in their discussion on postmodernism 
and China, proposing that the ‘coexistence of the precapitalist, the capitalist, and 
the postsocialist economic, political, and social forms represents a significant 
departure from the assumptions of a Chinese modernity embodied in the socialist 
revolutionary project.’
146
  Internet and mobile phone communication networks 
facilitate unprecedented methods of editing, circulating and consuming the 
political art of the revolutionary past, and the interactivity of this technology 
allows users to select people to communicate with, i.e. the user can choose which 
pictures to ‘text’.  This apparent freedom, however, does not mean the user can 
consume any images. Instead, like the political pictures available during Cultural 
Revolution, there is a restricted choice with only a limited range of images that 
the audience is allowed to access.   
This apparent freedom of choice (although within a limited range) creates 
a contemporary notion of a free individual in contemporary Chinese popular 
culture.  The meaning of former revolutionary imagery is no longer the same in a 
new context of 21st century China. The specific political messages written and 
depicted in the original images, such as those that stress ideological struggle and 
class conflict during the Cultural Revolution, are no longer relevant to today’s 
Chinese context.  As well, the ways that people engage with the same set of 
images are different and context-specific.  While officials travelled with political 
posters in order to spread them to different areas, now mobile phone users can 
                                            
146 Dirlik and Zhang, "Introduction: Postmodernism and China" , 3. 
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circulate the same kind of pictures almost immediately.  However, it is important 
to note that certain politically-specific themes from the Cultural Revolution, such 
as themes the political campaigns like 'Smash the Four Old' and 'Up to Mountain, 
Down to Countryside', have been removed from the 21st circulations.
147
  In this 
sense, Cultural Revolution imagery is depoliticised when former political 
messages are removed and their political functions are considered irrelevant in the 
process of visual editing.  For example, the visual depictions of the radical and 
violent Red Guards of the revolutionary past are played down by colloquial, 
humorous taglines in the contemporary post-2000 context.  Cultural Revolution 
imagery is generally categorised by internet dotcom corporations as either 
nationalistic images or humorous pictures used to poke fun. The idea of freedom 
of choice, which creates a way for public access to an essentialised, stereotypical 
culture of the Cultural Revolution, could be a way of feeding the curiosity of the 
young generation about the officially denounced history.  Thus, I argue that this 
seemingly subversive practice and the apparent ‘tolerance’ of the government fits 
very well with the overall goal of the post-Mao reform and development – to 
strive for ‘political stability and economic development through modernisation'.
148
   
While the art of the past remains, its new form as a digitised cultural 
product facilitated by new communication technology, prevalently used in the 
People's Republic of China since the turn of the millennium, radically changes the 
physically printed form in which Cultural Revolution pictures were originally 
produced.  This digitization, and widespread usage of mobile phones, allows the 
transmission of information no longer limited to printed media or physical space; 
as well, online information can be updated quickly and constantly.  However, 
arguably, the increasing prevalence of mobile phones in the People's Republic of 
China also constructs limits in the information that can be accessed.    
As my research reveals, in the rise of consumer culture, Cultural 
Revolution imagery is posited within a practice of commercial entertainment and 
                                            
147  In the early phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1968) one of the stated goals of the political 
campaigns in the People's Republic of China was to bring an end to the ‘Four Olds’ (Si Jiu), which were 
Old customs, Old culture, Old habits and Old ideas.  This was done by physical destruction of historical 
artifacts such as statues of traditional religious figures and books.  After the young Red Guards destroyed 
the cities continuously for two years, they were sent to the countryside so that the cities could be 
reconstructed.  This the movement was called ‘Up to Mountain, Down to Countryside’. 
 
148 Barnett and Clough, "Introduction" , 1. 
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lifestyle.  The producers, which are internet or telecommunication corporations, 
need to make money with their products.  Thus, Cultural Revolution imagery, 
which is well-rooted in Chinese culture and which is more likely to gain a 
sufficiently large audience in order to secure a return on their investments, may 
explain why such kind of imagery is chosen. This commercial motive implies that 
the corporations aim to make Cultural Revolution images into a mainstream mode 
of representation with an appeal to mainstream audiences.  In this way, studying 
mobile phone pictures in China is a good way to explore how the officially 
denounced culture of the past ‘contributes’ to the modernization and economic 
development of China in the present.  
This chapter reveals how Cultural Revolution pictures are ‘essentialised’ 
in new digital forms – the reduction of the culture, image and history of the 
Cultural Revolution to an essential idea of what it means to be contemporary or 
modernised – so that certain core meanings or identities used in Cultural 
Revolution culture are not subject to interpretation in the new era.  Besides, since 
the idea of the Cultural Revolution is produced by the recurrence of a few simple 
characteristics, the Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures discussed in this 
chapter offer one-sided descriptions of Cultural Revolution culture.  These 
pictures are simplified, partial ‘cut-outs’ of the originals which reduce people, 
objects and practices of the past to a limited range of features.  The essentialised,  
stereotypical representation of the Cultural Revolution marginalises alternative 
modes of reading revolutionary history and therefore destabilises the original 
meaning of revolutionary culture and history as a whole.  
To adopt the view that ‘every social practice depends on and relates to 
meaning, and culture is the constitutive condition of that practice’, this cultural 
phenomenon – processed, essentialised and stereotyped Cultural Revolution 
imagery – has significant social and cultural implications in 21
st
 century China’s 
context.
149
  The changing forms and means of consumption of Cultural Revolution 
imagery facilitated by new technology and commercialization, creates an 
unprecedented engagement with Cultural Revolution culture. This constitutes a 
highly essentialised, partial exposure of the Cultural Revolution past through the 
processing of imagery via websites.  I argue that the new cultural form, practice 
                                            
149 Dikovitskaya, Visual Culture: the study of the visual after the cultural turn , 58. 
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and environment suppresses a thorough understanding of what had happened 
during the Cultural Revolution.  Through creating a playful and ‘high tech’ way of 
engaging with Cultural Revolution imagery, the once serious political content 
becomes depoliticised and trivialised.  More significantly, the limited ‘freedom’ 
or ‘choice’ in interacting with former political ‘rebel’ pictures creates a pseudo 
democratic impression when young people are allowed to devote themselves to 
new forms of communication and entertainment.  This cultivates a new sub-
cultural identity in contemporary Chinese urban societies. 
Thus, to sum up, I explore how Cultural Revolution pictures are 
essentialised in a context of a technology-driven consumer culture in China.  This 
is done by analyzing the differences in visual content, captions and forms in 
which the Cultural Revolution imagery was/is produced in different historical 
moments (i.e. the 1960s, 1970s and the 2000s).  I then analyse the contemporary 
meanings of the new version of Cultural Revolution imagery by contextualising 
them in the 21
st
 century urban Chinese context.  With the acknowledgement of the 
role of capitalist corporations in the production of the Cultural Revolution mobile 
phone pictures, a consumption-oriented study might argue that the meanings of 
these pictures depend very much on whether the consumers actively engage with 
the pictures.  However, as my research shows, young Chinese urban individuals 
do actively use Cultural Revolution imagery in 21
st
 century China even outside of 
the commercial context.  This argument is supported by examining the use of 
Cultural Revolution pictures by some young Chinese football fans in the Asian 
Cup held in Beijing in 2004.
150
  
Before my discussion of these issues, it is necessary to give examples of 
the original Cultural Revolution posters produced in the early phase of the 
Cultural Revolution which can be seen reproduced or reworked in mobile phone 
pictures in the post-2000s era.   
 
                                            
150 The Asian Cup, also called AFC Asian Cup, is one of the football competitions organised by the Asian 
Football Confederation (AFC), which is the governing body of Asian football and one of the six 
Confederations making up FIFA.  AFC has 46 Member Associations and these represent more than half of 
the world’s population, in which just India and China have more than 2.5 billion people.  The AFC was 
founded in 1954.  Its headquarter is in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.   
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Youth engagements with Cultural Revolution imagery 
My online research reveals that many Cultural Revolution images in mobile 
phone pictures are based on images from the early phase of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1968).  With the use of editing techniques to ‘cut-out’ parts of 
the original images and replace the original slogans with new ones, Cultural 
Revolution images are reconstructed into a new form of high technological 
entertainment which is closely related to the urban life of the young generation.  
Many mobile phone pictures show certain specific ways that Cultural Revolution 
images engage with new telecommunication technologies and consumer culture.  
First, many of the pictures that originally depicted the radical movements, 
enthusiasm and violence of the young Red Guards are used.  Second, the new 
slogans promote either nationalistic sentiments or individualistic values in daily 
life.  Third, similar to the former Red Guard engagements, the new practice of 
‘texting’ is closely related to contemporary urban everyday life particularly 
among young consumers.  This section compares the new versions in mobile 
phone pictures with the originals, and analyses an aspect of the contemporary 
meanings of Cultural Revolution imagery in Chinese online digital culture. 
 Not all political pictures produced during the Cultural Revolution 
employed the same theme.  One of main themes was about the Red Guard’s 
involvement in political campaigns.  As Gittings point out, political art of the 
Cultural Revolution was closely related to current political and social themes 
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.
151
  With the very short life span of 
artwork due to the constantly changing political agenda, a pattern in artistic styles 
and specific slogans can be identified among the many posters produced during 
the decade.  For example, the political pictures produced in the early phase of the 
Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1968 are characterised by the radical and 
violent destruction of the Red Guard movements.
152
  This period was typified by 
social unrest caused by Red Guards which was deemed to be a way to participate 
in the political campaigns summoned by Chairman Mao Zedong.  The point is that 
Cultural Revolution imagery has been actively experienced by the young 
                                            
151 Gittings, "Excess and Enthusiasm" , 27-46. 
 
152 The destruction of the Red Guards was considered as the engagement of the current political campaigns 
which advocated ‘smashing the Four Olds’ and ‘anti-economism', etc.  See Ibid. , 27-46. 
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generations of different eras (i.e. the 1960s/70s and the 2000s).  These youth 
involvements create specific meanings of Cultural Revolution visual culture as 
youth culture. 
 
Red Guards engagement with posters 
The Red Guards (hongweibing, literally red guarding soldiers) were a group of 
university or tertiary students who pioneered the mass movement which sparked 
off the Cultural Revolution.
 153
  It officially started when large-character posters 
(dazibao) were displayed at Peking University on 25 May 1966. This was 
regarded by Mao Zedong as the first Marxist large-character poster display to 
initiate the revolution.
154
  The Red Guard was organised by a group of teenage 
students from the Middle School attached to Tsinghua University on 29 May 1996, 
followed by other students nationwide.
155
  The movements of the young Red 
Guards were nationwide and radical.  According to Jiang Jiehong’s account: 
[T]he Red Guards searched over ten million homes across the country and confiscated or 
destroyed “old” property, including dynastic calligraphy and paintings, ancient books and 
archives, gold, silver or jade ware and jewellery… Records indicate that there were 6,843 
cultural relics registered in Beijing in 1958 but only 1,921 remained in the 1980s…These 
radical actions of Red Guards soon turned into the “red terror” across the country.  In 





                                            
153  The duration of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, conventionally known as ‘The Cultural 
Revolution’, has been defined in different ways. Early scholars, such as John King Fairbank, The Great 
Chinese Revolution 1800-1985 (London: Harper Perennial, 1987), 317, claimed that the Cultural 
Revolution in the People’s Republic of China took place from late 1965 to April 1969.  Most recent 
scholars, such as Paul Clark, The Chinese Cultural Revolution: a history (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), I, defined the series of socio-political movements in the People’s Republic of 
China between 1966 and 1976 as the Cultural Revolution. In China, Mao Zedong, the first Chairman of 
the Chinese Communist Party, regarded the Cultural Revolution was launched after Yao Wenyuan’s Ping 
Xinbian Lishiju ‘Hai Rui Baguan’ (The Criticism on the New Version of the Historical Play ‘Hai Rui 
Dismissed from Office’) was published in Wenhui Daily on 10 November 1965.  Hua Guofeng, Mao 
Zedong’s successor, declared in the Party’s Eleventh Session in 1977 that the Cultural Revolution ended 
following the smashing of the Gang of Four (Siren Bang).  Cited in Jiang, "Burden or Legacy: From the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution to Contemporary Art" 1-32. 
 
154 Chunming Jin, Wenhua de Geming Shigao (A History of the "Cultural Revolution") (Chengdu: Sichuan 
People Publishing House, 1995), 174. 
 
155 Jiang, "Burden or Legacy: From the Chinese Cultural Revolution to Contemporary Art" , 1-32. 
 
156 Ibid. , 4; Mingxian Wang, "From Red Guard Art to Contemporary Art"in Burden or Legacy: From the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution to Contemporary Art, ed. Jiehong Jiang (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2007), 4. 
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The Red Guards usually wore green military uniforms with red armbands and 
carried the Little Red Book (Quotations of Mao Zedong) with them at times.
157
  
The plastic toy figures of Red Guards produced during the Cultural Revolution 
serve as good example of what the Red Guards looked like at the time.
158
  (Figure 
10) These figures show the classic revolutionary postures, the standardised outfits, 
and the popularity of the Little Red Books that were important visual elements for 
the Red Guards.  The production of Red Guard model figures also shows how 
teenagers were socially shaped into a collective social role.  Practices such as 
putting up posters, reading of Quotations of Mao Zedong, watching Model operas 
and destroying objects that were deemed to be the ‘Four Olds’ composed the 
everyday life of the Red Guards in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution.   
The Red Guards put up their large-character posters to disseminate the 
messages of criticizing the ‘Four Olds’, which referred to old ideas, old culture, 
old customs and old habits.
159
  This was because the ‘Four Olds’ were regarded as 
the obstacle which prevented art and literature from directly serving the majority 
of the population who were peasants, workers and soldiers.
160
  A political poster 
produced in Beijing in 1967 with the slogan Smash the old world, Establish the 
new world, may well illustrate the movement of the young Red Guards.  This 
political picture shows a crowd of Red Guards going onto the roads and streets to 
disseminate large-character posters and political pictures.  They rally in public 
with speeches and red flags, and attack signs of the ‘Four Olds’ or objects which 
represented bourgeoisie.  A closer inspection of the picture reveals objects of the 
bourgeoisie, including music records, a crucifix, an image of the Buddha, casino 
dice and classical literature. These represented Western capitalist culture and 
traditional Chinese culture.  
                                            
157 The practice of the Red Guards carrying the Little Red Book (Quotations from Chairman Mao) has been 
written about in many books on the history of Cultural Revolution, such as Jiang, "Burden or Legacy: 
From the Chinese Cultural Revolution to Contemporary Art" Wang, "From Red Guard Art to 
Contemporary Art" Michael Schoenhals, China's Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not A Dinner Party 
(New York & London: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). 
 
158 These artefacts are housed at University of Westminster Chinese Poster Collection, London. 
 
159  Jiaqi Yan and Gao Gao, Wenhua Da Geming Shinian Shi (The Ten-Year History of the Cultural 
Revolution), vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Chaoliu Publisher, 1989), 90. 
 
160 Mingxian Wang and Shanchun Yan, Xin Zhongguo Meishu Shi (The Art History of the People's Republic 
of China):1966-1976 (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2000), 40. 
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Many of the posters illustrate how radical, violent and destructive the Red 
Guard movements were.  The struggles of Red Guards and Rebels to “seize 
power” from bureaucrats and managers depicted in the posters have been 
described as using a style in which, quoting Gittings, ‘the fist was larger than the 
face.’
161
  As Wang Mingxian points out: 
 In the 1960s, the world was experiencing dramatic changes; the arts were also 
undergoing fundamental fission and reconstruction.  Red Guard art was a fanatical 




The initial period of Cultural Revolution was also typified by a cultish emphasis 
on Mao Zedong and the Quotations of Mao Zedong.  Mao and the Little Red Book 
were key subjects of the posters.  The start of the Cultural Revolution was actually 
marked by a huge number of young people, many in their teens, answering Mao 
Zedong’s summons to struggle against the ‘Four Olds’ and the bourgeoisie.
163
     
Many political pictures at that time illustrate Red Guards holding the Little Red 
Books and brushes which promote the reading of Quotations of Mao Zedong and 
making posters and pictures.  These messages were spread widely particularly 
during the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.  These slogans and political 
pictures were characterised by the ideological struggle of Maoist communist 
against the intrusion of Western capitalism.   
In a typical example – Oppose Economism: Beat down the counterattack 
of the capitalist class’ reactionary line – produced in Shanghai in 1967, one Red 
Guard rips up papers written with text ‘Economism’ (jingjizhuyi) and ‘Welfarism’ 
while other writes the slogan ‘Oppose Economism!’ on a bare wall. (Figure 4) 
This theme corresponded the situation where senior leaders (i.e. Liu Shaoqi, Deng 
Xiaoping) were accused of ‘economism’ because they offered material incentives 
which sidetracked the masses away from Mao Zedong’s thought.  Thus, a poster 
bearing the slogan of Smash the Liu-Deng [Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping] 
Reactionary Line belongs to this initial period, in which a giant figure with huge 
fists holding Quotations of Mao Zedong is beating up two small figures on which 
the words ‘Liu’ and ‘Deng’ are written.   
                                            
161 Gittings, "Excess and Enthusiasm" , 32-33. 
 
162 Wang, "From Red Guard Art to Contemporary Art" , 35. 
 
163 Clark, The Chinese Cultural Revolution: a history , 52. 
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The anti-Western capitalist campaigns were necessarily related to Soviet 
revisionism and Western capitalism at that time.  Thus, some posters produced 
around the mid-1960s period depict the struggle against Soviet revisionism and 
Western capitalism.  In a typical poster, Down with the Soviet Revisionist 
produced in Shanghai in 1967, features many red fists which represent the power 
of the Chinese communism smashing the figures which represent Leonid 
Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, the First Secretary and Premier of the Communist 
Party of Soviet Union at that time.  (Figure 6) This picture is described in a sub-
heading: ‘Smash the dog-head Brezhnev, Smash the dog-head Kosygin’.   
When the movement had become too violent and chaotic for the Party to 
control, the policy was put into place for the mass transfer of 'educated youth' 
(zhiqing) to the countryside. The ‘Up to the mountains, Down to the villages’ 
movement began in 1968 to prepare for the restoration of order in the cities and 
posters were important tools to encourage the Red Guards to leave the cities.  A 
poster – New Home (Xin Jia) – produced in Beijing in 1974 illustrates the 
welcoming scene of an urban youth who is transferred from the city to a host 
family in a village. (Figure 7)   
Posters were also used in promoting international relations policies during 
the Mao years. In February 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon paid his historic 
visit to China, soon after the first American sports delegation visited Beijing in 
1971. Two months after Richard Nixon's visit, a Chinese table-tennis delegation 
also visited the U.S. in April 1972.  This was the well-known ‘Ping Pong 
diplomacy’ which was significant in normalising the relation between the People's 
Republic of China and the U.S. through establishing a mutual understanding of 
the idea of ‘One China’, and Nixon and the U.S. government reassured their 
mutual interests in a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question worked out by the 
Chinese themselves.  Thus, in a poster produced in Liaoning in 1975, a group of 
children was depicted writing letters to their friends in Taiwan and embroidering a 
China national flag with two table tennis rackets and toys. (Figure 8) 
Political figures were featured in posters mainly in written texts produced 
in the later period of the Cultural Revolution.  Jiang Qing and other members of 
the Gang of Four became the targets of poster attacks for a short time after they 
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were arrested in October 1976.
164
  A poster produced in 1976 depicting a crowd 
reading Quotations of Mao Zedong is given great emphasis with the slogans laden 
with dogmatic Party language: Thoroughly expose the monstrous crimes 
committed while attempting to take over Party power by the anti-Party clique 
Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan. Cartoon figures 
of the Gang were featured in the anti-Gang propaganda campaign.
165
  (Figure 9)  
These cartoons were reproduced in other cultural forms, such as the cartoons of 
Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen on circular 
target paper boards in the form of a throwing game for kids. (Figure 11) 
In the previous paragraphs I briefly introduced some examples of posters 
and themes produced and adopted during the Cultural Revolution.  These 
examples show how posters and slogans during the Cultural Revolution were 
closely related to the daily lives of people and the changing political agenda of the 
authorities.  In the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards 
engaged in political activism by producing posters, putting them up on walls and 
writing slogans on walls.  Through these activities a growing sense of group 
identification among the young students was constructed and strengthened, and 
formed a new kind of cultural-political identity.  These street level cultural forms 
were complemented with highly produced posters at the Party level.  The young 
student Red Guards engaged in a whole set of practices from the production, 
exhibition and dissemination of the large-character posters and political pictures 
with specific political messages at that time.  In this case, those posters and 
pictures were not only produced by the students, but the artefacts also had an 
effect on the identity-formation of the students.  After 1968 Red Guards were sent 
to learn from the peasants in the countryside, an experience which had a profound 
effect on the hardship of those young urban citizens.
166
  Themes and slogans of 
the posters and other daily objects corresponded to political and social 
developments and were inextricably linked with the everyday life of the people.
167
  
However, almost all the original slogans of Cultural Revolution pictures were 
                                            
164 Gittings, "Excess and Enthusiasm" , 35-36. 
 
165 Ibid. , 33. 
 
166 Jiaqi Yan and Gao Gao, Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1996), 279. 
 
167 Gittings, "Excess and Enthusiasm" , 35-36. 
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replaced by new taglines, which closely related to current socio-economic 
developments in post-2000 China when these pictures were brought into a 
completely different context across time.  Only a small range of Cultural 
Revolution themes have been made into new cultural products in the 
contemporary era for young urban consumers.  In particular, the theme of anti-
capitalism depicted in posters in the early phase of Red Guard violence contrasts 
radically with the new policy of a socialist market economy in the post-reform era.  
In the following section I explore how Cultural Revolution pictures are transferred 
to our current time, and how they form close relations with issues in the post-2000 
era. 
To examine closely the posters produced during the Cultural Revolution 
reveals several different ways of using the pictures with slogans.  Sometimes one 
main message is produced by the combination of the picture and slogan.   For 
example, in the poster – Chairman Mao is the Reddest Reddest Red Sun in Our 
Hearts – produced in Jilin around 1966 or 1967, a huge image of Mao Zedong is 
depicted radiating like the sun over a crowd of female Red Guards. (Figure 12) 
But sometimes the pictures can be less specific so that it functions as a 
background for a written slogan.  For example, the poster of a group of Red 
Guards holding slogans and the Little Red Books sets the scene for the slogan 
'Revolutionary Proletarian right-to-rebel troops unite!’ (Wuchan jieji zaofan pai 
lianhe qilai).  (Figure 13)  Sometimes the visual depictions emphasise the actual 
physical action of how the goal stated in the written slogan can be implemented.  
For example, in a classic example of early Red Guard art, the male individual is 
smashing objects including a crucifix, a Buddha and classical Chinese texts which 
were considered images of the Olds and imperial domination.  This picture 
illustrates the action of the goal stated in the slogan: 'Smash the Old World, 
Establish the New World’ (Dasui jiu shijie chuangli xin shijie). (Figure 14)  Some 
pictures with similar slogans can illustrate different aspects of how the same 
principle can be actualised.  For example, a poster with a slogan which reads: 
'Chairman Mao is the red sun in our hearts’ illustrates a crowd of people of 
different ethnicities holding Quotations of Mao Zedong and the person in the front 
holds his book up high with his strong arm. (Figure 15).  This poster has almost 
the same slogan as the previous example (Figure 12), but instead of illustrating the 
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unity among Red Guards it depicts the unity of different ethnicities within the 
country.   
 The above examples of original posters of Cultural Revolution show how 
the lives of Red Guards were generally depicted in political pictures in certain 
specific moments.  It shows the visual representations of the radical movements, 
the enthusiasm and violence of the Red Guards and the prevalence of these art 
practices at the time.  It is important to note that in 21st century contemporary 
China, similar images of the Red Guards circulated through new technologies as a 
new way to engage with today's urban city life.  These are the mobile phone 
pictures which have only become available since 2002, and were not more 
widespread until 2004.
168
  Like the plastic figures and posters in the past, Cultural 
Revolution imagery in the form of mobile phone pictures targets the teenagers 
who are now enthusiastic about engaging with new technologies such as the 
internet and mobile phones.  Barmé has pointed out that an aspect of the new Mao 
Cult in the 1990s was that the young were the main target audience, and 
accordingly, the agent who consumes the Cultural Revolution products: 
Many consumers of Mao products were adolescents or people in their early twenties who 
were unfamiliar with the Mao era.  Unconcerned with the burdens of the past, they could 
indulge their curiosity and be playful in their approach to Mao memorabilia.  Young 
people often regarded Mao not as a unique Great Leader but as a homebred luminary who 
deserved a position in the galaxy of Hong Kong and Taiwan pop stars popular on the 
Mainland… There was an unbridgeable gap between those who had lived through the 
Mao years and those who had not.  The Cult provided a common ground and a hazy 
realm of consensus in a society in which the generation gap was increasingly making its 
impact felt.  Young converts to the new Mao Cult also found in it a perfect way to 
express adolescent rebelliousness and romanticism.   Here was a politically safe idol that 
could be used to annoy the authorities, upset parents, and irritate teachers.’
169
   
Barmé’s point is still valid in the post-2000 Chinese context in the sense that, on 
the one hand, there was a market for Maoist imagery and thus Cultural Revolution 
mobile phone pictures, as new technological products, were likely to attract this 
particular group of young consumers.   
However, unlike the role of political pictures during the Red Guard 
movements, these pictures are not faithful and complete reproductions of the 
                                            
168 Most of the websites of internet dotcom corporations were available since 2002.  In this same year mobile 
phones became relatively affordable than ever before when cheaper phones were available in the market.   
 
169 Barmé, Shades of Mao: the posthumous cult of the great leader , 47. 
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originals.  Instead, these are edited, 'cut-out' and thus essentialised pictures of the 
original.  Moreover, as new digital editions, the political messages attached to the 
original are no longer relevant or applicable in a different era.  These pictures are 
reconstructed to become a new form of entertainment in the context of capitalistic 
urban culture.  More significantly, both the textual and social meanings of 
Cultural Revolution imagery are transformed in this specific contemporary 
practice of reproduction and consumption. 
 
New technology development in post-2000 era 
Before discussing the examples of Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures, it is 
necessary to understand the development of the internet and telecommunication 
technologies in the post-socialist Chinese context.  According to the statistics 
reported by China Daily, there were more than 700 mobile telecommunications 
equipment users in China in 1987.
170
 According to survey reports on Internet 
development in China conducted by China Internet Network Information Center 
(CNNIC), in January 2000, there were 8,900,000 internet users in China.  In 
addition to the users who accessed the internet by computer, 200,000 users 
employed other equipment such as mobile telephone and palmtop computer 
(PDA).
171
  In 2001 the number of mobile phone users increased to over 100 
million, which was the largest in the world at the time.  By January 2002 there 
were 33,700,000 internet users in China among which 1,180,000 used mobile 
terminals to access to the internet.
172
  A survey on new media awareness in China 
was conducted between December 2003 and January 2004 which showed that 
about sixty percent of one thousand Chinese aged between ten and forty-five in 
Beijing and Shanghai admitted that they are deeply dependent on mass media and 
“could not stand to live a life without a TV and the internet.”
173
  By January 2004 
                                            
170 Xinhua, China's mobile phone users exceeds 600m [Online] (China Daily,  2007 [cited 17 September 
2009]); available from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-09/17/content_6111334.htm. 
 
171 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the state network information centre of China 
founded in 1997, defines an Internet user as a Chinese citizen who uses the Internet at least one hour per 
week.  This definition excludes the citizen in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.  The data was obtained 
from Internet Statistics, The 5th Survey Report. 
 
172 Internet Statistics, The 9th Survey Report. 
 
173 ‘China Daily, Media Literacy Crucial in 21st Century (30 October) (Xinhua News Agency,  2004 [cited 
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there were 79.5 million internet users in China and 2.14 million of this population 
used mobile terminals.  The rising number of internet users indicates the 
increasing popularity and prevalence of new technologies in China.   
This trend shows no sign of stopping as China still has a vast rural market 
to open and urban mobile phone users are demanding more ‘vogue, media-rich 
and web-accessible’ handsets.
174
  Since the 1980s the Chinese government has 
adopted a welcoming policy towards the development of new technologies in 
China.  Zhou Yongming points out that the rapid development of the Internet in 
China since the 1980s was due to the Chinese government’s desire to make use of 
this new technology as an engine for economic and technological development, 
and its interest in keeping the infrastructure and services out of foreign control.
175
  
With government support, the public use of the Internet in China has drastically 
penetrated into aspects of everyday life.  The number of Internet users in China 
increased from 22,500,000 in 2000 to 298,000,000 in 2008.
176
  Since the Internet 
was first introduced in China, authorities have regarded this new technology as 
the same as other forms of mass media such as newspapers, radio and TV which 
are monitored and controlled by the government.
177
  The Chinese government’s 
concerns about economic and technological development also led to a 
commercialisation of public media during the reform era, but as Zhou says, this 
does not mean a relaxation of control on the part of the authorities.
178
  To 
understand the rapid growth of the internet in China, we must take into account 
the Chinese government’s principle: ‘to promote active development and take full 
advantage of the new technology while strengthening control and avoiding 
negative effects.’
179
  To avoid ‘negative effects’ the government has issued many 
regulations about the use of the internet for disseminating information.  Regarding 
                                            
174 Xinhua, China's mobile phone users exceeds 600m. 
 
175 Yongming Zhou, Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in 
China (Stanford and California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 137. 
 
176  Internet Statistics, Internet Development in China between 1997 and 2009 [Online] (China Internet 
Network Information Center,  2009 [cited 15 Aug 2009]); available from 
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/index/0O/02/index.htm. 
 
177 Zhou, Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China , 138. 
 
178 Ibid.  
 
179 Ibid. , 141. 
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content, there are numerous forbidden items of information which are not to be 
copied, transmitted or spread through the telecommunication networks, including 
references that are deemed to endanger national security, injure national unity and 
solidarity, harm national dignity and interest, advocate cult and feudal 
superstitions, promote violence or terrorism.
180
  Control is exercised through 
Chinanet, the national public information network, established in order to prevent 
individuals and businesses connecting to the internet independently and to make 
sure that internet use is under surveillance.
181
  Zhou argues that we need to pay 
attention to both the popular creativity in the use of technology and how the 
technologies have been used to serve the Chinese Communist Party’s interests
182
.   
The Chinese government’s welcoming policy on the development of new 
technologies resulted in the availability of new information technologies such as 
the Internet and mobile telecommunication networks in major urban Chinese 
cities.
183
 This resulted in an increasing use of the World-Wide Web and mobile 
phone technology among urban Chinese citizens.
184
  These socio-economic 
developments made available a newly emerged cultural product called mobile 
phone picture (shouji caixin which literally means mobile phone picture message) 
which could be downloaded via the internet or telecommunication service through 
electronic devices such as computers and mobile phones, and further circulated 
via the Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS).
185
  Against this socio-
technological background, some of the political pictures formerly produced by the 
                                            
180 Ibid. , 142. 
 
181 Ibid. , 143. 
 
182 Ibid. , 146-147. 
 
183 China introduced its first mobile telecommunication equipment in 1987.  There were approximately 700 
users. In 2001, the number of cell phone users passed 100 million.  When Gome, China's largest electronic 
retailer, started selling mobile phones in 2002, there was a rapid increase in the number of mobile phone 
users.  The number reached 300 million in May 2004 and 400 million in January 2006. Information about  
Internet development in China: Internet Statistics, The 5th Survey Report.  Information about the mobile 
telecommunication development in China: Xinhua, China's mobile phone users exceeds 600m.  Also read 
People's Daily, About 40% of Chinese people use mobile phones [Online] (English People's Daily Online, 
25 December 2007 [cited 25 Dec 2008]); available from 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6326944.html. 
 
184 Internet Statistics, Internet Development in China between 1997 and 2009. 
 
185 Internet Statistics, The 15th Survey Report [Online] (China Internet Network Information Center, Jan 2005 
[cited 1 Oct 2009]); available from http://www.cnnic.net.cn/download/2005/2005012701.pdf ; Beijing 
Time, China's portals eyeing MMS for future explosive growth [Online] (English People's Daily Online, 
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young Chinese in the 1960s, hereafter referred to as ‘Cultural Revolution’ 
imagery, were integrated with the new technologies in the form of the mobile 
phone picture.  The cultural and social meanings of these pictures have been 
transformed through its unprecedented usage via the new technologies and the 
new socio-economic environment in China in the post-2000 era. 
Following the introduction of mobile phone technology and multimedia 
messaging service in China, an unprecedented mode of image consumption 
emerged.  This method is called Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), and is a 
wireless technology which allows mobile phone users to send pictures to other 
handsets.  Wireless multimedia service companies have been rapidly established 
since the technology was introduced, and websites which provide MMS-related 
products have also appeared on the internet.  These websites aim to provide the 
community with a wide range of multimedia value-added products and services 
(duo mei ti zeng zhi chan pin ji fu wu).  The websites of wireless multimedia 
service companies not only publish written materials, but also play an important 
part in disseminating, and facilitating the further circulation of multimedia 
materials which are mainly digitalized images.  One example of which is the 
MMS picture pages of online multimedia service providers.  These pages display 
MMS visual products in a wide range of categories from which cell phone users 
can access a variety of images for decoration and entertainment purpose. In 2006 
a Google search with the keyword ‘MMS download’ (caixin xiazai in Chinese) 
provided 2,560,000 results.  What is more instructive is that this search was on the 
top of the result list, which indicates that MMS download has been the most 
popular among all other searches in relation to MMS technology.  In 2009 this 
search yields 2,800,000 results on the top of the search list.   
The introduction of MMS technology has formed an alternative channel 
for the dissemination of audio-visual materials in China since 2002.
186
  It allows 
delivery of personal multimedia messages, which can contain images, graphics, 
voice and audio clips, from phone to phone or from phone to e-mail.  The 
combination of the Internet, MMS and mobile phone network facilitates the 
                                            
186 The Chinese telecommunication operators, such as Beijing Mobile and Fujian Mobile, cooperated with 
Nokia in 2002 to set up the first MMS roaming in Asia.  The first MMS messages were experimentally 
sent between Beijing Mobile and Hong Kong CSL Ltd. and between Fujian Mobile and Hong Kong CSL 
Ltd. in April 2002.   
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production of new cultural products and their dissemination.  One of the recent 
examples is the emergence of mobile phone multimedia graphics, which is called 
Multi-media pictures (caixin) in Putonghua, created by MMS audio-visual source 
providers in response to the consumption of MMS in China.   
Multi-media pictures, literally meaning ‘picture messages’, refer to the 
multimedia graphic products purchasable through the websites of some MMS 
audio-visual source providers in China.  Some of these multimedia pictures are 
moving graphics which can also go with pop music ring tones.  Mobile phone 
users in China can buy and download their favourite photos, animations and ring 
tones to their mobile phones through accessing specific websites on the Internet.  
After a multimedia graphic is purchased and downloaded, an individual can 
circulate it, and any attached audio file, from a mobile phone to another mobile 
phone or from a mobile phone to the Internet.  This mobile entertainment and 
commerce has radically developed in China since MMS was introduced.  Some 
major MMS audio-visual source providers such as Tom Online, Yitang, Caixiu 
and Sina have emerged in China’s telecommunications market one after another 
since 2002.  MMS was expected by the service providers to ‘encourage the 
deployment of content like entertainment, information, gaming and mobile 
commerce’ in China.
187
   
 
Cultural Revolution imagery as mobile phone pictures 
My online research shows that Cultural Revolution imagery, as mobile phone 
pictures, have been categorised under different labels by different providers.  But 
generally I can summarise the nature of its use into three main types.  The first 
type refers to the use of Cultural Revolution imagery as a cultural source for 
nostalgia.  For example, the mobile phone picture provider www.wapol.cn 
categorised pictures of Red Guards, Lei Feng and Chairman Mao Zedong, which 
were published in political posters during the Cultural Revolution, under the label 
‘Fervent Red Epoch’ (Huohong niandai).  This suggests the meaning of these 
images is to recall a bygone, eventful era.  The second type is similar to the first in 
emphasizing the glorious revolutionary past, but this time the images of the past 
                                            
187 China Daily, Nokia Chips in on MMS services (31 May) (Zhonghuawang, 31st May 2002 [cited 11 
November 2009]); available from 
http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=33607&p_qry=MMS. 
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are used as a way to promote national unity in today’s context.  For example, 
another provider mms.etang.com placed a series of Cultural Revolution images 
under the category ‘Cultural Revolution Series’ (Wenge Xilie) in which taglines 
such as ‘Learn Culture to Contribute to the Motherland’ (Xuexi wenhua baoxiao 
zuguo) and ‘United as One Heart to Protect the Motherland' (Tuanjie yixin baowei 
zuguo).  The third type refers to the borrowing of Cultural Revolution images to 
produce humorous statements for general amusement.  For example, 
mms.tom.com reworks pictures of the Red Guards and characters in model operas, 
and turns them into funny expressions with colloquial taglines which closely 
correspond to the everyday life in 21
st
 century China.  Some of these pictures are 
given slogans which emphasizes individualism while some others correspond to 
the current popular cultural trends in the society. 
Some features of mobile phone pictures can be generally identified.  These 
pictures are meant to be looked at via the screens of mobile phones after being 
downloaded from the Internet, which can also be accessed by desktop computers 
or other devices.  Thus, the small screen of a mobile phone explains why the 
captions of these digitised pictorial products are usually abbreviated as short 
catchphrases. The form of technology has an impact on the scale and scope of the 
image/text.  These brief catchphrases can also be understood as a result of a well-
rooted, prevalent local cultural phenomenon called shunkouliu.  According to 
Barmé, shunkouliu or shunkouliu’r could be found in the use and comic abuse of 
Mao quotations during the Cultural Revolution when daily life speech was under 
tight control.
188
  It was an unofficial local culture through which people expressed 
their discontentment in an indirect and implicit way.  This oral culture is 
characterised by humorous, ironic and rhythmic popular sayings used in daily 
conversations.  Barmé also identified a characteristic of local culture in Beijing in 
early 1990s wherein the consumers of the products also enjoyed ‘the clever use of 
language and apothegms’ in Kong’s T-shirts which bore humorous, ironic, 
political statements and illustrations.
189
  The point here may be that the local 
people in China enjoy the pleasure of humorous and ironic statements and 
rhythmic expressions which could be a part of a long established cultural and 
social practice ingrained into everyday life.  Here I am not suggesting that there is 
                                            
188 Barmé, In The Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture , 147. 
189 Ibid. , 145 and 147. 
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a definite direct link between shunkouliu culture and the commercialised Cultural 
Revolution culture in postsocialist context.  However, the local and unofficial 
nature of shunkouliu and its traditional use as a comic twisting of Mao quotations 
is only specific to mainland Chinese culture which may play an important part in 
the appreciation of the parodic captions in Cultural Revolution mobile phone text 
pictures.  Shunkouliu culture has established a familiar way of exchanging 
commentary in everyday life, and the Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures 
which have taglines about social life are typical cultural products from the same 
cultural environment. 
 The first example of a Cultural Revolution mobile phone picture shows a 
man wearing a green cap with an emblem in the front and a piece of red insignia 
of the Red Guards on this left arm. (Figure 16)  Both the green cap and the red 
insignia on arm were popular during the Cultural Revolution period.  This man 
has a big Little Red Book in his left hand which looks like The Quotations of Mao 
Zedong.  In his right hand is a brush which suggests that he is writing.  In the 
course of the Cultural Revolution, writing large character posters (dazibao) was a 
practice and form of political expression.  The man writing looks like he is 
producing a dazibao.  This picture is captioned with the phrase: ‘You are the best 
(excellent)’ (ni shi zui bang de) which is written vertically on the left and 
horizontally below the image respectively.  This phrase in Chinese could be easily 
heard today in everyday life in China.  But this statement which values 
individualism creates a strong contrast with the collective identities (i.e. the Red 
Guards, the educated youth, the PLA, the worker, peasant and soldier, etc.) and 
social life (e.g. mass assembly) during Cultural Revolution, when Mao Zedong 
was usually described as the most important leader of the country as manifested in 
the metaphor of Mao Zedong as ‘the red sun’.    
This example is collected from the website mms.tom.com of the Tom 
Group (Tom Online), one of the largest wireless internet service providers in 
China.  It started launching MMS services to provide multimedia MMS products 
in 2002. 
190
   Their online products include multimedia graphics and animations, 
ring tones, screen savers and wireless magazines.  Their target customers are the 
                                            
190 I saw the Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures on mms.tom.com in late 2004.  But the trend could be 
earlier since 2002 when the use of mobile phone started prevalent in major urban cities and most of the 
dotcom business websites were built since then. 
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young mobile phone and Internet users reside in mainland China.  To successfully 
purchase multi-media pictures the customers need an MMS-enabled handset and 
internet access to download the audio-visual materials.  Some providers may only 
provide service to users of specific cellular networks.  The price varies from 
providers but the average cost for one multi-media picture is around RMBҰ1.0 to 
RMBҰ2.5 per download.  Charges are to be made directly to the customers’ 
mobile phone bills.
191
   
This mobile phone picture was labelled as ‘Humours and Jokes’ (youmo 
gaoxiao) on Tom Online’s Multi-media pictures main page.
192
  In this case, the 
Cultural Revolution imagery was made into humour or jokes in everyday social 
life or relationships.  This categorisation of Cultural Revolution imagery as 
everyday humour or jokes may reflect a tailored taste to match the Chinese 
consumer most of whom enjoy the pleasure of humorous and ironic jokes about 
the Cultural Revolution.   Thus, this shows a relative level of sophistication that 
contemporary recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery is not a simple 
mimicking but a process of meaning making. 
This example suggests that the individual identities are given more 
emphasis in the reform era.  On the other hand, the Cultural Revolution images 
were exclusively used in promoting the latest political and national goals or 
campaigns.  Their depoliticised and decentralised use in other social aspects and 
more personal aspects of life enriches the role of the Cultural Revolution images 
in contemporary China.   
The second example is a similar version but captioned differently.  In this 
picture, a man is wearing the same green cap and red insignia on his left hand.  He 
is also holding a brush as if he is writing. (Figure 17)   What makes the difference 
is the neon light effect in the background which makes the Little Red Book looks 
like shinning.  This picture is captioned with the phrase: ‘My wife is the red sun in 
                                            
191 This price range and also the criteria of the ownership of mobile phone and necessary access to the internet 
suggest that the consumers of multi-media pictures are mainly the urban middle-class educated users. 
 
192 In 2004, this picture was published on one of the popular pages in Tom.com's main page.  But since June 
2006, I found it being removed from the main page. This picture is still available for consumption on 
Tom.com but not promoted by the company anymore and it is no longer as popular as it used to be.    
Hyperlink to this picture before 2006: 
http://mms.tom.com/ani_new.html?inc=index&t=1&mobtype=10010003&catalog=9&ordby=inserttime&
ord=desc.   
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my heart’ (laopo shi wo xin zhong de hongtaiyang).  To put it in mainland 
Chinese context, this phrase is a reference to the content of an interview in a local 
TV programme called ‘Husband and Wife Theatre’.  On 23
rd
 January 2002, the 
emcee interviewed Gong Hanlin and his wife who are both popular performing 
artists in China.  In their conversation, Gong Hanlin described the role of his wife 
as ‘the unique sun in his life’ because of her joyful and outgoing personality.
193
  
Gong Hanlin’s performance on TV is well-known across China.  To ‘google’ with 
the keyword ‘Gong Hanli’ in Chinese brings to 266,000 results in relation to his 
work.  With the same Cultural Revolution picture being appropriated for different 
versions of mobile phone text pictures suggests that there is a narrow range of 
Cultural Revolution pictures or symbols being particularly recycled in the post-
revolution era.   
The same Cultural Revolution pictures provided by www.tom.com could 
also be found commercialised at www.etang.com and www.wapol.cn.  For 
example, the picture of a male Red Guard writing big character poster used in 
Figure 16 is the same as the one in Figure 17, Figure 22 and Figure 23.  This 
picture is given different captions such as 'Knowledge is Power' (Zhishi jiushi 
liliang) under the category of ‘Fervent Red Epoch’ at www.etang.com and 
‘Revolt Till the End' (Geming Daodi) under the category of ‘Cultural Revolution 
Series’ at www.wapol.cn.  
The third example ‘(I’ve) Got my red pockets’ at www.tom.com (Figure 18) 
illustrates the sending of educated youth to the countryside in 1968.  In this 
picture, Red Guards are in the train heading to the countryside.  This is a picture 
of two joyful young individuals travelling on a train.  We can see these two young 
individuals wearing warm hats and coats which look like Chinese Army fur hats 
and uniforms.  In their hands are the red envelops which suggests red envelopes of 
lucky money (yasuiqian).  This also suggests that, if the Little Red Books 
dominated the people’s mind during Cultural Revolution, then during post-
socialist, the dominating thought should be the little red pockets which suggest 
capitalist ideologies and money-oriented thinking.  The individuals are wearing a 
red floral emblem (hong xiu qiu) which suggests that the young individuals are 
                                            
193 Hong Xie, Lian jia de nanren' Gong Hanlin: Laopo shi wo xin zhong de hong taiyang (An Attentive Man 
At Home' Gong Hanlin: My wife is the red sun in my heart) (Epoch Times,  2002 [cited 15 June 2004]); 
available from http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/2/1/23/n165805.htm. 
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educated youth who participated in the ‘Up to the mountains, Down to the 
countryside’ movement (Shang shan xia xiang yundong) which was implemented 
in 1968.  During the movements, young individuals in the cities were summoned 
to go to the countryside to be re-educated by the poor and farmers in villages.  It is 
found published in a handbook of political newspaper heading (Baotou) designs 
titled Information on headings for Mao Zedong Thought Dissemination Board 
(Mao Zhedong Sixiang Xuanchuan Lan Baotou Ziliao).
194
 (Figure 25) 
The book gave guidance to art workers to produce the standardised layouts of 
newspaper headings so that a unified style could be produced by a large number 
of art workers all over the country.  This picture is presumably to be reproduced in 
a variety of cultural forms during Cultural Revolution.  The original illustrates the 
departure of a train on which two young enthusiastic passengers wearing big grins 
on their faces waving their ‘Little Red Books’ which suggests The Quotations of 
Mao Zedong.  There are some waving red flags which suggested a farewell scene 
at the train station.  A slogan ‘Learn from Comrade Jin Xunhua’ (Xiang Jin 
Xunhua Tongzhi Xuexi) and the words ‘Shanghai’ are written on the train.  Jin 
Xunhua was one of the model Red Guards in the 1960s.  (Figure 26)  This scene 
of a train departure suggests that the young individuals are leaving the city 
Shanghai and they are going to learn from the comrade Jin Xunhua to learn and 
contribute in rural areas. Like the previous examples, this picture can also be 
found at other websites.  For example, the same image is given a different caption 
'Build up the motherland' (Jianshe Zuguo) at www.wapol.cn under the category of 
'Fervent Red Epoch’.  
The third example is a picture of a man who is wearing a blue uniform 
with a round blue hat. (Figure 19)  For readers who have little knowledge about 
the culture during the Cultural Revolution, the simple elements in this picture may 
not mean a lot.  But for those who experienced that period, it is not hard to 
identify the man in a blue uniform as the main character named Li Yuhe in a 
Chinese Beijing model opera called Red Lantern (Hongdengji), which was 
popular in China around mid-1960s.  This picture is given a caption: ‘I am not the 
boss for quite a few years)’ (wo bu zuo da ge hao duo nian). The origin of this 
                                            
194 Baotou is the picture by the newspapers or magazines headings with a purpose of visually highlighting the 
theme and decorates the cover page of a text.  Claiming to encourage the participation of the general 
public in the making of baotou, handbooks were published by the Chinese Communist Party to provide 
samples and guidance to the painters of baotou particularly in the 1960s and 1970s.   
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phrase is from a song under this name sung by the Chinese pop star Ke Shouliang 
who became famous in Hong Kong in the 1980s.   
The fourth example is a picture of a man who is wearing a green military 
uniform (lujunzhuang) with red insignia of the Red Guards on his collar and left 
arm, and a gun in his right hand.  (Figure 20) Again, the visual elements in this 
picture are not easily identified without specific knowledge of the ballet culture 
during the Cultural Revolution.  The posture of this Red-Guard-like man looks 
like the main character in the Cultural Revolution ballet play called The White-
Haired Girl (Bai Mao Nu), which was originally a film and adapted into ballet 
under the leadership of Jiang Qing.  This work was well-known during the 
Cultural Revolution as it was honoured as ‘one of the eight revolutionary 
theatrical performances’ in China.
195
  The picture is captioned with a phrase: ‘Do 
you love me after all’ (ni dao di ai bu ai wo).  This phrase also suggests a Chinese 
pop song with the same name composed by a local Chinese music band called 
Zero Point (ling dian yue dui).  The song Do you love me not is popular across 
China, which was ranked number one for over twenty weeks in the ‘Top Ten 
Songs of the Week’ chart in 1997.  This song also won the ‘Top Ten pop songs in 
China’ and ‘The Most Popular Original Chinese Song’ in China in the same year.  
The meaning of the new tagline becomes particularly interesting when the 
Cultural Revolution imagery illustrates the model performance during the Cultural 
Revolution.  This model performance aimed to promote and cultivate a sense of 
self-sacrifice for the country.  The original politically charged imagery has been 
transformed to depict a romantic, nationalistic relationship. 
The last example is a picture of man wearing a green military uniform 
with two red insignias on his collar which suggests that he is a Red Guard.  
(Figure 21)  This simple picture with a red background is captioned with the 
phrase: ‘If others leave me alone, I will leave them alone’ (Ren bu fan wo, wo bu 
fan ren), which means ‘We will not attack unless we are attacked’.  This phrase is 
the first half of the motto which was first spoken out by Mao Zedong in 1939.  
The full original motto is ‘We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are 
attacked, we will certainly counterattack’ (Ren bu fan wo, wo bu fan ren; ren ruo 
                                            
195 Kwok-Sing Li, A glossary of political terms of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, 1995), 156. 
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fan wo, wo bi fan ren).  Mao Zedong announced in the press on the 16
th
 of 
September 1939 that this motto is the principle/attitude of the Communist in terms 
of defence and offence.  This is still one of the official mottos of the Communist 
Party of China today.
196
  An internet search with this Chinese motto displayed 
297,000 results. 
During Cultural Revolution a large quantity of different Cultural 
Revolution pictures were produced to correspond to the latest political agenda and 
different campaigns at the time.  However, it seems that only those pictures which 
are related to the radical social movements used with mobile phone pictures, such 
as the writing of the large character posters, the Red Guards, the sending of the 
youth to the countryside or pictures of revolutionary enthusiasm which are based 
on the image of a serious gaze suggesting hopes, spirits and determination.  These 
particular phenomena, events and movements all involved mass social 
participation which dominated the everyday agenda of people from all walks of 
life during Cultural Revolution.  The reappearance of these particular Cultural 
Revolution elements suggests a sense of admiration towards the enthusiasm, 
spirits and common goals of the mass social movements from the revolutionary 
past.   
The above mobile phone pictures are a good example of how the culture of 
the Cultural Revolution is integrated with contemporary urban culture in the 21
st
 
century China.  These new cultural forms are significant for the study of how 
contemporary meanings of Cultural Revolution imagery are constructed in an 
unprecedented context in China which is marked by rapid developments in new 
technologies.  In general it is obvious that the imagery has been edited and 
replaced by new slogans when it is used in today's urban culture.  Most of the 
images are characterised by their origins as pictures of violent, radical and 
enthusiastic Red Guards with their classic revolutionary postures.  Most 
significantly, my semiotic analysis reveals that the former use of the collective 
pronoun ‘we’ and the common political idol ‘Mao Zedong’ have been removed in 
the 21
st
 century versions, and the use of ‘I’ and ‘You’ are more emphasized.  A 
                                            
196 Tom Group Caixin, Ren bu fan wo wo bu fan ren (If others let me along, I will let them alone)[mobile 
phone picture] [Online Mobile phone picture downloading page] (Tom Group China,  2002 [cited 7 Feb 
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good example can be found in the caption of the mobile phone picture (Figure 17) 
and the popular slogan in posters produced in the 1960s (Figure 12 and Figure 15) 
in which ‘Chairman Mao’ and ‘Our’ are replaced by ‘My wife’ and ‘My’.  This 
exemplifies a very important change in the notion of self identity from the 
collective sense of ‘Our’ to the individual sense of ‘My’.  This implies that the 
idea of private ownership in China is developing in the new era, along with the 
rise of consumerism and the use of new technologies. 
 
Cultural Revolution imagery since Mao’s Death 
The mobile phone pictures discussed in the previous section throw light on the 
contemporary recycling of former revolutionary images in 21
st
 century.  These 
images of the past, which functioned as promotion tools in the political campaigns 
of a bygone era, are inherently outdated and irrelevant to the culture in 21st 
century China.  However, as the mobile phone pictures show, instead of being 
forgotten in the new era, particular images of the Red Guards and heroes are 
reproduced and edited to integrate with contemporary culture.  As discussed 
earlier, these images are given new captions to relate to current situations or 
reflect common ideas among the majority of people.  However, this recycling of 
former revolutionary icons is not specific to the 21
st
 century context.  According 
Gittings, the image of Mao Zedong was not absent from the people’s everyday 
lives even after Mao's death in 1976.  Previous studies, such as the work of Barmé 
and Tao, have also observed the commercialization of Cultural Revolution images, 
particularly the images of Chairman Mao Zedong and Red Guards were used in 
restaurants, tourist points and flea markets in the reform and post-reform eras.  
Thus these images have constantly remained in Chinese physical public spaces. 
After Mao Zedong died in 1976, and thereafter the smashing of the Gang 
of Four, the Cultural Revolution officially ended.
197
  However, the end of the 
Cultural Revolution did not mean the end of production and dissemination of 
Cultural Revolution imagery.  It is important to note that the Cultural Revolution 
imagery, particularly the image of Mao Zedong, has not been removed from 
                                            
197 The Gang of Four (Siren Bang) was a political faction composed of four major Chinese Communist 
Party’s officials.  It was headed by Jiang Qing, the wife of Mao Zedong, and her three other associates, 
Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen.  After Mao Zedong died in 9 September 1976, the 
gang was accused of plotting in 1966 to seize control of the Chinese Communist Party and thus the nation.  
Clark, The Chinese Cultural Revolution: a history , 26. 
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people’s everyday life after his death.  Instead, according to Gittings, a painting of 
Mao Zedong and Hua Guofeng talking in Mao's study hung for more than two 
years at the top of the escalator in the main hall of the Beijing Railway Station, 
which was only removed when Deng Xiaoping returned to power in 1979.
198
 The 
Maoist Cultural Revolution imagery continued to emerge in post-Mao era.  Many 
posters with Mao Zedong’s image were published posthumously in 1977 and 
1978. (Figure 27-30)  In many of these posters, Mao Zedong was depicted as an 
important and good political leader.  His portrait remained a part of people’s 
everyday life in domestic settings or public spaces in China in the post-1976 
context.  It is important to note that Mao Zedong, though he has been criticised, 
has never been repudiated.  The portrait of Mao hanging at Tiananmen Square is a 
good example to show Mao as an important political leader of China. 
Barmé points out that there was a ‘national revival of interest in Mao 
Zedong’ in China in the late 1980s.
199
  With this Barmé specifically points us to 
the emergence of  a particular kind of ‘Cultural Revolution Mao knick-knacks’, 
consumer items reproduced with the image of Mao Zedong in different 
commodity forms, in flea markets or ‘antique stores’ in China’s major cities.
200
  
The continuing presence of Mao and Cultural Revolution imagery in post-Mao 
China suggests its cultural significance. 
Barmé points out an important aspect of socio-economic change in the 
Post-Mao era, namely, an increasingly open market under the system of 
‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ adopted since late 1982.
201
  This change 
in China’s economy was the major factor to the emergence of ‘Cultural 
Revolution Mao knick-knacks’ in early 1980s.
202
  These consumer items were 
mainly souvenirs for foreign tourists.  Maoist Cultural Revolution posters and 
                                            
198 Gittings, "Excess and Enthusiasm" , 36. 
 
199 Barmé, Shades of Mao: the posthumous cult of the great leader , 40. 
 
200 Ibid.  
 
201 The system of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ was adopted after the Constitution of People's 
Republic of China was passed on 4 December 1982.  Source from The Constitution of the People's  
Republic of  China : adopted on December 4, 1982 by the Fifth National People's Congress of  the 
People's Republic of  China at its fifth session,  (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983), 1-19. 
 
202 The reproductions of posters and images of Mao Zedong were still prevalent and popular, and were sold at 
generally affordable prices.  This information was gathered from my fieldwork at the Panjiayuan flea 
market in Beijing in May 2005. 
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other relics in different forms are Chinese cultural products which serve as good 
souvenirs to represent China in a certain way.  I would argue that the survival of 
Cultural Revolution imagery in the post-Mao era is also because of a lack of a 
better signifier for the People's Republic of China.  After the smashing of the Four 
Olds and after ten years of development in a kind of Cultural Revolution political 
art and sloganised culture, the layout of Cultural Revolution imagery with its 
taglines has become a cultural characteristic of China.  This has a significant 
relevance to the Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures in the post-2000 era 
because, as I will argue, the Cultural Revolution imagery is adopted to indicate a 
particular type of ‘Chineseness’ in the context of the globalisation of culture and 
rapid technological development.  I will also argue that the mobile phone pictures 
in general inherited the layout of the Cultural Revolution poster: a big picture with 
attached slogans.  Thus the mobile phone picture in post-2000 era could be 
interpreted as a newly emerged cultural form that is greatly influenced by the art 
of the Cultural Revolution. 
Since the 1990s, the dissemination of the image of Mao Zedong and 
Cultural Revolution imagery has been transformed from physical objects to 
teleseries and documentaries.
203
  These were produced as video compact discs or 
digital versatile discs which were widely available in local shops in China.
204
  Tao 
has written an article about commercialised revolutionary culture in post-1989 
China in which he considers the commercialisation and commodification of  
revolutionary symbols an aspect of the ‘Chinese postmodern condition’ and 
‘Chinese consumer culture’.
205
  In Tao’s terms, this refers to the circumstance in 
which ‘there are no clear distinctions between high culture and low culture, elite 
culture and mass culture, etc.
206
  For Tao, postmodernity in Contemporary China 
does not refer to a ‘new era’, but to ‘the synchronical condition of cultural 
hybridity’.
207
  Tao gives two typical examples of how Cultural Revolution 
                                            
203 Barmé, Shades of Mao: the posthumous cult of the great leader , 40. 
 
204 There was a collection of Mao Zedong DVD and VCD series available at Guangzhou Book Centre in 
China in 2005.  Information gathered from my fieldwork at Guangzhou Book Centre in China. 
 
205 Tao, "The Commercialised Revolutionary Culture in Contemporary China" , 69. 
 
206 Ibid.  
 
207 Ibid.  
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culture/images are commercialised in the post-1990s socio-economic Chinese 
environment.  The examples are advertisements for a palmtop computer (PDA) 
and a website of an electric business in China.  Both of these print advertisements 
draw on the common symbols and the culture of the Cultural Revolution: the Red 
Guards, the Little Red Book (which appears to be The Quotations of Chairman 
Mao), the red flag (looks like the Chinese National Flag) and even uses the 
standardised layout of newspaper during the Cultural Revolution.  These Cultural 
Revolution elements are recycled and remodelled to play a role in the 
technologised socialist market economy, and thus are used in the marketing of 
palmtop computers and electric business which are seen as unprecedented 
business opportunities in contemporary China.   
The above examples exhibit the complexities involved in the 
commercialisation of Cultural Revolution culture.  In Tao’s term, the uniqueness 
of mainland Chinese modernity and postmodern rests on the situation that 
‘Chinese modernity was largely characterised by Cultural Revolution ideology… 
which lasted for more than half a century’ and ‘Chinese postmodernity is 
accordingly closely related to post-socialism or post-revolution’ which resulted in 
a legacy of Cultural Revolution pictures and images in the postsocialist cultural 
and social context.
208
  Thus, in this sense, the use of Cultural Revolution imagery 
in mobile phone pictures can be considered as a continuation of this legacy during 
the period of technological development.  While new technologies have been 
rapidly developed in China, well-rooted Culture Revolution pictures serve as a 
stable cultural source to be integrated with these new technologies and are readily 
accepted by the majority of people.   
 
Cultural Revolution imagery as new nationalistic icon 
The discussions in the earlier sections show a contemporary way of producing and 
consuming Cultural Revolution imagery in 21
st
 century China.  It is important to 
note that the prevalent use of the internet and mobile phones, particularly the 
immediate exchange of visual images via digital technologies, is a very recent 
phenomenon not only in China, but also in other parts of the world.  Thus, the 
significance of this newly emerged linkage between Cultural Revolution pictures 
                                            
208 Ibid.  
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and new technology, as well as capitalist commodification, should not be 
underestimated in a study of contemporary’s culture.  But what is apparently 
distinctive in a mainland Chinese context is the intrinsic contradiction between 
communist and capitalist ideologies in a ‘socialist market economy’.   As Dirlik 
and Zhang point out: 
Throughout the 1980s, decentralization, the “invisible hand” of the market, global 
operation and competition, and the whole cornucopia of neoliberal economic doctrines 
were engaged ideologically and theoretically in order to create a “socialist market 
economy”.  The socio-economic change that sets the platform for discussions of Chinese 
postmodernity and postmodernism is, therefore, historically a state project.  And it is the 
history of the particular state ideology or ideologies that provides the temporal as well as 
the social framework by which the process of Chinese “postmodernization” acquires 
concrete meaning as a postrevolutionary secularization.  While Chinese leaders like to 
speak of “using capitalism to develop socialism”, the current reality may well be the 
reverse: the use of “socialism” to achieve capitalist development.
209
 
In this sense, the former revolutionary imagery which is now circulated on the 
internet and mobile phones can be understood as making use of ‘socialism’ to 
realise capitalist and technological developments, which are considered crucial for 
a ‘socialist market economy’.  For example, though the contents of slogans are 
changed, we can see the assertive, determined language of the Cultural Revolution 
style which was popular during the Cultural Revolution and is ingrained in 
today’s culture through the use of mobile phone pictures.  However, in other 
words, it is not inappropriate to consider that the commercialization of former 
revolutionary imagery helps consolidate political stability under the control of the 
Chinese Communist Party.  For example, alongside the images with 
individualistic taglines shown earlier, there are also political pictures of former 
political leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping circulated as mobile 
phone pictures with slogans: ‘To Support Communism’ and ‘Proletarian 
Revolution’. (Figure 22)  In Liu Kang’s view, the socialist slogans of the Cultural 
Revolution era officially remain in postsocialist context as a means to maintain 
social order.
210
  It is understandable that while the Chinese authorities consider 
capitalism and new technologies as a way to modernise China, the potential 
                                            
209 Dirlik and Zhang, "Introduction: Postmodernism and China" , 5. 
 
210  Kang Liu, "Popular Culture and the Culture of the Masses in Contemporary China" Boundary 2: 
Postmodernism & China 24, no. 3 (1997), 105. 
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threats to the authority of the government should not be underestimated.  As my 
research reveals, a variety of Cultural Revolution images appearing within mobile 
phone pictures are available at the same time in order to offer consumers choice.  
The captions of these images are varied, but they all mix an ‘individualistic’ 
attitude with pro-government and nationalistic messages which create a new sense 
of Chinese identity.  The increasing globalisation and integration of information 
and economy has necessitated a strong and modern Chinese identity.  As Dirlik 
and Zhang point out: 
Against the universal claims of the world market, these differences are constant 
reminders of location, boundary, and community.  Thus, amid the euphoria of 
globalisation and integration, Chinese must also be experiencing what Ernest Gellner 
calls the “fatalistic” sense of belonging (and loyalty and love as a valorisation of or 
“supplement” to what you cannot choose), namely, an enhanced communal identity in 
terms of birthplace, natural environment, colour, economic condition, political culture, 
common history and language.
211
 
The official use of Cultural Revolution culture in maintaining social order could 
be a strategic state project to construct a Chinese identity based on a common 
history, culture and language.  In this sense, the influence of the revolutionary past 
in post-revolution era should not be considered as simply kitsch because ‘its 
aesthetic forms and structures are deeply ingrained in the Chinese cultural 
imaginary constituting a significant dimension in the contradiction-ridden cultural 
arena’ which can well be used to reconstruct a new Chinese identity in a context 
of technological modernization and ‘socialist market’ economy.
212
   
 Thus, the recycling of Cultural Revolution imagery in digital consumer 
items is a complex phenomenon.  As a practice and experience specific to the 
early 21
st
 century, on the one hand, it shows how a socialist ideology adapts to 
capitalist consumer culture and new technologies in urban areas, and how Cultural 
Revolution imagery is reconstructed as both nationalistic and fun.  In the 
following section I discuss an example of how the younger generation has 
enthusiastically engaged with Cultural Revolution imagery in a non-commercial 
and unofficial way, in which Cultural Revolution imagery is used as nationalistic 
emblems for an international sport event. 
                                            
211 Dirlik and Zhang, "Introduction: Postmodernism and China" , 7. 
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Cultural Revolution posters in Asian Cup 2004 
During the year when digital Cultural Revolution imagery first circulated online, 
Cultural Revolution posters were used by some Chinese teenage football fans in 
Asian Cup held in Beijing.  The Asian Cup football tournament is organised by 
the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) which was founded in 1956.  Only Asian 
countries can join this tournament where the winning team becomes the champion 
of Asia and automatically qualifies for the FIFA Confederations Cup. The Asian 
Cup had been held every four years from 1956 to 2004.
213
  China was the host 
country for the Asian Cup 2004 which was held in Beijing, the capital city of the 
country, from the 17
th
 July to the 7
th
 of August.  What is noteworthy in this 
tournament is the patriotic and anti-foreign sentiment (especially toward the 
Japanese) of the Chinese football fans, tied to the traditional rivalry between 
China and Japan.  The final match of the Asian Cup 2004 between China and 
Japan ended up in a riot by the Chinese football fans in part due to the Japanese 
victory and the historical tensions between the countries.
214
  The young fans’ use 
of posters of the aggressive, determined Red Guards is a good example to 
understand a non-commercial and less regulated deployment of Cultural 
Revolution imagery. (Figure 31)   
 
Poster No.1: China Team Go! 
At the time when a photograph of the Chinese football fans was circulated on the 
internet in July of 2004, the original of this ‘China Team Go!’ poster was 
appeared on the home page of Stefan Landsberger’s website.
215
 (Figure 32)  The 
                                            
213  However, since the Summer Olympic Games and the European Football Championship were also 
scheduled in the same year as the Asian Cup, the AFC decided that the Asian Cup after 2004 was to be 
held in 2007 and will be held subsequently every four years.  Information from AFC Asian Cup, AFC 
Asian Cup 2011 History (AFC Official Website, [cited 21 Jan 2010]); available from http://www.the-
afc.com/en/history. 
 
214 BBC News Channel, Chinese riot after Japanese victory (7 August) (BBC News online,  2004 [cited 11 
November 2009]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3541380.stm.  Also read 
Mike Geddes, Jeers as Japan win football final (7 August) (BBC News,  2004 [cited 11 November 2009]); 
available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3545474.stm. 
 
215 When I revisited the website in October 2008, this poster has been removed from the cover page of 
Landsberger’s website , (Front Page) (Stefan Landsberger at International Institute of Social History,   
[cited 10 October 2009]); available from http://www.iisg.nl/landsberger/.  Landsberger is a collector of 
Chinese political posters and owns a physical collection in Amsterdam of the Netherlands.  He started his 
‘Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages’ online in 1997 in order to provide the public with an easier way to 
access his collection.  Stefan Landsberger, e-mail message to author, 13 February, 2006. 
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original version of the ‘China Team Go!’ poster was produced in China in 1977.  
It was originally painted by the art worker Wang Yongqiang who was based in 
Shanghai following his graduation from the Shanghai Art School in 1965.
216
  Like 
many other posters produced at that time, the purpose of this painting was to 
spread and promote the current political messages and campaign to the public at 
the time.   
The visual composition and contents of this poster are simple but powerful.  
It depicts the confident and sophisticated facial expressions of two enthusiastic 
young Chinese individuals: a belligerent man wearing a floppy-eared winter hat 
and a cotton-packed jacket (mian ao), and a young woman shouldering a big 
hammer and a coil of rope with a copy of Quotations of Mao Zedong in her hand, 
positioned against an industrial field marked by oil drilling rigs and a van.  To 
look at the poster more closely, there is also a cheering crowd holding red flags in 
the background.  The confident facial expression and gaze were highly stylised to 
compose a rather standardised revolutionary posture.  The original captions are: 
‘Relentlessly criticise the “Gang of Four”, Set off a new upsurge of industry 
studying Daqing, Agriculture studying Dazhai’ (henpi “Si ren bang” qianqi 
gongye xue Daqing nongye xue Dazhai xin gaochao) and ‘Independence and 
complete self-sufficiency; Regeneration through our own efforts’ (duli zizhu zili 
gengsheng).  This poster depicts industrial success: Daqing and Dazhai counties 
had been visually depicted as two model counties of the party state during the 
1970s because of their regional achievements in oil drilling and agricultural 
mechanisation. Tools such as hammers, shovels and spanners had been used to 
represent the efforts and success of the industrial and agricultural mechanisation 
at that time. 
It is understandable why such a powerful depiction of confidence and 
determination is used in an international sporting event like Asian Cup.  While the 
teenagers had never experienced the Cultural Revolution and new taglines were 
given to the pictures, the power of Cultural Revolution imagery more than three 
decades after its original context, I argue, is less to do with the image’s  
historically specific meaning, but more likely rests on its own as an artwork with 
high quality aesthetics and powerful depictions, which fits well in any situation 
                                            
216 Stefan Landsberger, Wang Yongqiang 王永强 (Stefan Landsberger at International Institute of Social 
History,   [cited 13 September 2009]); available from http://www.iisg.nl/landsberger/sheji/sj-wyq-a.html. 
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calling for national solidarity to achieve collective goals.  Thus it is 
understandable to see such a powerful picture used by fans cheering the Chinese 
team in international football tournaments.   
 
Poster No.2: Chinese Football Nothing Is Impossible!!! 
Another poster that the Chinese fans used shows a large assembly of armed 
workers, peasants and soldiers (the PLA) in the front line of a battlefield under a 
big disembodied portrait of Mao originally produced in 1969.  (Figure 33) The 
armed masses holding high red flags and The Little Red Book with a high morale 
surge towards to the direction that Mao directs.  This image was captioned ‘All 
People of the World Unite, To overthrow American imperialism! To overthrow 
Soviet Revisionism! To overthrow reactionaries of all nations!’ (Quan shijie 
renmin tuanjie qilai, Dadao meidi! Dadao Suxiu! Dadao geguo fandongpai!).  
The romantic and idealised floating representation of Mao suggests the idea that 
Mao was spiritually with the people all the time without geographical constraints.  
The Little Red Book which represents the selected works of Mao reinforces the 
Mao cult encouraged by the party during the Cultural Revolution period.  The 
meaning of this picture was also guided by the caption to stress national unity and 
the defeat of the American imperialism and Soviet revisionism.   
These depictions of the three key social roles constructed in the revolutionary 
China – worker, peasant and soldier – along with the red flags, The Quotations of 
Mao Zedong and the floating disembodied Mao portrait were typical of the early 
Cultural Revolution posters.  During the initial stage of Cultural Revolution 
between 1966 and 1969 there were political campaigns against American 
imperialism and Soviet revisionist.  This poster was part of the whole political 
visual discourse which corresponded to these campaigns.  The depiction of an 
angry advancing crowd was another visual ‘vocabulary’ commonly used in the 
composition of pictorial art in China during the late 1960s. The defensive 
fierceness and assertiveness of the masses characterized the Cultural Revolution 
posters in the 1960s, while the posters in the 1970s placed relatively more 
emphasis on a positive perseverance in the development of national infrastructure 
and education of the next generations with the goal of making China an advanced 
country with cultured and civilised people.  These were the cultural symbols of 
cultural unity and nationalism.  Again, this example further demonstrates the 
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social practice of young Chinese in choosing nationalistic symbols.  This was 
associated with the curiosity and creativity of an emergent Chinese nationalistic 
identity of this young generation. 
The Chinese opposition to American imperialism and Soviet revisionism had 
continued since the outbreak of the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet split in the 
1950s.  The political campaigns against the reactionaries of other nations had 
become a hot topic for political art production.  The slogan which encouraged the 
unity of the people and proletarians around the world came from the idea that 
China was the saviour of the proletarians, and could rescue them from the 
oppression of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.  The new caption ‘Chinese 
football – nothing is impossible’ made by the football fans was followed by three 
exclamation marks, which may be influenced by the original slogan in which the 
exclamation mark was used three times to stress the defeat of the three major 
threats: the American imperialist, the Soviet revisionist and other reactionaries in 
the world.  The original slogan is no longer relevant to the context of 2004, and 
this provides an interesting opportunity of replacing the inappropriate slogans of 
the past. It is also a source of irony in which the teenagers can poke fun at the 
culture of the past.  It is amusing because of the contrast between the past and the 
present, but in this example the nationalistic sentiments and social solidarity 
depicted in the picture functioned as an instant, ‘ready-made’ template that was 
available for use.  In fact, it is not very different from how Cultural Revolution 
pictures were used during the Cultural Revolution in the sense that collections of 
model pictures were published as references books so that art workers could easily 
reproduce the pictures and adapt them for different situations. 
 
Poster No.3: A great victory a red-letter day for the people 
The original poster was made in order to celebrate the inauguration of chairman 
Hua Guofeng, the successor to Mao in 1977.  (Figure 34)  The cheerful muscular 
drummer in the poster beats a big drum with a crowd of participants dancing in 
the ceremony under a giant yellow sun.  The slogan ‘A great victory a red-letter 
day for the people’ (weida de shengli renmin de jieri) appears in the picture. Red 
balloons, ribbons, slogans, a big red sun and a carnival comprise the background 
of the picture and denote a notion of happiness.  The original preferred reading of 
this picture can be understood in the slogan written on the white ribbons in the 
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image which states ‘Closely united in the surroundings under the central party’s 
leadership of Chairman Hua’ (Jinmi de tuanjie zai yi Hua Zhuxi weishou de dang 
zhongyang zhouwei).  This kind of carnival depiction has been particularly related 
to the National Day and the advertising of the leadership of important political 
figure.  The slogan on the ribbon was one of the discursive statements at the time 
when the message ‘All party, army and minority groups in the country are closely 
united in the surroundings under the central party’s leadership of Chairman Hua’ 
was used in different artistic forms and publications at the time.   
Unlike the previous two poster examples, this poster was re-used by the 
Chinese fans without any textual appropriation, which may be because the image 
was already about a national celebration and fitted well with the context of the 
football tournament.  Interestingly, the cheerful smiles and the dance celebration 
depicted in the poster were very similar to the happy smiles of the young Chinese 
fans and the gestures of the public in the Asian Cup.  The white ribbons in the 
poster, for example, were well matched with the inflated plastic bags used by the 
supporters.  This poster was different from the rest because it created a more 
celebratory mood which contrasted with the aggressive and defensive tone of the 
other three posters.   
This example shows an important aspect of the reproduction of culture in 
contemporary China.  As we can see the original slogan written in the picture (i.e. 
the one written on the white ribbon) can hardly be read in the reproduction used 
by the teenagers.  Like many other pirate copies of cultural products (such as 
films, books, branded goods), a copy of the original is meant to be used 
temporarily because trendy goods are meant to be short-lived.   The quality and 
delicate details of the original are usually not valued. 
 
Poster No.4: an advancing crowd with the Little Red Book 
Another poster adopted by the Chinese fans was characterised by the red-white-
black colour composition which was typical of Chinese political posters produced 
in 1967.  (see the poster on the left, Figure 31)  Some distinctive features of this 
poster can be identified.  First of all was the wood-block print style of the poster 
which characterised poster production in the initial stage of the Cultural 
Revolution. (examples such as Figure 5, Figure 14 and Figure 25)  The use of 
woodcuts in printing has been adopted by the Chinese Communists in the new 
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woodcut movement of the 1930s.
217
 At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, 
large quantities of posters had to be produced.  Thus, woodcuts offer the best way 
to produce multiple copies when printing presses were in short supply.  Also, the 
extremely short-lived nature of the posters, due to the nature of rapidly changing 
political campaigns, made the quick wood-block printing method the most 
popular form of poster production.   
This type of wood-block print was usually made in a limited colour range 
with red, black, white, and sometimes also yellow as the most popular colours.  
Another feature was the depiction of the advancing masses.  In many posters 
produced in 1967, the theme of the advancing masses, usually with an assertive 
gaze, was commonly used to promote the Mao Cult and the reading of the Little 
Red Book, and also to encourage the united action of the people.  It is useful to 
compare this poster with other Chinese political posters produced in 1967. The 
posters produced in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution were very often 
characterised by ‘extremist’ expressions and illustrating scenes of popular activity 
‘packed with vivid detail’ with a bolder and brasher style.
218
  This kind of extreme 
political imagery which represents the radical campaigning in the 1960s can be 
seen as comparable to the post-2000 socio-economic reform.   
The youth’s use and reception of Cultural Revolution imagery in a context 
which stresses national identity and unity can be seen as a way to realise the 
transforming, modern Chinese identity. The striking visual elements are recycled 
in the new artefact, yet the more historically specific information, like the original 
captions, are removed and replaced.  One implication of this is that though China 
has changed dramatically in terms of its economic and technological 
developments, and the young generation has become more and more distant from 
the history and culture of the Cultural Revolution, the images are still meaningful 
and powerful.  It is important to note that although it suggests that the teenagers 
found it fun to play with Cultural Revolution images, their playfulness is not 
completely liberal and is strongly confined to nationalistic expressions. 
 
                                            
217 Gittings, "Excess and Enthusiasm" , 30. 
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Cultural Revolution imagery, technology and the Chinese government 
Dirlik and Zhang give a useful account of postmodern conditions in China which 
is inspirational in understanding contemporary China in 21
st
 century.  They point 
out that in the contemporary Chinese context, ‘the tradition now appears as a 
means to transcend the modern’ and ‘the postmodern is also the postrevolutionary 
and the postsocialist.’
219
  In the case of mobile phone pictures, Cultural 
Revolution images are the source of traditional culture in the sense that they are 
cultural products specific to a historical moment.  Thus in order to promote the 
widespread  use of mobile phones, which is at the same time significant to the 
development of the capitalist consumerism in the country, Cultural Revolution 
images may be able to help in the combination between new technologies and 
local cultures.  This is a complex situation wherein the revolutionary past has a 
role to play in the post-revolution era, yet at the same time the Chinese leaders 
promote the ‘use of capitalism to develop socialism’.  In this paradoxical situation, 
Dirlik and Zhang are perhaps right to describe Chinese postmodernity ‘as a site of 
struggle between the legacy of the past and the forces of the present’ within which 
‘the problem of representation in a radically unstable situation of everyday life 
and culture’ seems inevitable.
220
  It is inevitable because, as manifest in mobile 
phone pictures and football fans’ posters, today’s China is very dynamic in taking 
up the latest information in order to improve efficiency in everyday life.  But the 
rapid development of new technologies in cities further widens the technological 
gap between rural and urban areas.  For example, although the internet and mobile 
phone technologies can allow a quicker exchange of information, they are still too 
expensive for many people who live in underdeveloped areas in rural China, and 
therefore these regions are still very much excluded from the use of information 
technologies.  According to the statistics provided by CNNIC, by the 31
st
 of 
December 2009, the number of Chinese internet users had reached 384 million.  
But by the 30
th
 of June of the same year, the penetration rate of the internet in 
China was only 25.5%, which was concentrated in particular urban social groups 
residing in cities.
221
  In this sense, the reception of a Cultural Revolution image by 
                                            
219 Ibid. , 4. 
 
220 Ibid. , 8. 
 
221 Internet Statistics, The 24th Survey Report [Online] (China Internet Network Information Center,  2009 
[cited 10 January 2010]); available from http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/10/13/94556.pdf. 
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an urban citizen can be very different from that by a villager in rural China.  
Moreover an urban netizen, such as one of the afore mentioned football fans, is 
likely a resident of Beijing who got hold of the Cultural Revolution images from 
the internet (may be on Stefan Landsberger’s website), and may read about 
Cultural Revolution imagery from a European perspective.  To select Cultural 
Revolution imagery from other cultural symbols to represent China could be an 
indirect result of the legacy of Western collection practices.   
Liu reminds us of the local-global interactions that are not only nourished 
in Chinese postmodern conditions, but also in the contributing factors to such 
conditions.  Liu writes: 
The local, as opposed to the global, in the present context may first refer to the 
geopolitical and cultural specificities of China, but it then may have to be narrowed to the 
more specific, to the more concrete social practices of particular locations and 
temporalities within China.  Ultimately, the global postmodern has to return to the most 
fundamental question of the everyday.  The everyday is not only both global and local (in 
the sense that it must encompass different temporalities, subjectivities, spaces, and public 
spheres); it may also serve as a site that unravels and critiques the contradictions and 
fallacies of the age.
222
 
Liu’s point is useful to help understanding the Cultural Revolution mobile phone 
picture and the text messaging social practice as a significant case for 
understanding the unique Chinese postmodern condition.  Internet browsing and 
mobile phone usage are becoming a social norm especially among the urban 
young generation with their strong buying power.  The number of teenage 
netizens was 175 million by the 30
th
 of June 2009, which accounted for 51.8% of 
all internet users in the country.  In 2004 when I first found Cultural Revolution 
images created as mobile phone pictures, MMS business initiatives were just 
beginning.  As an article in the Beijing Times on the 7
th
 of March 2004 states: 
China's Internet portals are increasingly reporting that they are expanding their 
multimedia messaging service (MMS) as they believe the business will become another 
"gold mine" following online advertising, online gaming and text-based short messaging 
service (SMS) to prop up their profit growth.
223
 
                                                                                                                        
 
222 Liu, "Popular Culture and the Culture of the Masses in Contemporary China" , 102-103. 
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To encourage the development of MMS business, China’s 
government pushed the development of a faster technology called 
3G which allows the transmission of voice, data and video along 
with much faster wireless internet access.224  According to the list of the 
most searched topics in 2009 for the search engine www.baidu.com and the 
Internet portal www.ifeng. com., the keyword ‘new 3G technology’ was 
one of highest ranked searches, along with ‘the launch of China's Growth 
Enterprise Market’ and ‘H1N1’, which suggests that Chinese netizens 
closely follow information technology trends. 225   On the 28th of 
February 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao went online to chat with 
Chinese netizens.  Following this over 400,000 posts were received 
on the Xinhuanet website, a government-owned portal, and more 
than 100,000 text messages were sent by mobile phone users to 
respond to Wen Jiabao’s online chat.226  This suggests that ‘the rising 
number of Chinese online population has dramatically changed the political 
landscape of the country.’227  Regardless of the uneven distribution of 
resources, information technologies still play a significant role in 
transforming social and communicative  practices and, even more 
significantly, in building up a ‘sincere’ image for the Chinese 
Communist government which is concerned with its public voice.228   
 Some may argue that although there are a huge number of 
Internet and mobile phone users in China, the actual users still do 
                                            
224 Ibid. 
 
225  Global Times, Most searched of 2009 (People's Daily,   [cited 22 August 2009]); available from 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90782/90873/6884401.html. 
 
226  China Daily, Online chat focuses on pressing issues (People's Daily,  2010 [cited 1 March 2010]); 
available from http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6904657.html. 
 
227 Xinhua, Chinese premier to go online to meet massive netizen questions (People's Daily,  2009 [cited 1 
March 2009]); available from http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6603121.html. 
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not exceed more than forty percent of the country’s population.  
However, I would argue that what is even more instructive in the 
statistics is that this population of netizens and mobile phone users 
were almost entirely absent before 2000.  The social practice of 
Internet browsing and using mobile phones in the everyday life is 
an unprecedented phenomenon, and it is temporally specific in 
China from the early 2000s onwards.   
Early in 1983 the Chinese government had already recognised the power 
of new technologies in the country’s reform as the former premier Zhao Ziyang 
announced that ‘the new technological revolution or information revolution... may 
help China skip over some of the stages which have been experienced by other 
developing countries.’
229
 However, facing the penetration of Western technologies, 
the Chinese government also identified the need to develop local Chinese popular 
culture to counter-balance the impacts of Western culture.  Since the mid-1990s, 
Jiang Zemin allowed and encouraged China’s popular-culture products to 
compete with the commercial popular culture of the west.
230
  With a cautious 
approach, the Chinese government continues to have a welcoming attitude toward 
the development of new technologies because it is considered to be a crucial force 
for the postsocialist market economy; in fact, Jiang Zemin stated that ‘none of the 
four modernizations would be possible without informatisation.’
231
 Thus 
technological innovation has been linked with economic development.  The so-
called Golden Bridge Projects which started in 1993 were deliberately the 
outcome of this principle with a view to building a national infrastructure as a 
path to modernization, economic development and national unity. 
232 
                                            
229 Zhao Ziyang’s speech is analysed in Carol Lee Hamrin China and the Challenge of the Future (San 
Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), 213. This is also cited by Geoffry Taubman, "A Not-So World Wide 
Web: The Internet, China, and the Challenges to Nondemoncratic Rule" Political Communication 15, no. 
2 April (1998), 262. 
 
230 Quoted after Liu, "Popular Culture and the Culture of the Masses in Contemporary China" , 105. 
 
231 Jiang Zemin’s slogan can be found in the preface of a book series on informatisation. See Xinxihua 
Congshu (Book Series on Informatisation),  (Beijing: Jinghua Chubanshe, 1998), quoted after Yuezhi  
Zhao and Dan Schiller, "Dances With Wolves? China's Integration into Digital Capitalism" 3, no. 2 April 
(2001).  
 
232 Peter Lovelock, E-Government In China (TRP Publications, it is a pre-publication version of the chapter 
to appear in Zhang Junhua, Martin Woesler, eds.(2002) China's Digital Dream,  2002 [cited 18 March 
2010]); available from http://www.trp.trpc.com.hk/publications/e_gov_china.pdf.  
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 Regardless of the political and cultural reasons mentioned, 
the use of Cultural Revolution symbols or images for commercial 
goals is ultimately a business decision because these are visually 
exploitable images which are financially lucrative.  In response to a 
‘Cultural Revolution’ themed restaurant in Hubei province, Tao 
writes: 
From the restaurant owner’s point of view, the Cultural Revolution and the symbols, 
images and rituals related to it, have great commercial value.  They were taken out of 
their original context and were put into the commercial context.  This does not mean 
sincere nostalgia, but is a new kind of commercial promotion strategy, a fashionable 
lifestyle, the commercialisation of the memory of revolution.
233
 
Thus the consumption of digital Cultural Revolution images through mobile 
phones is a complex phenomenon in 21
st
 century China.  While the culture of 
Cultural Revolution imagery is used to make the implementation of new 
technologies smoother, the meaning or implication of the practice as a whole is 
always interwoven into political, economic and social factors.  Similar to other 
material cultural artefacts, Cultural Revolution mobile phone text pictures are 
socially constructed and thereby have significant socio-economic and political 
implications. The debate of whether the Internet is being used to create a 
homogenous or a heterogeneous world has been popular among scholars. While 
the Internet has been seen as providing the conditions for a certain universal 
homogeneity, its function as a platform for social communication and interactions 
also provides possibilities for individuals and groups to challenge dominant 
ideologies.
234
 As such, new technologies such as the Internet and 
telecommunications must be seen as a system and source of tools, materials, 
structures and techniques through which local populations seek to integrate certain 
cultural products or practices into their own practices and beliefs, and in so doing 
create hybrid cultures.
235
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Cultural Revolution imagery and urban culture  
Thus new technologies can be used to preserve, challenge and reinvent cultural 
identities and traditions.
236
  For this reason, a study of mobile phone picture 
messaging as both a cultural practice and product which rely heavily on the 
application of new technologies is useful for understanding the emerging 
postsocialist cultural identities and the tensions between traditions and modern 
culture.  The Internet and mobile phone text messaging in China have increased 
the flow of images within local communities.  However, differences in generation, 
education and financial backgrounds contribute to unequal access to the Internet 
and telecommunication networks in China.  Consequently, these new technologies 
have contributed to the emergence of new local hierarchies among Chinese groups.  
I would argue that the rise of local electronic media products such as MMS 
pictures in postsocialist China contributes to the process of redefining 
cultural/social identity among Chinese communities within the context of 
technological innovations and consumerism. 
 The examples of Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures given in the 
last section exhibit features of a social and cultural phenomenon in the 
postsocialist Chinese context of technological innovation and consumerism.  In 
this section I will focus on ‘deconstructing’ the elements in the pictures and the 
associated social practices involved in the circulation and consumptions of these 
pictures, which I argue demonstrates an aspect of the Chinese postmodern 
condition. 
 As discussed earlier, the Chinese postmodern condition is characterised by 
a ‘cultural hybridity’ in the site of which both ‘revolutionary culture’ and 
‘postsocialist culture’ coexist.  To understand Cultural Revolution MMS pictures 
as a feature of the Chinese postmodern condition, it is essential to ‘deconstruct’ 
the revolutionary and postsocialist elements in these pictures and practices.   
 The examples of MMS pictures exhibit some typical Cultural Revolution 
visual elements such as Little Red Books, Red Guards (in particular their 
uniforms), and characters from films and ballets from the Cultural Revolution era 
(i.e. the role of Wang Dachun in The White-Haired Girl and Li Yuhe in Red 
                                            
236 Ibid., 613. 
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Lantern, etc).  In the last example a Cultural Revolution picture is attached to the 
famous Chinese Communist motto announced by Mao Zedong in the late 1930s.  
The sources of the pictures can be traced back to the original film, ballet 
performances and posters from the revolutionary era.  However, there is an 
enormous gap between the original and the MMS pictures.  Although these 
pictures may be perceived as somehow historical or traditional in the postsocialist 
era, the extracted images with original captions removed blur the boundary 
between the revolutionary past and the postsocialist present, and accordingly, the 
Cultural Revolution elements are distilled into a representation of the generalised 
distancing between the past and the present.  Cultural Revolution elements are 
historical, yet how these were originally integrated into everyday life no longer 
matters in the postsocialist context.  The value of Cultural Revolution culture 
seems that it represents the revolutionary past as a whole. 
 On the other hand, the postsocialist condition further complicates the 
meaning of Cultural Revolution culture.  Though the Cultural Revolution images, 
pictures and symbols are generally distanced and differentiated from the post-
revolution present, the juxtaposition of the traditional from the contemporary 
seems to legitimise their presence in a different context.  For example, the social 
role of the Red Guards no longer exists in the post-revolution era, but the 
historical slogan which is still officially promoted in today’s contemporary China 
validates the meaning of the whole MMS picture in the present.  What interested 
me the most is not the Red Guards, which were popular and influential during the 
Cultural Revolution, but their gaze which suggests determination and courage, 
and it is these attributes which become the actual ‘link’ between the Cultural 
Revolution culture and contemporary culture.   
The picture of the educated youths leaving their homes in cities and 
learning from the peasants in the countryside (mobile phone picture: Figure 18; 
the original: Figure 25) is apparently irrelevant, outdated and could be nostalgic 
for some people in today’s China.  In 1968, the youth were sent into the 
countryside as a government measure to control the destructive movements of the 
Red Guards in cities, during which political posters played an important role in 
coordinating campaigns.  In the present context, the same type of image also 
targets and appeals to the urban youth.  Therefore the Chinese government’s 
censorship of search engines and blocking online social networking services such 
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as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are the government’s measures of regulating 
the social use and dissemination of information in contemporary China.
237
  If a 
large number of text messages are sent out from one mobile phone within a short 
period of time in today’s China, the SMS function of this phone may be 
terminated and the service blacklisted by the service provider.
238
  Thus, the 
development of the Internet and mobile phone technology in China 
does not mean that Chinese residents are able to freely exchange 
information with other mobile phone users globally. 
By playing with the Little Red Books in Mao’s era and Red pocket lucky 
money (hongbao or yasuiqian), the power of Mao Zedong’s thought which used 
to mobilized the masses is now replaced by the joy of receiving lucky money.  
This serves as a good example to show how the meaning of an important 
revolutionary icon – the Little Red Book – has been destabilised in the urban 
youth consumer culture.   
 Because both the filmic and theatrical performance of Red Lantern and 
The White-Haired Girl played such an important role in the art and politics of the 
Cultural Revolution, these films and performances were the integral parts of 
everyday entertainment.  Red Lantern (or The Legend of the Red Lantern) and The 
White-Haired Girl, replete with outspoken communist revolutionary themes, were 
two of the eight famous model operas or ballet plays that were permitted during 
the Cultural Revolution period in between 1966 and 1976.  Red Lantern was one 
of the most popular model operas during the Cultural Revolution.  Though these 
works of performance art were saturated with political content specific to the 
Cultural Revolution period, many of these works still remain popular more than 
three decades after the Cultural Revolution.  The local Chinese pop music band 
Zero Point and the actor Ke Shouliang and their songs were well-known across 
the country after winning local popular music awards in different cities in China.  
The lyrics of these pop songs are found to be captions of some mobile phone 
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pictures.  The popular culture during the Cultural Revolution (i.e. model operas 
and the ballet) is now combined with the popular culture of the post-revolution 
period (i.e. pop songs) in the production of a completely new form of postsocialist 
popular-culture product (i.e. MMS pictures).  The tension between the popular 
culture of different eras exists between the forms of the Cultural Revolution 
period, such as the Beijing model opera, ballet performances and political posters, 
and those of the post-Mao or post-Cultural Revolution, such as pop songs, rock 
bands, actors, and certainly the Cultural Revolution images in MMS pictures. 
 The large-character poster was one of the major means of political 
expression during the Cultural Revolution.  Its origin began after Nie Yuanzi and 
some others published a large-character poster on the 25
th
 of May 1966 at Beijing 
University to express their discontentment with how the university being 
dominated by anti-revolutionaries. Chairman Mao Zedong showed his support and 
widely reproduced the poster in the press.  Since then large-character posters were 
prevalent in every kind of public debate during the Cultural Revolution.  In the 
height of the Mao cult, contents of The Quotations of Mao Zedong were widely 
disseminated on hand-written posters.  In addition to this, the metaphor of Mao as 
the ‘red sun’ was ubiquitous during the Cultural Revolution.  Phrases like 
‘Chairman Mao is the red sun in my heart’ and ‘Chairman Mao is the red sun in 
people’s hearts’ were widely repeated, reproduced and disseminated in different 
forms, such as in posters, musical dramas (e.g. Hongtaiyang), books, vases, etc.  
In the current examples of MMS pictures, the metaphor of the red sun has now 
been changed from Chairman Mao to one’s wife.  These MMS picture suggests 
that Mao Zedong was an important political figure during the Cultural Revolution, 
whose significance was comparable to the warmth and strength of the sun.  Under 
the legacy of revolutionary culture in the post-revolution era, the ‘red sun’ still 
signifies someone irreplaceable in one’s life, but it is no longer exclusively used 
to represent Mao Zedong.  It is also worth noting another layer of tension 
conjured up in the mixing of Cultural Revolution pictures and contemporary 
culture.  In the revolutionary past only a limited range of slogans, mainly 
quotations of Mao Zedong or the latest political goals, would appeared on 
political posters.  As the current example demonstrates, it is the words of a famous 
actor that are published and circulated on MMS pictures.  This suggests that 
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popular culture is becoming the dominant ideology in contemporary Chinese 
societies, even as fragments of Cultural Revolution culture still remains. 
 In the earlier discussion I mentioned that Tao has pointed out some 
features of commercialised revolutionary culture in contemporary China.  One of 
these is about the power of appropriation.  It is very true that without the idea, the 
artistic skills and specific technologies of appropriation, MMS pictures and 
culture would not have been made available.  In my opinion, the appropriation of 
Cultural Revolution culture is not only powerful in providing the conditions for a 
cultural hybridity.  The ‘cut-outs’ of images resulting from editing determines 
what Cultural Revolution elements remain in the MMS pictures.  Although the art 
during Cultural Revolution was produced according to political guidance and only 
a limited range of expression was allowed, it did nevertheless cover quite a vast 
range of topics including industry, commerce, technological development and 
agriculture, and a period of ten years encompassed different stages and 
revolutionary movements.  Accordingly, it is instructive to find out that only a 
limited range of Cultural Revolution elements are appropriated in MMS pictures.  
Those which present a rather serious or sacred looking image are usually chosen.  
Examples include the classical revolutionary posture which references the ‘Paris 
Commune’ style, the confident and spiritual gaze of individuals, the Little Red 
Book which contained highly political and influential writings during Cultural 
Revolution and the ‘red sun’ which symbolised the political leader Mao Zedong.  
It is interesting to see that the same Cultural Revolution image can be 
appropriated to make two different versions of MMS pictures published on the 
same page of a website.  From the MMS business point of view, that typical kind 
of Cultural Revolution image should have a great commercial value which has the 
potential to be the most popular MMS picture.  In fact, ‘You are the best 
(excellent)’ MMS picture ranked in the top ten most popular MMS pictures in 
2004.   
 Beyond the visual properties, one important implication in the 
commercialised Cultural Revolution MMS pictures phenomenon is that they are 
concrete instances which exemplify the vital role of postsocialist technological 
innovation in the Chinese postmodern condition.  The new media and practices in 
relation to telecommunication networking (i.e. the use of mobile phones, text 
messaging and Internet browsing) are manifestations of the socio-economic 
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transformation of everyday life in China, particularly in post-2000 era.  The above 
examples of Cultural Revolution mobile phone text pictures demonstrate a legacy 
of revolutionary images and how these images are recycled, circulated and 
consumed by and through the Internet and the social practice of mobile phones 
text messaging.  What is worth noting is that the use of these new technologies 
and related practices tends to be dominated by an ‘urban-young-student’ 
community.  According to CNNIC statistics, in July 2007, over 75 percent of the 
162 million Internet users live in urban areas.  The urban penetration rate has 
registered over 20 percent, while the rural rate was only 5.1 percent.  Over 70 
percent of Internet users were aged 30 or below, in which nearly half of this 
population aged was between 18 and 24 and over 50 percent were students.
239
  It 
is also instructive to know that mobile phone Internet access has developed 
rapidly in China: over 75 percent of wireless users are mobile phone users and 
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), a wireless communication network which 
is usually accessed from a mobile phone or a PDA, has become fashionable with 
an increasing number of mobile phones users in China.
 240
   
From these cases we can find that one of the major features of the Chinese 
postmodern condition – postsocialist technological innovation – is characterised 
by the increasingly prevalent use of the Internet and wireless telecommunication 
technologies, and as mentioned, the use of these is dominated by a specific group 
of young students in urban areas.  In contemporary China, the development of the 
Internet has been officially promoted by the government because it is seen as a 
pervasive ‘platform for both personal life and social, economic and cultural 
activities’ which promotes ‘the development of the whole social economy.’
241
  
From the mobile phone pictures we can see that the technology itself suggests a 
fashionable lifestyle, and through the application of which different kinds of 
cultural products can be produced and reproduced.   
                                            
239 Internet Statistics, The 20th Survey Report [Online] (China Internet Network Information Center, July 
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The use of Cultural Revolution culture with new technologies to some 
extent validates Dirlik and Zhang’s claim that the tradition is now utilised as a 
way to ‘transcend’, which suggests that if these images were circulated in the 
printed forms of the past, they now appear in new virtual forms conveyed by 
mobile phones and the Internet; and if these images were once collectively 
appreciated in physical public spaces, they are now available in a virtual space 
which can be accessed individually, anytime and anywhere.  It is this networked 
individualism and its consumption, which seemingly ‘challenges’ tradition, and 
characterises the fashionable lifestyle and the uniqueness of postsocialist 
consumerism and cultural products.   
The above cases exemplify a legacy and reappearance of revolutionary 
culture in a Chinese postmodern condition dominated by technological 
innovations.  Certainly, as Barmé and Tao suggest, this is a special phenomenon 
of postsocialist China.
242
  The visual images of the Cultural Revolution create a 
powerful contrast between the revolutionary and the post-revolutionary.  In the 
process and outcome of recycling the culture of the past in the postsocialist 
culture, some typical elements or properties are made particularly visible/invisible 
in their reappearance.  This can be explored through four main aspects of Cultural 
Revolution MMS pictures. 
The distance between the past and the present is amplified by the contrast 
between the past images and the present culture and technology.  But the gap is 
further widened when the original properties (i.e. social and political functions, 
contexts, etc) are lost in translation.  The concept of Cultural Revolution images 
as being traditional is still valid. But when these images are radically removed 
from their original properties they then become floating signifiers, which are open 
to interpretations and mean different things to different people.  
This kind of violation is, in Tao’ terms, an ironic alteration of the original 
meaning of revolutionary symbols.  Tao points out three major features of this 
Chinese social and cultural phenomenon: 1)  the appropriation of Chinese 
revolutionary culture resulted in a cultural mixture, cultural hybridity and the 
holistic meaning of revolutionary culture was ironically interpreted; 2) this kind of 
appropriation deconstructs the hegemony of socialist ideology; and 3) 
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consumerism is becoming the new dominant ideology.  When revolutionary 
culture and post-revolutionary culture coexist in Cultural Revolution MMS 
pictures, revolutionary symbols become the visual platform where the past is 
borrowed, challenged and violated.  There is a taste for a parodic distortion of the 
former politic pictures/symbols in the postsocialist consumer and commercial 
culture.  Borrowing Tao’s term, the appropriation of political symbols of the past 
is not simply a reworking of the visual.  It is an appropriation of the revolutionary 
culture, and accordingly, of the revolutionary socialist ideology.  This use of 
Cultural Revolution symbols as a postsocialist phenomenon suggests the capacity 
or power of the revolutionary culture to persist in the new era, albeit in a different 
way.   
Walter Benjamin’s term ‘aura’ is helpful in understanding the role of 
Cultural Revolution symbols in the postsocialist Chinese context.  The power of 
Cultural Revolution symbols in MMS pictures does not merely come from the 
aesthetic quality of the art itself, as the quality (display resolution) of the pictures 
very often deteriorates after being reworked, reproduced and displayed in the 
small screen of mobile phones.  Rather the ‘aura’ of Cultural Revolution pictures 
inheres to the external attributes, such as the lifestyle of mobile phone messaging, 
the pleasure of parodic irony and in the cursory challenge to the authority,  which 
composes the whole experience and popularity of the images beyond their original 
context.  Benjamin wrote in the essay ‘The Work of Art in The Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’ that the technique of reproduction was dominated by 
the medium of film which detaches the image/object from the domain of tradition.  
In postsocialist China, it is the Internet and telecommunication networks which 
allow a plurality of reworked copies to meet the customers, and reactivates the 
appropriated object.  What is different in the postsocialist Chinese context is that 
it is not simply a ‘liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage’ that 
makes new technologies powerful tools.  The traditional value of Cultural 
Revolution pictures is only partially ‘liquidated’ and then distilled and condensed 
into a generalised idea of ‘the Cultural Revolution’, which is adapted for use in a 
different age.    
To further explore the external attributes of Cultural Revolution popular 
culture in postsocialist China, it is useful to understand the active agents in mobile 
phone text messaging practices.  Although mobile phone text messaging has been 
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prevalent around the world, the infiltration of this technology in postsocialist 
China is a recent phenomenon.  As we have discussed earlier with statistics, more 
than half of the country’s population do not use the Internet, mobile phones or 
other mobile devices.  However, it is instructive to know that among these users, 
those who live in cities are still the dominant group.  For example, in 2002, in the 
same year that Cultural Revolution MMS pictures first appeared in China, over 40 
percent of the total population of Internet users came from only five urban areas: 
Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang with the rest of the 60 
percent scattered in 26 other cities.
243
  It is also worthy to note that even it is an 
urban phenomenon, the distribution of the netizen population in urban areas is by 
no means even, with internet users in Guangdong and Beijing attributed to over 20 
percent of this population. Thus, presumably, the consumption of Cultural 
Revolution mobile phone text picture is only popular among urban youth who 
come from the major city areas of China where the ratio of owners of computers 
and mobile phones is high.   
A term ‘thumb community’ (muzhi yizu) refers to the community who use 
mobile phone text messaging as their main communication channel in daily life.  
This mobile phone messaging therefore comprises an unprecedented industry and 
market in China called the ‘thumb economy’ made up of a number of mobile 
phone value added service providers and run wireless and online businesses.  An 
idea of being ‘modern’ or ‘edgy’ is related to the use of new technologies as the 
essential tools for obtaining the latest information of the day.  The main reason for 
relating ‘modern’ or ‘edgy’ culture with new technologies is that the Internet and 
mobile phone messaging, for example, enable the fastest way to get the latest 
information.  The speed and the idea of ‘being the first to know’ are particularly 
important in the ‘modern’ life style of the young community, otherwise one would 
become excluded from the young trendy community.  There are top-ten charts of 
downloading multimedia pictures and ring tones on multimedia wireless service 
providers’ websites.  The word ‘the latest’ (zuixin) is stressed in most of the 
multimedia wireless products as a way to market the products to the ‘thumb 
community’.  Using new technologies as the tools of communicating and 
                                            
243 Internet Statistics, The 9th Survey Report. 
Chapter Three 
 - 122 - 
receiving information has become a social practice to acquire a modern ‘lifestyle’ 
and a young urban cultural identity. 
 Cultural Revolution pictures and symbols persist in the era of the Cultural 
Revolution and the postsocialist in China.  In the revolutionary past, Cultural 
Revolution images were sacred and authoritative because of the cult of the 
political leader and the role of art in the political agenda at the time.  They were 
ubiquitous in everyday life.    In the postsocialist present, the same kind of images 
become icons of being cool and trendy after they are associated with the latest 
technology and mainstream popular culture.  On one hand, Cultural Revolution 
culture functions like the ‘vocabulary’ of the local ‘slang’ in the postsocialist local 
culture.  It is a manifestation of one’s cultural identity in a social space.  In the 
revolutionary past, the images were reproduced in physical printed forms in large 
quantity; but in the postsocialist present, the images are everywhere as long as you 
have the downloading tools with you.   
Though the older generation have their own personal experience to the 
revolutionary culture and history, the place, rituals, gaze and audience are 
redefined in a youth dominated popular culture which requires specific know-how 
to consume.  Cultural Revolution culture is depoliticised in the popular culture 
products which are considered as having no political threat to the authority, yet in 
a way they are re-politicised as a tool to form new cultural and social identities.  
On the other hand, Cultural Revolution images are borrowed, recycled and 
appropriated in a ‘Chinesisation’ of the foreign new technologies which are 
regarded as being beneficial to economic development, yet potentially threatening 
to national unity and stability.   While Chinese leaders sloganise ‘using capitalism 
to develop socialism’, and some may argue it is more valid to describe it as ‘the 
use of socialism to achieve capitalist development’, it may be useful to think of 
this in a different way: neither of them overrules the other, but it is the interaction, 
combination and negotiation between them which make the Chinese postmodern 
condition unique.  It is a coexistence of the revolutionary culture, consumer 
culture, technological innovations and urban youth popular culture. It is the 
representations of Cultural Revolution culture, but not Cultural Revolution culture 
itself, that people are consuming.  As well, the consumption of these images also 
provides the pleasure of confrontation and challenge to the authority represented 
by the Cultural Revolution culture.   
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Conclusion 
The contemporary renewal of Cultural Revolution imagery is an interface of the 
contrasting meanings of China’s radical socio-economic and cultural 
transformation since 2004, if not earlier.  It is closely related to a culture which is, 
on the one hand, well-rooted in the legacy of the culture of Cultural Revolution; 
but on the other hand, there is a newly emergent urban youth techno-culture 
following the development of information technologies such as the Internet and 
mobile phone networks.  As my analysis suggests, Cultural Revolution imagery as 
the cultural icon of the revolutionary past continues to have commercial value in 
21
st
 century Chinese culture.  Former political images and icons such as Red 
Guards, the Little Red Book, national heroes and model operas are made into 
mobile phone pictures.  These images still play a role in Chinese urban consumer 
culture as virtual consumer items three decades or more after they were first 
produced during the Cultural Revolution. 
 When I retrieved the mobile phone pictures discussed in this chapter on 
the 1
st
 of March 2010, some of them are still available for downloading while 
others are not because some service providers are now closed down.
244
  However, 
those Cultural Revolution images as mobile phone pictures remained on 
www.tom.com are no longer as popular as they used to be in 2004.  This is 
informed by the fact that these pictures are not on the main page of the website 
anymore.  Although its popularity fades, they are still evidence of their temporary 
popularity in 2004, a year of which marks the revision of the Constitution of 
China, and a changing and more open attitude towards idea of private ownership.  
The Cultural Revolution images with contemporary taglines which promote more 
individualistic personal values and affirmation of oneself instead of a collective 
self circulated online in the same year.  With this I argue that the culture of the 
Cultural Revolution, particularly the imagery, is still useful to understand 
contemporary Chinese culture and society because of its continuing recurrence, 
and most importantly, its integration with digital technologies in the formation of 
new cultural forms.   
                                            
244 The irretrievable websites include mms.etang.com and www.wapol.com. 
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With the use of Cultural Revolution imagery in mobile phone pictures, a 
connection between two similar kinds of Chinese mass cultures across eras is 
established.   The young Red Guards used to actively engage with the original 
Cultural Revolution imagery during the 1960s and 1970s, whereas a group of 
young urban educated consumers are the target market of these digitally 
reproduced revolutionary images in the 21
st
 century through new technologies.  A 
great deal of socio-economic transformation is evident when two different ways 
of engagement are compared and contrasted.  The lesson of the radical and 
destructive Red Guard movements in the past may be able to explain China’s 
determination to regulate and control Internet and mobile phone communications 
through which political actions or social movements could be coordinated and 
arranged. 
However, irrespective of the potential threat the development of new 
technologies is constantly supported by the Chinese authorities as important tools 
to achieve modernisation.  I argue that the vision of implementing new 
technologies to modernise the country has appeared a long time ago, although its 
actual realization can be seen since the early 1980s; and the social use of mobile 
phone, texting and Internet surfing as part of everyday life in urban cities has only 
become widespread recently.  Technologies are significant to the development of 
China which is considered being able to make the country into a modernised and 
internationally recognised power.  This is understandable in a context of the full 
government support in technological development and the nationalistic sentiments 
of Chinese people expressed in international sports events.  Technology is the 
hope of China to shorten the period of time to become an internationally 
recognised developed country.  Alongside with the increasing prevalence of the 
use of information technologies, some new slogans attached to the Cultural 
Revolution digital images, though somehow trivial and apparently apolitical, 
suggest a strong sense of individualistic attitude toward the sense of self and 
capitalist consumer culture.   
The integration of Cultural Revolution culture with new technology and a 
capitalist commodification produces a Chinese identity with a sense of both 
integration and difference.  It is in the sense that Chinese cultural symbols are 
available to the capitalist and technological tendency to yield different products 
under different social circumstances.  This was in a context when both consumer 
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culture and new technologies just entered China in the early 2000s, and visual 
sources were needed to produce cultural and technological consumer items for the 
population at the time when not many Chinese local cultural symbols could be 
drawn on.   
Dirlik and Zhang suppose that ‘a new brand of Chinese nationalism in the 
marketplace seems to have everything to do with [the] residual socialism lending 
itself to the most unrelenting forces of late capitalism.’ However, I would argue 
that, by using examples of Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures, this 
‘lending’ was not without official control in the sense that the borrowing of 
Cultural Revolution images was not completely liberal.
245
  The concept of 
‘Chinese nationalism in the marketplace’ is important in understanding the 
circumstances which led to the Internet and mobile phones becoming an 
inevitable part of urban Chinese kids’ everyday experience.   It is not illogical to 
correlate the Cultural Revolution mobile phone text pictures with a postsocialist 
project of a ‘sinicisation’ of Western technological products to counter Western 
cultural intrusions.  Therefore these aspects form the background to the 
development of Cultural Revolution mobile phone pictures which could be 
interpreted as a strategic way to achieve a government-supported socio-economic 
transformation, and to enhance a sense of ‘modern’ and successful Chinese 
identity in popular culture.   
The young Chinese generation can conveniently make use of the imagery 
of the past as a safe site to satisfy their curiosity and endeavour to engage with the 
upbeat culture at the time.  To explore the popularity of using Cultural Revolution 
imagery in the social practices among the young Chinese generation, I refer to the 
young football fans’ borrowing of a Cultural Revolution poster for the Asia Cup 
in 2004.   
This research also reveals that the former revolutionary icons, such as the 
Little Red Books and the image of Mao Zedong, received special attention from 
different interest groups.  For example, the idea of the former Little Red Book, 
which signifies the thoughts of Mao Zedong, has been used at the basis for 
Chinese ‘Hong Bao’ (red pocket money) which emphasises personal joy and 
                                            
245 Dirlik and Zhang, "Introduction: Postmodernism and China" , 6. 
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satisfaction with capitalist values.
246
  This implies huge contradictions between 
communist and capitalist ideologies.  This example is best compared with a 
similar manipulation of the Little Red Book in Hong Kong in 2004, as discussed 
in Chapter Four, in which it was used by a Hong Kong designer to express the 
local sense of individualism.  Both of these borrowings are good examples of how 
the revolutionary icon is used to construct new meanings in current cultures.  The 
Chinese government’s tolerance for the reworking of Cultural Revolution imagery 
in the making of digital mobile phone pictures interestingly contrasts with the 
Chinese ambassador’s intervention on the reworking of the portrait of Mao 
Zedong in Singapore in 1999 as discussed in Chapter Five.    
Among all the above considerations, it is also important not to forget that 
all these examples occur in a context in which the history of Cultural Revolution 
is still a taboo in today’s China, and it is not acceptable to refer to it in public.  In 
this sense, is the official tolerance of essentialised, partial Cultural Revolution 
imagery through new information technologies in urban environments a strategy 
of the Chinese government to diffuse potential political motivations and 
curiosities of the educated urban teenagers in 21
st
 century China? 
 
                                            
246 ‘Hong Bao’ (Red Pocket money) is a monetary gift in Chinese tradition which is given during holidays or 
special occasions especially Chinese New Year. 
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Chapter Four 
Cultural Revolution imagery in post-2003 Hong Kong:  
lifestyle, identity and difference  
 
 
Hybridization…is not about people who eat Chinese food, wear Italian clothes, and so on; 
but sometimes, in a very complimentary way to me personally, it’s been taken to mean 
some kind of diversity or multiple identities.
247
  
Gary A. Olson and Lynn Worsham on Homi Bhabha’s concept of ‘hybridization’ 
 
 
Identities are constructed through, not outside, difference.
248
 




This chapter discusses the recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery in post-2003 
Hong Kong popular culture.  It argues that Cultural Revolution imagery is the sign 
of accumulative tensions that have been created by the cultural differences 
between Hong Kong and mainland China since 1967, and, more significantly, tied 
to the changing political and social circumstances in post-2003 Hong Kong.  The 
use of Cultural Revolution imagery in Hong Kong popular cultural products is 
considered as a way of marking cultural differences by constructing a mainland 
Chinese cultural ‘Other’ and contrasting it with Hong Kong culture.  The imagery 
is a product of cultural hybridization – the mainland cultural symbol is negotiated 
with Hong Kong’s local culture which is itself comprised of a group of cultural 
minorities from China who always see, and are always seen, as both partly 
belonging to China and not belonging enough.  This chapter further argues that 
Cultural Revolution imagery in post-2003 Hong Kong popular culture 
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commodities and sites is a way of making a transnational articulation through 
which Hong Kong positions itself. 
 In this chapter I analyse several political posters of Hong Kong produced 
by Chinese leftist in 1967 and compare these pictures with some examples of 
Cultural Revolution imagery used in recent Hong Kong popular culture.  With this 
I demonstrate that the imagery in post-2003 Hong Kong is similar to but 
somewhat different from the original Cultural Revolution imagery of the 1960s.  I 
argue that this specific way of using historical and cultural resources of the 
mainland Chinese ‘Other’ is closely related to specific social and political events 
which took place in the post-2003 Hong Kong context.  This cultural practice, I 
argue, is not merely a simple repetition of unrelated cultural codes of the ‘Other’.  
Instead, it can be understood as a process of identity formation through using a 
representation which is an established cultural symbol of the mainland, but at the 
same time functions as a meeting point between Hong Kong and China.  Thus this 
practice is shaped by the changing relation between Hong Kong and China.  This 
analysis of Cultural Revolution imagery, as I argue all the way through, fits into 
the larger discussion about the formation of a post-2003 Hong Kong identity, 
which is constructed through difference and exclusion.   
 This chapter begins with analysing three posters produced in the People's 
Republic of China in 1967 which were dedicated to the dissemination of Maoist 
communist ideologies in British controlled Hong Kong.  These posters are 
significant for a study of the relation between the Cultural Revolution in China 
and the 1967 riots in Hong Kong, and more importantly, these pictures were a 
crucial part of the Chinese leftist movements in British Hong Kong.  These leftist 
posters, and the related riots, had a significant impact on how the majority of 
people in Hong Kong position themselves in relation to China since 1967.  The 
original posters are then compared with some Cultural Revolution imagery in 
Hong Kong popular cultural products in the post-2003 context.  My analysis 
reveals that this recurrence of imagery draws on both similarities and differences 
between Hong Kong’s current situations and the campaigns took place in China 
during the Cultural Revolution period.  This chapter exposes how the cultural 
resources of the past are selectively borrowed and strategically revised to fit into a 
new context.  This borrowing and revision is closely related to how the post-
handover relation between Hong Kong and China is interpreted, which is shaped 
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by the wider historical circumstances since 1967.  The last section of this chapter 
explores how my analysis of Cultural Revolution imagery fits into larger 
discussions about identity formations, cultural difference and transnational 
articulation.  To contextualise the cultural difference between Hong Kong and 
China, it is necessary to understand the British colonial policy in Hong Kong and 
the development of a Hong Kong self-awareness. 
 
British policy in Hong Kong since 1967 
A television news programme on the Chinese leftist riots in Hong Kong in 1967 
was broadcasted to foster an irrational, impulsive and destructive image of the 
Chinese leftists.  In one of the programmes about the riots, the narrator states: 
In retrospect, 1967 was a busy year for the Hong Kong police because they needed to 
deal with a group of impetuous rioters.  The police’s patience, capability and bearing was 
praised by Hong Kong citizens and highly respected by the people around the world.
 249
 
The official television broadcast of this narrative can be understood as a British 
counter-discourse to the anti-British political posters produced by the Chinese 
leftists in Hong Kong at that time.  It is interesting to compare the accounts of the 
same event in Chinese political posters.  While the anti-British slogans on the 
Chinese leftist posters stressed the violent and brutal actions taken by the Hong 
Kong police, the British Hong Kong official narrative of this period of history 
particularly emphasized the ‘patience, capability and bearing’ of the police.   
The narrator of the TV news programme briefly summarised that the riots 
in 1967 eventually ended because the rioters were unable to win the support of the 
majority of Hong Kong citizens.  Regardless of whether it was because the lack of 
support from the mainland Chinese government or the violent suppression by the 
colonial Hong Kong police that caused the riots to fail, the Hong Kong 
government endeavoured to seek the people’s support by indicating the difference 
between the people of Hong Kong and those of mainland China.
250
  The year of 
1967 was described in this programme as ‘an eventful year’ stirred by the 
aggressive and destructive Chinese leftists who made Hong Kong citizens upset 
and worried.   
                                            
249 Hong Kong Government News programme produced in the 1960s cited in Su-kueng Ho and Feng-siu Li, 
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The negative sentiments among the Hong Kong people were soon 
assuaged by improved living conditions as a result of a series of social reforms.  
After 1967 the British Hong Kong government sought to boost the economy and 
improve the living conditions of people.  For example, ‘Hong Kong week’ was 
one of the important economic campaigns promoting the idea that ‘Hong Kong 
people buy Hong Kong-made products’ and ‘Hong Kong people join together to 
achieve prosperity’.  It was initiated by the British Hong Kong government in 
1967 to divert local sentiments toward the common goal of economic prosperity.  
After the 1967 riots, sixteen floor public housing estates were built with elevators, 
with and elevators operating from the ground floor reaching the 8
th





   
 
Development of a Hong Kong self awareness 
After the Chinese leftist riots and the colonial government’s measures in 1967, a 
renewed sense of self-awareness was experienced by the Hong Kong people.  
Initially advocated by the government, a Hong Kong local identity distinct from 
mainland China gradually developed.  A culture of public discussion on TV 
became prevalent after 1967.  For example, a TV programme called ‘Weekly 
Forum’ (Mei zhou lun tan), which was a forum for open discussions about social 
issues at the time, paved the way for a public discourse based on the respect of 
individual opinions.  In general, the riots and other events that took place in 1967 
resulted in an unprecedented sense of local awareness which stressed the 
‘unbeatable’ competency of the Hong Kong people predominantly in terms of 
economic prosperity.  Economic performance was the major source of power and 
identity among the people of Hong Kong at this time. Wealth and economic 
success conferred power and status to the city and the residents.   
  The point here is that the Hong Kong experience of the riots in 1967 and the 
political posters advanced by the Chinese leftist in Hong Kong was inevitably 
influenced by the counter-discourse produced by the colonial government.  Hong 
Kong, as a British Colonial city, did not experience the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution in the same way as mainland China did.  Ever since 1967 the people of 
                                            
251 Hong Kong Housing Authority, Historical Background of Lower Ngau Tau Kok (II) Estate (Government 
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region China,  2009 [cited 10 October 2009]); available from 
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/hdw/en/aboutus/events/community/heritage/about_history_p3.html. 
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Hong Kong have been influenced by a culture of free speech cultivated by public 
discussions and other colonial reforms.   
China reclaimed Hong Kong in 1997 as stipulated by the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration of 1984.  The 1997 ‘handover’ of Hong Kong was a significant 
historical moment which brought the established Hong Kong cultural identity into 
an immediate tension and confrontation with mainland Chinese national identity.  
These tensions and cultural differences were renewed in 2003 as manifested by 
the mass rally organised by a group of Hong Kong citizens who were dissatisfied 
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government and 
were worried about a decline in the status of their democracy and a deterioration 
in human rights.
252
  These historical moments were significant in shaping the 
continually shifting relationship between Hong Kong and China, and thus animate 
the particular Hong Kong reception of Chinese revolutionary cultural symbols.   
 
Post-1997 Hong Kong situations 
The use of Mao’s image as an icon was under official control of the socialist 
Chinese regime.  After China’s advertising law was passed in 1994, the 
commercial exploitation of Mao’s image was banned,
253
  although this restriction 
did not necessarily lead to a decline of its use in tourist products or other 
commercial goods such as bags and wallets. The official ban seemed to turn the 
commercial use of Mao’s icon into a challenge against the government of China.  
In 1995 the marketing of Mao, which was inspired by the former revolutionary 
                                            
252 According to the ‘Two System’ principle, Article 23 provides that Hong Kong shall enact relevant national 
security laws ‘on its own’.  Also see Kelley Loper, "A Secession Offence in Hong Kong and the 'One 
Country, Two Systems' Dilemma" in National Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong's article 
23 Under Scrutiny, ed. Hualing Fu, Carole J. Petersen, and Simon N.M. Young (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2005), 189.  The Chinese government attempted to justify its proposals to pass the 
National Security Bill by comparing them to relevant laws in other Western countries such as the US and 
the UK.  However, the government overlooked the different situation in post-1997 Hong Kong.  Hong 
Kong has reverted from the Colonial British rule to Chinese sovereignty in which Hong Kong citizens had 
no political right to exercise power over this decision.  Hong Kong has become a small wealthy and 
separated city-state under a different system within the developing but still vastly poor People’s Republic 
of China.  The passing of the National Security Bill was regarded as a threat to further restrict the political 
and human rights of Hong Kong citizens.  See Carole J. Petersen, "Introduction" in National Security and 
Fundamental Freedoms: Hong Kong's article 23 Under Scrutiny, ed. Hualing Fu, Carole J. Petersen, and 
Simon N.M. Young (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 2 and D.W. Choy and Richard 
Cullen, "Treason and Subversion in Hong Kong" in National Security and Fundamental Freedoms: Hong 
Kong's article 23 Under Scrutiny, ed. Hualing Fu, Carole J. Petersen, and Simon N.M. Young (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 187. 
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China, appeared in the British colony of Hong Kong.
254
  The play with Cultural 
Revolution fashion and Mao kitsch were very successful and deemed ‘stylish’ and 
‘up-market’ in Hong Kong in the mid 1990s.
255
  In the same year when Mao’s 
image was used in stylish and expensive goods, Asian fashion designer Vivienne 
Tam (who studied fashion design at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University) used 
reworked portraits of Mao to create clothing for modern life in her Spring 1995 
collection.
256
   
Since the establishment of the HKSAR, the Chinese government policy of 
‘One Country Two Systems’ has been implemented which guarantees that Hong 
Kong’s socio-economic status quo will continue after its return to Chinese 
sovereignty at least during the first fifty years.  Since then the Chinese central 
government has retained a policy of non-interference: Hong Kong has maintained 
its capitalist economic system, legal system and the Hong Kong people have also 
retained their previous life-style – ‘horses are still racing, people are still dancing.’  
However, this policy of non-intervention does not mean that no concern is given 
by the Chinese central government.  Under the influence of the Asian financial 
crisis, Hong Kong has been facing financial difficulties and challenges.  
According to Gao Shangquan, with its strengthening economy, China was able to 
provide effective support for Hong Kong’s economy.  Gao points out that China 
would provide strong support for Hong Kong in order to ensure local stability, and 
since the 1997 the partnership has become the new pattern of relations between 
Hong Kong and the mainland.
257
  In my opinion, it is not only that the Chinese 
central government has provided strong and effective support for Hong Kong, but 
due to the economic crisis Hong Kong has also become more dependent on its 
motherland for help.   
While the new pattern of relations between Hong Kong and the mainland 
reflects a certain level of reliance of Hong Kong, particularly in its economy, on  
the mainland, the incorporation of a territory which was strongly influenced by 
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British colonial rule for more than a century and which differs from Chinese 
mainland culture is inevitably fraught with difficulties.  Lau Siu-Kai points out 
that one of the difficulties has to do with the identity of Hong Kong Chinese.  Lau 
argues that while Hong Kong Chinese use the term ‘Hongkongese’ to refer to 
themselves and ‘Chinese’ to refer to the people who come from the mainland 
(Daluren or Neidiren), ‘Hongkongese’ and ‘Chinese’ are the two major identities 
which the Hong Kong Chinese consider meaningful.  My understanding of Lau’s 
argument is that the two terms have a locally-specific meaning for the Hong Kong 
Chinese community which, in my opinion, perceive a differentiation between 
Hong Kong and the mainland as something intrinsic.    
The majority of the Hong Kong Chinese community is composed of 
immigrants originally from China who decided not to return to Communist China 
and settled in the British colony of Hong Kong in the 1960s when the control over 
the movement of people between Hong Kong and mainland China was 
tightened.
258
  In his discussion on Hong Kong-mainland relations from a social 
and cultural perspective, Lau points out some political and historical factors that 
play an important role in contributing to the formation of Hongkongese identity 
before Hong Kong’s hand-over to China.  These factors led to an isolation of the 
Hong Kong Chinese from the social and cultural changes in China, and a 
differentiation between the capitalist and international economy of Hong Kong 
and the closed Maoist China after 1949. The colonial British rule of law and 
human rights was preferred by Hong Kong Chinese community, as well as the 
situation where people were more likely to have a better standard of living and 
economic opportunities.
259
   
Lau also comments that for historical reasons the Hong Kong Chinese saw 
themselves culturally different from mainland Chinese: 
[T]here was in Hong Kong a strong sentiment against the socialist regime in China…the 
wide disparity in the levels of development and standards of living between Hong Kong 
and the mainland generated a sense of superiority among the Hong Kong Chinese…the 
dominance of vernacular Cantonese among the Hong Kong Chinese and the gradual 
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emergence of a distinctive popular culture based on that dialect played a significant role 
in moulding the Hongkongese identity.
260
  
This sentiment towards mainland China and sense of superiority over the 
mainlanders had been formed long before the territory’s handover to China in 
1997.  Some would propose that this Hong Kong sentiment and sense of cultural 
supremacy would gradually wane, particularly under the strong economic support 
of China during the financial crisis.  However, although many aspects of Hong 
Kong society have benefited from its unity with the motherland, a conglomeration 
between Hong Kong Chinese identity and mainland Chinese identity has not 
developed since 1997.  This is evident in the ‘psychological barrier’ among Hong 
Kong residents in their response to the government’s policy of a 24-hour opening 
of immigration control points between Shenzhen and Hong Kong.  As Bono Lee 
comments, both the geographical and temporal barriers are eliminated with the 
passing of this policy, but psychologically Hong Kong Chinese are still full of 
worries about the issue of a further union with mainland China a decade after 
unification: 
The attitude of Hong Kong Chinese towards the issue of 24-hour opening the 
immigration control point between Shenzhen and Hong Kong is that they always need a 
one-way assured protection: we can go to your side but you are not welcome to come 
over to our side. Thus, the immigration control point to many Hong Kong people is like a 
symbolic and necessary filter.
261
      
Very similar to Lee’s observations, Lo Kwai-Cheung also notices the growing 
negative feelings of Hong Kong locals toward recent mainland Chinese arrivals 
and their wish to have the right of control over a mainland Chinese influx after 
1997: 
In January 1999, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal ruled that mainland residents 
with at least one parent who was a legal resident of Hong Kong had a constitutional right 
to join their parents in Hong Kong.  The ruling intensified the Hong Kong people’s anti-
immigrant sentiments…on the other hand, mainland visitors make up the largest portion 
of the city’s tourist industry.  Twelve million tourists are expected to visit Hong Kong per 
year and about one-third will come from China.  Hong Kong’s fear of a huge influx of 
mainlanders results in the SAR authorities’ erecting hurdles to restrict the flow of tourists 
and immigrants to the city.  But when the city’s economy is in dire straits and it becomes 
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desperate for tourist money, the SAR government pleads with Beijing to relax visa 
restrictions on mainland visitors and business people who want to visit.
262
 
In the post-handover context, the people of Hong Kong had never considered 
themselves as mainland Chinese.  However, the regional Hong Kong identity 
which had long been constructed under the British colonial rule remained 
unchanged.  Therefore the post-1997 Hong Kong identity was constitutive of both 
the legacy of the British influence and mainland Chinese contributions and 
regulations.  While the society has been under the positive influence of the 
Chinese government’s economic measures, there are signs of a struggle for 
political rights against mainland Chinese rule.   
In his discussion on the formation of Hong Kong identity in local culture, 
Lo points out that early in the 1940s Hong Kong filmmakers already appropriated 
Chineseness as a means of realising a hybrid Hong Kong identity formation: 
[T]he popular culture in and of Hong Kong moves toward or away from Chineseness at 




Lo’s point is relevant for this study in the way it shows how the appropriation of 
mainland Chineseness is not a novelty of the 21
st
 century.  In fact, Chineseness 
has long been used as a vehicle for the transformation of local identity in Hong 
Kong popular culture.  With this, I propose that any other similar representations 
of Chineseness in the future should also be adapted and used by Hong Kong locals 
for their ongoing cultural purposes.   
But more importantly, Lo points out that a distinctive characteristic of 
Hong Kong popular culture, namely, Chineseness has very often been exploited 
for commercial purposes, and socio-culturally this creates a space in which 
‘members of various communities might somehow relate and recognize 
themselves as Chinese’.
264
  In his study of Hong Kong culture, Lo does not intend 
to assert the uniqueness of Hong Kong culture and identity.  Instead, he considers 
how Hong Kong culture operates as ‘an articulation of “transitional Chineseness”’ 
which is by no means fixed: 
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Hong Kong cannot become Chinese without the Chinese changing into something else.  
The post-1997 subjectivisation of the Hong Kong people as Chinese nationals 
demonstrates that a different notion of Chineseness can always gratify new demands and 
that the return of the colony to its motherland might present a challenging perspective 
from which to examine the supposedly incontestable status of national identity.
265
 
Post-1997 Hong Kong identity was marked by a tension between a strong local 
cultural identity and a reliance on the mainland Chinese government.  Hong 
Kong’s fear of communist China, established since 1960s, seemed to be 
diminishing when China provided strong support during the economic recession 
of the 1990s.  However, the relationship between Hong Kong and the Chinese 
government deteriorated once again when Article 23 of Basic Law proposed by 
the Chinese government was deemed to be a threat to freedom of speech in Hong 
Kong.  It is in this context that the use of Chinese Revolutionary imagery emerged 
in Hong Kong.  I argue that to a certain extent the current relationship between 
Hong Kong and China is reflected in the juxtaposition between mainland Chinese 
cultural symbols and their articulation in various cultural elements in Hong Kong. 
 
Cultural Revolution imagery of the British Hong Kong in 1967 
While revolutionary culture is deeply ingrained in the minds of those mainlanders 
who personally experienced the Cultural Revolution, or functions as a site of 
cultural imagination for younger Chinese generations, it is important to note that 
Hong Kong, as a former British Colonial city, never experienced that period of 
history in the same way.  For example, when the series of political campaigns 
known as the Cultural Revolution kicked off in mainland China in 1966, the Hong 
Kong experience of the Chinese communist movements were associated with the 
riots in 1967 which were known by Hong Kong leftist as the ‘resistance to the 
brutal rule of the Hong Kong British government’.
266
  The riots initially started 
with strikes, demonstrations, throwing stones, burning cars and the police use of 
tear gas.  But in the later stage the rioting turned into attempted assassinations and 
the production of hand-made bombs.  Some political posters from the Poster 
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Collection produced in 1967 illustrate these scenarios of aggressive Hong Kong 
leftist demonstrators holding Little Red Books and banners with anti-British 
slogans.  These posters belong to the theme of anti-British imperialism in the 
Cultural Revolution campaigns.  In the paragraphs which follow I discuss three 
posters in this theme produced in Guangdong in the People's Republic of China 
which aimed to respond to the 1967 riots in Hong Kong.  These posters were 
produced in the early Red Guard phase (1966-1968) during which the style of 
pictorial art was predominantly characterised by depictions of physical violence 
and furious gestures.
267
   
In the first example, with the title Blood Debts Need To Be Repaid By 
bloodshed!, a huge figure of a worker leads a crowd of demonstrators and holds a 
wounded corpse in his arm.  (Figure 35)  In the front row, a female demonstrator 
is holding The Little Red Book which represents Quotations of Mao Zedong. The 
other male demonstrator is holding a banner written with the slogan ‘Fiercely 
resist the fascist brutality of British rule in Hong Kong’ (Qianglie kangyi 
GangYing dangju de Faxisi baoxing!).  This poster depicts the violent suppression 
of the British colonial forces which caused the death of Chinese people.  This 
poster was closely related to the situation in British Hong Kong in 1967 when a 
series of riots took place during that year.  When the Cultural Revolution began in 
China, there were a series of large-scale and sustained disturbances in Hong 
Kong.
268
  The initial demonstration was in 1967 at a factory of the Hong Kong 
Artificial Flower Works owned by Li Ka-Shing and turned into a riot.  This 
original industrial dispute was seized upon by the local communists as a way to 
mark their entry into the Cultural Revolution, which hitherto had been exclusively 
in mainland China. The Hong Kong groups organised mass rallies and 
coordinated violent actions similar to the ‘Smash the Four Olds and enemies’ 
campaigns and rallies of the Red Guard movements in the mainland.
269
  For 
example, like the Red Guard, the Hong Kong rioters used a lot of posters and 
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banners with slogans, and they also held high The Little Red Books during their 
rallies.  These were the key features of Red Guard movements particularly in the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution.  In another poster, entitled We Must 
Triumph — The British In Hong Kong Must Be Defeated, a typical Red Guard 
style rally is depicted.  The picture presents a crowd of demonstrators arm in arm, 
holding large character banners with slogans, holding The Little Red Book and 
shouting.  Again, posters, slogans and The Little Red Book are the key features of 
a mass rally in the style of the Red Guards.  The slogans, which also suggest the 
contents of what the demonstrators are shouting, included: ‘Imperialists and all 
reactionaries are paper tigers’, ‘Quote by Chairman Mao: be firmly determined, 
do not fear sacrifice, surmount all difficulties, strive for victory’ and ‘The Chinese 
people are not to be humiliated’; these corresponded closely to the major themes 
of the then current campaigns in China.   
These posters played a part in disseminating Maoist slogans in British 
Hong Kong.  An emphasis on the violence of British colonial suppression against 
Chinese people aimed at gaining the support of the Hong Kong.  In this sense, 
while political posters were the tools for consolidating the leadership of Mao 
Zedong, they played a different role in the Hong Kong context where they 
functioned as a media through which criticisms against the government could be 
expressed.  It is this different function of the political posters in Hong Kong’s 
history that plays a part in shaping the current role of Cultural Revolution imagery 
in contemporary Hong Kong culture.  
Another poster, entitled Give Tit For Tat, Fight Resolutely!, depicts an 
angry and violent crowd of demonstrators who smash miniature figures of the 
then current British Hong Kong governor David Clive Crosbie Trench (戴麟趾) 
and the Hong Kong police with their fists and other objects such as chairs, 
wooden sticks and bottles.  (Figure 37) This picture describes the scenario of a 
march to the Governor House in Hong Kong during which the aggressive rioters 
put up large character posters at the entrance gate of the Governor’s House.  This 
depiction is closely related to the march of pro-Chinese communist activists to the 
Governor’s House on the 15
th
 of May 1967, which was broadcasted on television 
news after the riots were quelled.  The poster used the typical Red Guard style of 
using miniature cartoon figures to represent enemies who are being smashed by 
huge, strong fists of the Chinese communists.  However, this exaggerated style 
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might give an impression of an untruthful report of the event.  According to Alice 
Y.L. Lee, the Chinese Communist failed to gain full support from the majority of 
Hong Kong citizens during the riots partly because of the exaggeration and bias of 
the leftist media who only reported the victories and the positive side of the 
Chinese Communists.
270
   
Through a study of the leftist Chinese posters disseminated in Hong Kong 
in 1967, I reveal a different function of these posters in the British Hong Kong 
context.  First, the poster was a visual point of reference through which the 
immediate conflict between the Maoist Communist movements and the British 
colonial government was represented.  Second, to many Hong Kong people, the 
posters, which had anti-British slogans, were sites where criticisms opposing the 
ruling authority could be expressed.  Third, under the British colonial rule, the 
posters (and also the leftist newspapers) were effective ways to become informed 
about Maoist China.  Thus in general these pictures in the Cultural Revolution 
style played an important part in visualising not only the Chinese communist view 
of Hong Kong under foreign colonial rule, but were also significant in that such 
visual narratives ‘positioned’ Hong Kong in the middle of two authorities: the 
communist Chinese and the colonial British.  The role of the posters in Hong 
Kong in 1967 can be understood as providing representations within which a 
sense of difference between Hong Kong and the mainland, and thus an early sense 
of Hong Kong identity, was constructed.  This sense of difference, I argue, has 
remained in Hong Kong culture all the while since 1967, and shapes how Hong 
Kong positions itself in its relation with the mainland.   
 Through analysing these Cultural Revolution posters which circulated in 
Hong Kong in 1967, I reveal that the Cultural Revolution imagery, which played a 
distinct role in Hong Kong, is significant in the study of the China-Hong Kong 
relations and in understanding why Hong Kong has been seen, and continues to 
sees itself as a Chinese city different from the others.  It is important to note that 
this difference was further consolidated when the British colonial government 
carried out reforms and measures to improve the standard of living and to create a 
local sense of belonging among Hong Kong citizens (for example, the public 
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housing policy and Hong Kong Festival).  For the above reasons, I argue that the 
recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery in post-1997 Hong Kong context can 
be considered as the reminder of the in-between positioning of Hong Kong in both 
the post-colonial and re-colonised eras.  Thus, what is more significant in the 
study of the recurring of Cultural Revolution imagery in post-handover Hong 
Kong is to look at the extent to which Cultural Revolution imagery still serves as 
the site where the difference between Hong Kong and China is visualised, and 
therefore, reveals key aspects of current China-Hong Kong relations in the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century.  In the following section I give examples of some 
recurring Cultural Revolution images in post-2003 Hong Kong in order to explore 
the meaning of these images in the contemporary context. 
 
The Little Red Book, Red Guards mass assemblies and sloganising culture 
Daily life during the Cultural Revolution was dominated by the thoughts and 
influence of Mao Zedong, Red Guards movements and mass assemblies.  As Paul 
Clark describes, the typical daily scenario during the Cultural Revolution was 
marked by Chairman Mao’s summoning of young people: 
The start of the Cultural Revolution saw young people answering Mao Zedong’s call to 
rise up against the establishment (excluding himself) by organizing themselves into Red 
Guards (Hongweibing, literally red guarding soldiers).  On several occasions when he 
appeared before millions of adoring Red Guards and other young people in Tian’anmen 
Square, Chairman Mao was very often in an army uniform.
271
 
According to the above description, we understand that social life during the 
Cultural Revolution was dominated by the culture of mass gatherings in open 
public space with millions of Red Guards as the major participants.  Alongside 
this practice, these Red Guards also sang or read out slogans.  Clark writes about 
the details of this culture: 
With the start of the Cultural Revolution, musical attention turned most immediately to 
what we might call “praise songs” for Chairman Mao and “rebel songs” for Red Guards 
groups.  To the existing repertoire of songs glorifying Mao’s wisdom were added such 
gems as ‘Wish Chairman Mao a Long Life (Zhufu Mao zhuxi wanshouwujiang) and 
‘Chairman Mao is the Red Sun in the Hearts of the People of the Whole World (Mao 
Zhuxi shi quan shijie renmin xinzhong de hong taiyang).  These songs, known as “loyalty 
songs” (zhongzi ge), served as the musical part of the ‘loyalty dances’ (zhongzi wu), 
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performed by amateurs in factories, offices, and in the street during the late 
1960s...Another novel kind of song was “quotation songs” (yulu ge), setting the 
quotations and passages from the so-called Little Red Book to music…
272
 
The marching of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution was not only 
characterised by singing or reading from The Little Red Book.  It was also marked 
by the rebel movements of these young people who deliberately destroyed the 
‘four olds’ (po sijiu).  Some posters of the Cultural Revolution illustrated the Red 
Guard movements marching in the street with their Little Red Books and banners 
with slogans.  One of the typical examples was produced in Jilin in 1967 which 
demonstrates the function of The Little Red Books and banners. (Figure 13)  This 
poster illustrates a young man holding aloft his Quotations of Mao Zedong 
followed by a crowd of people who are also holding their Little Red Books and 
banners with slogans such as ‘Revolution is guiltless!’ (Ge ming wu zui) and 
‘Revolutionary Spirits Long Live!’. (Ge ming zao fan jing shen wan sui)   
 
The 1967 riots and aftermath 
The spread of the Cultural Revolution from the mainland to Hong Kong was 
marked by social chaos and economic stagnancy.  The original labour dispute was 
quickly subsumed by a series of large-scale demonstrations, marches and noisy 
street protests with stone-throwing and even the use of hand-made bombs in the 
city and outside of the Government House.
273,274
  Not only were Hong Kong’s 
economy and social stability seriously upset, but the Hong Kong British colonial 
government was also challenged by the riots.
275
   
These riots traumatized the people of Hong Kong and resulted in a fear of 
the ‘communist’ regime. There was a suspicion of whether China’s ‘communist’ 
resumption could provide an environment for Hong Kong to maintain its 
economic prosperity.
276
 The intensification in emigration from Hong Kong after 
1984 demonstrated the reluctance of Hong Kong citizens to cede the city’s 
sovereignty to China.  With the impact of the Tiananmen square incident in 1989, 
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anxiety among Hong Kong people was evident. Rampant emigration continued 
and people urged the British government to grant the right for all Hong Kong 
citizens to abode in the United Kingdom.
277
  Under the British Nationality (Hong 
Kong) Act in 1990, fifty thousand families in Hong Kong were granted British 
citizenship.  To enable some of the population to obtain British citizenship, the act 
sought to maintain citizens’ confidence in Hong Kong and to counteract the 
effects of losing many of its most talented residents through emigration.  The 
emigration trend and the right to abode in the United Kingdom issue suggest the 
Hong Kong people’s reluctance to be governed by the Chinese authority in the 
pre-handover period.   
The significance of these riots in Hong Kong is not about whether the 
agitators succeeded or not in overthrowing British colonial rule.  The riots in 1967 
brought a terrible blow to the people of Hong Kong at that time which generated a 
domestic crisis of confidence toward the Chinese communist regime.  At the same 
time the British carried out a lot more social reforms after 1967. 
The year of 1967 is a significant year in history of Hong Kong.  As 
mentioned, this year was marked by a series of riots.  They transpired during a 
period of eight months between May and December in 1967, and were the most 
serious social disruption in Hong Kong history.  A recent television series on the 
history of Hong Kong started from the year 1967 because this year is understood 
as the crucial dividing point in which the history of today’s Hong Kong began to 
take shape.  For example, it was the year in which the majority of Hong Kong 
citizens lived in fear of violence.  Teenage agitators, and even primary school 
students, threw stones at the police, burnt cars and destroyed property to express 
their discontent of the Hong Kong British government.   
 
Cultural Revolutionary imagery in Hong Kong popular commodities 
Most of the ‘Chinese Revolutionary’ popular cultural products in Hong Kong 
between 2003 and 2004 drew on a limited range of Chinese Revolutionary 
elements.  The two major elements, The Little Red Book and the Red Guards, had 
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frequently appeared in different kinds of commodities.  The first example of 
Chinese Revolutionary product I discuss was a notepad called the Essential little 
red (note) book designed, produced and sold by a company called G.O.D.
278
  
(Figure 39)  With the founding of G.O.D., Douglas Young claims that he wanted 
to establish a brand which particularly addressed the local Hong Kong people and 
represented Hong Kong culture to the world.  As Douglas Young said, ‘We [Hong 
Kong people] need to assert ourselves both economically and culturally’ because 
‘Hong Kong is neither China nor the West’ and ‘it is at the risk of being 
marginalised’.
279
  In this sense, Douglas Young consciously considers Hong Kong 
cultural identity as a product of Hong Kong’s in-between positioning.  Thus, his 
constant use of Cultural Revolution imagery in his products since late 2003 
suggests that Cultural Revolution imagery does not lose its meaning in signifying 
difference between Hong Kong and China. 
 
The Essential little red (note) book 
The Essential little red (note) book was one of the products designed by Douglas 
Young which were sold when the 1
st
 of July mass rally in 2003 took place in 
Hong Kong.  The notepad looked almost the same as The Little Red Book (The 
Quotations of Mao Zedong) from the Cultural Revolution era.  The book’s cover 
is inscribed with some slogans that praise the leadership of the Chairman Mao 
Zedong including ‘The Great Teacher’ (Wei da de dao shi), ‘The Great Leader’ 
(Wei da de ling xiu), ‘The Great Commander’ (Wei da de tong shuai) and ‘The 
Great Helmsman’ (Wei da de duo shou).  However, a closer look at the slogans 
reveals that a non-Cultural Revolution slogan ‘To Live Better Long Live, Long 
                                            
278 The company name G.O.D. stands for ‘Goods of Desire’ in English, but according to the founder’s 
explanation this English abbreviation intentionally represents the Cantonese pronunciation of its Chinese 
住住住name ‘ ’ (jyu6 hou2 di1) which literally means ‘to live better’.  This company was founded in Hong 
Kong in 1996 by Douglas Young, who is also the founder of G.O.D. Street Culture Museum 
( ) in Hong Kong.  The address of the G.O.D. Street Culture Museum is 
Studio Unit L2-09, The Jockey Club Creative Arts Centre, 30 Pak Tin Street, Shek Kip Mei, Kowloon, 
Hong Kong.  Part of the exhibits were comprised of daily objects and images from Hong Kong.  These 
included photographs of Hong Kong movie stars, clocks, calendars, furniture, etc.  Its founding purpose is 
to establish a database and a collection of resources for Hong Kong designers to reconstruct Hong Kong 
identity and culture with the use of local cultural symbols.  Like many other museums, some products are 
made from the resources of the database and they are retailed at the souvenir shop of the museum.  
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Live! Long Long Live’ (jyu6 hou2 di1 Wan sui, Wan sui! Wan wan sui!)
280
 is 
intermingled with the other original slogans.  ‘To Live Better’ is the name of the 
company which produced these ‘little red (note) book’ products.  The design is 
not only borrowed and references the properties of the Quotation of Mao Zedong 
which was widely published in China in 1960s and 1970s.  The print 
advertisement for the ‘little red (note) books’ shows a photograph of a group of 
Red Guards holding The Little Red Book and banners conjuring up an aspect of 
everyday social life during the Cultural Revolution in China.  Before analysing 
this contemporary use of Cultural Revolution imagery, it is necessary to 
contextualise this social practice.  There are three major aspects of social and 
political circumstances that we can understand in this phenomenon.  These are the 
Basic Law and the ‘One Country Two Systems’ policy of China, the 1
st
 of July 
2003 mass rally and the Beijing Government’s reaction to the democratic 
movements in Hong Kong. 
 
Basic Law and the ‘One Country Two Systems’ policy 
The Basic Law is the constitutional document of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) which was agreed on by the British and Chinese 
governments in order to provide the guarantees to maintain Hong Kong's existing 
way of life.  Since then the territory of Hong Kong has been shaped and remained 
unchanged under the British colonial rule.  Before the British lease of the New 
Territories expired, the United Kingdom and China discussed the issue of Hong 
Kong sovereignty and signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984.  With 
this agreement, the sovereignty of Hong Kong was due to return to China in 1997 
and Hong Kong would be governed as a ‘Special Administrative Region’ of China.  
To preserve the economic stability and the way of life of Hong Kong, the Chinese 
government agreed to allow Hong Kong to retain its laws and ‘high degree of 
autonomy’, which would remain unchanged for at least fifty years after Hong 
Kong’s sovereignty is transferred.  For this purpose, Hong Kong Basic Law, the 
constitutional document of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, was 
adopted in 1990.  And according to the ‘One Country Two Systems’ principle, 
socialism practised in China would not be applied to Hong Kong after 1997.  
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Rather, Hong Kong would continue its capitalist system and way of life as 
established under British rule.   
The Basic Law and the ‘One Country Two Systems’ principle also 
specifies that the Chinese government will be only responsible for ‘national 
defence’ and ‘foreign affairs’ and the internal social, cultural and economic affairs 
in post-1997 Hong Kong will be managed by the HKSAR government.  However, 
the execution of the Basic Law and the ‘One Country Two Systems’ principle is 
not without uncertainties.  As Shae and Wong point out, although article 45 of the 
Basic Law stipulates that the ultimate Chief Executive of the HKSAR will be 
elected by universal suffrage, there is no time frame to schedule ‘when’ this will 
be actualised.
281
  A lack of social confidence in the Chinese communist rule has 
long been established among Hong Kong citizens for decades.  To make matters 
worse, the economy of Hong Kong has been weakened by a chain of events since 
1997.  Hong Kong’s economy suffered from the negative impacts of the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997/1998, the avian flu fiasco in 1998 and the SARS outbreak 
in 2003.  To add fuel to the fire, as I discuss later, the first Chief Executive of the 
HKSAR, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa disappointed the Hong Kong public by dismissing 
public opinion.  These factors altogether made up the background for the struggle 





 July mass rally in 2003 
After the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the British and 
Chinese governments agreed on a political framework stipulated in the Basic Law 
as the governing principle of ruling Hong Kong before and after the year of 1997.  
Before 1997, the British Hong Kong government began a democratisation process 
as a part of the British plan for decolonizing Hong Kong.
282
  This was similar to 
the decolonising process in Singapore in the 1950s in the sense that the local 
people gradually gained more political power in the years before colonisation 
ended.  However, unlike the Singaporean context, the British democratisation of 
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Hong Kong had to closely follow the principles laid down in the Basic Law.  Thus 
instead of radical change, the British government carried out a series of reforms to 
protect the civic and political rights of the Hong Kong people.
283
  As Wan-Chaw 
Shae and Pik-Wan Wong point out, this formed the context of the development of 
a ‘partial democracy’ political system in Hong Kong.
284
  This ‘partial democracy’, 
together with a local cultural identity, have become the major components of the 
specific ‘Hong Kong way of life’ since the 1980s.  This distinctive political 
circumstance and cultural identity has had a significant impact on Hong Kong 
local cultures and social practices.   Since the Basic Law is the political structure 
that both the British and Chinese government had to follow in the ruling of Hong 
Kong, I will briefly lay out its core contents. 
From 2003 Chinese Revolutionary symbols emerged in Causeway Bay, a 
heavily built-up commercial district of Hong Kong and the location of major 
shopping malls and tourist souvenir shops.  These cultural symbols were used in 
popular cultural products aimed at young consumers and foreign tourists.  This 
was an unprecedented cultural phenomenon in the sense that Chinese 
Revolutionary culture had never been introduced in local cultural/commercial 
practices in any similar way before.  For example, there were previous examples 
of pricey ‘Mao’ products produced by high-end shops in the 1990s, but the use of 
the Chinese Revolutionary elements were mainly driven by commercial value 
resulting from the exotic interest of the west in China.  These products were too 
expensive to become popular among the young local customers or the majority of 
foreign tourists.  The use of the images of Chinese Red Guards in Hong Kong 
popular cultural products, as I argue, was not simply a result of a capitalist 
commodification, but a complex political and cultural phenomenon.  The instant 




 of July 2003, many people went on to the street to demonstrate 
against the HKSAR government.  The reason for this was that the Beijing 
government proposed to the HKSAR government to pass the National Security 
Bill as stipulated by the Article 23 of the Basic Law: 
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The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit 
any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's 
Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies 
from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations 




This controversy began when Mr. Tung Chee Hwa began drafting the legislation 
without sufficient consultation of the public.  Many Hong Kong citizens and 
politicians had doubts and concerns about the provisions of the proposed 
legislation.  Some major offences were poorly defined.  For example, some people 
found that the concepts of ‘government’ and ‘country’ were unclear and 
exchangeable in the proposed Bill, and would lead to treating a person opposing 
the government as a traitor opposing the country.   In the proposed enactment, 
police were allowed to enter residential buildings and arrest people without court 
warrants. Any speech deemed as instigating unrest could be regarded as illegal, 
including oral, written and electronic forms; it would be a crime to express, listen  
or fail to report such statements.
286
  As Shae and Wong assert, the passing of the 
Bill was regarded as ‘seriously endangering the civil rights and freedom of the 
press and expression guaranteed by the Basic Law.’ 287  These were heated issues 
that were debated in the public media for months, yet the HKSAR government 
was reluctant to postpone the deadline for passing the Bill.
288
   
The government was unconcerned by the lack of public support and 
continued to press ahead.  As a result, a mass rally was called by those who were 
dissatisfied with the Bill.  Approximately 500,000 people demonstrated against 
the legislation of Article 23 on the 1
st
 of July 2003 – the day that commemorates 
the establishment of the HKSAR.  This mass rally was launched from the Victoria 
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Park of Causeway Bay and marched to the Government Offices in Central. 
289
  
The ‘partial democracy’ in Hong Kong political system made it difficult to 
exercise control over the HKSAR government in the passing of the Bill.  As Shae 
and Wong point out, Hong Kong could only enjoy partial democracy with only 
eight hundred people participating in the election of the Chief Executive of the 
HKSAR.
290
  Only half of the Legislative Council seats were directly elected by 
the voters in geographical districts.
291
  In this case, when the executive-led 
HKSAR government was dismissive towards public opinion, the legislature did 
not have sufficient power to exercise an effective control.  However, the 
government did not pass the Bill as expected.  After the leader of the pro-business 
Liberal Party, James Tien, declared his opposition to the passing of the Bill, the 
Bill was postponed for an indefinite period of time.
292
 But it is important not to 
underrate the power of the social mobilisation.  The 1
st
 of July mass rally in 2003 
was known as the only protest in Hong Kong history that was larger than the one 
supporting the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.
293
  Demonstration as a way to voice 
social discontents was for the first time widely supported by a vast number of 
Hong Kongers.  This incident was significant in the struggle for political rights 
and democracy because, as Shae and Wong argue, ‘it is fair to say that it was the 
people’s power as manifested in the 1
st
 July 2003 rally that eventually stopped the 
legislation process’.
294
   
 
China’s measure in 2003 
However, the public wish for establishing universal suffrage for the election of the 
Chief Executive and the election of all members of the Legislative Council of 
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Hong Kong is still not tolerated by the Chinese government.  According to Shae 
and Wong, there were three major attempts of China to cool down the Hong Kong 
desire for such further development of a democratic government.  First, an 
‘ideological campaign’ was launched in February 2004 arguing that ‘the people 
ruling Hong Kong and those wanting to join the government must meet the 
“patriotic” criteria’ according to the former Chinese Communist Party leader 
Deng Xiaoping’s remark on patriotism.
295
  This aimed at excluding and 
marginalising the pro-democracy leaders who have been labelled as being 
‘unpatriotic’ in the sense that none of the twenty-five pro-democracy legislators in 
Hong Kong had been appointed into the Executive Council, the highest political 
power structure of the HKSAR.
296
  Second, China attempted to offer a different 
interpretation of the Basic Law.  In April 2004, some Chinese officials declared 
that according to their interpretation of the Basic Law ‘it would not be possible for 
Hong Kong to elect its next Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2007 or to 
implement full democracy in the legislature by 2008’.
297
  Third, the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) of China’s parliament declared that the NPC has the 
final say on what is needed for change and whether such change is acceptable.
298
  
These events related to the development of a democratic political system in Hong 
Kong happened in 2003 and 2004, and they formed the background for political 
struggles and identity politics.   
 
Understanding Cultural Revolution imagery in post-2003 Hong Kong  
 In the paragraphs above I discussed the three major aspects of the socio-
political situation in Hong Kong in 2003 which forms the context for the 
recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery in popular culture.  The images of Red 
Guards in the Back to the Little Red Book advertisement creates an immediate 
connection with the ‘Red Guard’ style of Cultural Revolution posters which were 
disseminated in Hong Kong in 1967, as mentioned in the previous section.  For 
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example, the advertisement uses aspects of the poster entitled We Must Triumph – 
The British In Hong Kong Must Be Defeated which featured an image of a mass 
rally in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-67). The advertisement 
has an image of a crowd of rioters holding banners with slogans and The Little 
Red Books.  However, the contemporary picture is obviously not a faithful 
reproduction of a Cultural Revolution image because the language used in the new 
slogans, although similar to the original Maoist slogans, has a completely 
different meaning.  For example, the popular saying of ‘long live Chairman Mao’ 
during the Cultural Revolution is reworked into ‘To-live-better long live'.  It is 
important to note that in the advertisement, the word ‘NOTE’ in between ‘Red’ 
and ‘Book’ does not appear in the original, but has been deliberately inserted.  On 
the banners the words which combine to read as 'Quotations of Mao Note Pad' 
(Maoyulu jishibao) suggest a deliberate play with the language of slogans during 
the era of the Cultural Revolution.  The original meaning of Cultural Revolution 
imagery is radically reworked and changed through the deliberate play of words 
and language but the key visual features such as The Little Red Book, Red Guards, 
banners and big character posters remain in the contemporary version.   
Working with the metaphor of the Red Guard movements in contemporary 
situations, the Hong Kong political subjects who went out on to the streets to 
protest against the HKSAR government became the Red Guards in the new era.  
By positioning themselves in this way, Hong Kongers now spoke a new 
subversive language.  This language of a democratic Hong Kong brought the 
practices of social struggle (i.e. rallies) particularly ‘into view’ and expanded the 
logical space for political and democratic deliberation.  In this new language, the 
claim of a new democratic Hong Kong did not sound radical but came to be 
accepted as ‘true’ and ‘historical’ (in the sense that Red Guard rallies took place 
more than four decades ago in China).  This emergence of such a language was 
part of an evolutionary struggle in a specific post-2003 context. 
These kinds of young mass movements and sloganising culture are the exact 
visual elements that are borrowed and recycled in Hong Kong ‘lifestyle’ products.   
When the original slogans are changed into ‘the red note book’, we can see that 
the use of Cultural Revolution images in Hong Kong commercial culture relies 
very much on wordplay to adapt the images of the past into the present context.  
The use of words is the means through which the Cultural Revolution images can 
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be made suitable to a different era because the social function of Cultural 
Revolution images has no direct connection with the present Hong Kong culture.   
Thus, in my opinion, the revisiting of the mass movements of the Red 
Guards focuses on the collective identity and the power of the ‘rebel’ for young 
audiences which is not simply spontaneous or accidental.  Some may explain the 
commercialisation of Chinese revolutionary images as a result of the guaranteed 
commercial value across cultures and locations.   But it is also important to note 
that these images are particularly connected to an idea of ‘lifestyle’ which 
‘promotes’ certain attitudes toward life and living, and the customers who are 
foreign tourists having their temporary visit in Hong Kong.  These particular 
linkages of Cultural Revolution images with the Hong Kong context are highly 
specific to the local culture and history. 
In this example, the Hong Kong designer borrowed the Chinese 
Revolutionary elements such as The Little Red Book and Red Guards for 
reworking and manipulation.  These mainland cultural symbols are both 
disconnected and related to the current Hong Kong context.  They are 
disconnected because this culture did not belong to Hong Kong people.  Yet post-
handover Hong Kong has become a part of China which suggests an inevitable 
connection between the city and the country.  To theorise Chinese Revolutionary 
popular cultural products using Hall’s idea of a cultural politics of difference, the 
role of Chinese Revolutionary imagery could be interpreted as the site upon which 
the cultural difference between Hong Kong and China is reflected.  It is because 
Chinese Revolutionary culture did not closely relate to Hong Kongers that The 
Little Red Book and the Red Guards could be turned ‘upside-down’ and function 
as a way to reconstruct the self (i.e. new Hong Kong political subjects who were 
struggling for a democratic political system).  In the process, the common element 
of the mass rally, as manifested by the Red Guards movements of the 1960s and 
the Hong Kong mass rallies of 2003 and 2004, became the essential connection 
between revolutionary China and the partial democracy of Hong Kong.   
Moreover, an additional contemporary meaning can be revealed in the 
question ‘Cultural Revolution, what is it about?’ (Wenhua da geming, zhenme 
huishi?).  This question, together with the inserted word ‘NOTE’ to make the 
Little Red Book into the Red NOTE Book, marks a double reading of the meaning 
of this Cultural Revolution imagery and its contemporary usage.  By means of this 
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double reading, I understand the recurrence of an image (i.e. Communist mass 
rally in 1967) as a way of using resources of real history; however this image of a 
mass rally also connects to another historical moment in Hong Kong history — 
the  July 1
st
 mass rally in 2003.  Thus, the meaning of this advertisement can be 
understood as: the Red Guards holding Quotations of Mao Zedong and banners 
written with Maoist slogans in 1967, and the recent Hong Kong protestors holding 
aloft their own red note books in 2003.  Rather than remaining unchanging, the 
meaning of the Essential Little Red Book of the past is becoming the Essential 
Little Red NOTE Book of the present.  
Derrida’s concept of ‘under erasure’, with involves crossing a word out yet 
leaving both the word and its crossed-out version visible, offers a useful way to 
reflect on the double reading of The Little Red Book and the social movements of 
the Cultural Revolution in the Hong Kong context.  By borrowing Derrida’s 
notion of ‘under erasure’, I understand the designer’s deliberate reference to an 
event of the Cultural Revolution in the advertisement as a practice of placing the 
Maoist Little Red Book and the Cultural Revolution itself ‘under erasure’.  It 
refers to the act of using particular historical moments (i.e. the Red Guard 
movements in China and 1967 riots in Hong Kong) and the practice of borrowing 
and reworking the language (e.g. Maoist style of slogans), cultural objects and 
practices as a process of revising and destabilizing the meaning of The Little Red 
Book and the Cultural Revolution. This is both useful and necessary for 
identifying Hong Kong as distinct from the mainland.  For example, by inserting 
the word ‘NOTE’ to change The Little Red Book into the Red NOTE Book is 
similar to the Derridean way of erasing a word, but allowing the erased word to 
remain visible.  In this sense, both The Little Red Book of the past and the Red 
NOTE Book in the present are put together for comparison, and it is the process of 
inserting the word ‘NOTE’ through which the difference and tension between the 
two similar cultural objects is articulated.  Similarly, the question which 
interrogates the nature of the Cultural Revolution not only creates double readings 
of Cultural Revolution imagery and history, but also destabilizes the meaning of 
the term ‘Cultural Revolution’ from the political campaigns that took place in 
China during the 1960s and 1970s, and also from the socio-cultural practice (i.e. 
the reworking of Cultural Revolution imagery and slogans) in Hong Kong in 2004.  
In this way, the term of ‘Cultural Revolution’ is also put ‘under erasure’.  The 
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designer’s questioning of the Cultural Revolution also has multiple meanings: it 
can at the same time address the political campaigns in China during the era of 
Cultural Revolution, the 1967 riots in Hong Kong, the mass rally in Hong Kong in 
2003 and also the very act of reworking Cultural Revolution imagery in the 
making of the advertisement as a ‘cultural revolution’.  It is this multiple 
possibility of readings, and the tensions within these readings, which constructs 
the contemporary meaning of Cultural Revolution imagery. 
Thus, my understanding through Derrida’s notion of ‘under erasure’ sees 
the recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery in Hong Kong popular culture as a 
social and political phenomenon, through which the temporary connection 
between the Red Guard rallies between 1966 and 1968 and the mass rally in Hong 
Kong in 2003 is forged.  This temporary connection is only specific to post-2003 
Hong Kong context, and its context specific meaning can only be understood by 
the local Hong Kong audience.  This specific contemporary context for the 
meaning of Cultural Revolution imagery, which is socially constructed in Hong 
Kong popular culture in post-2003 era, suggests that Cultural Revolution imagery, 
like other signs, is instable.  Its meaning shifts according to new practices and the 
unexpected occurrence of new events. 
In this sense, meaning of Cultural Revolution imagery is unfixed and in 
process.  This is the position of Roland Barthes when he writes that: 
 A text is not a line of words releasing a single “theological” meaning (the “message” of 
the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of 
them original, blend and clash.  The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the 
innumerable centres of culture.
299
 
Barthes’s point effectively explains the nature of the Cultural Revolution imagery 
and The Little Red Book in this Hong Kong recurrence which is the outcome of 
new relationships between texts.  It brings together two different historical events 
and exposes the tensions within the changing relations between Hong Kong and 
China across time.   
The idea of ‘redescription’ summarised by Barker – ‘social change 
becomes possible through rethinking and redescribing the social order and the 
possibilities for the future’ and ‘this “rethinking” of ourselves emerges through 
social practice’ which ‘brings new political subjects and practices into being’ – 
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offers a useful lens to reflect on the social and political character of the G.O.D. 
designer’s practice of using Cultural Revolution imagery in the contemporary 
context of Hong Kong popular culture.
300
  It positions this practice as a social and 
political activity, that is, the activity of using the language of the cultural ‘Other’ 
to ‘redescribe’ the current social order in post-2003 Hong Kong.  Through this 
social practice, the ‘rethinking’ of a shifting Hong Kong identity emerges also 
through its social contradictions and conflicts with China, particularly in the 
development of a democratic political system.  While a ‘new language’ can be 
understood as the power to redescribe ourselves, the question of this cultural 
power in the recurrence of Cultural Revolution imagery translates into the purpose 
of cultural politics when Hong Kongers are redescribed through popular culture 
using images of protesters in a mass rally for political freedom.  Thus, a mass 
rally is the social activity through which the citizens of Hong Kong struggle and 
re-identify themselves with and against China. Cultural Revolution imagery is the 
sign through which they redescribe themselves.   
The Essential Little Red (NOTE) Book cultural product is a good example 
of how Cultural Revolution imagery, particularly pictures of the Red Guards, The 
Little Red Book and Maoist slogans, takes on different meanings in a popular 
culture context.  In the previous paragraphs I examined how the reworking of 
Cultural Revolution imagery and slogans can be understood as forming a kind of 
‘new language’, and also a process through which the post-2003 Hong Kong 
political situation is redescribed.  Cultural Revolution imagery and history is a site 
where difference, contradiction and conflicts between the political systems of 
Hong Kong and China are revealed.  When a struggle for more political rights 
became urgent and necessary, a mass rally was organised to defend Hong Kong’s  
democratic government.  Considering the context-specific nature of Cultural 
Revolution imagery, I argue that this imagery was a powerful cultural code that 
was widely available for exploitation, and through which Hong Kong redescribed 
its relationship with China.  In explaining how a text can be borrowed to produce 
new subjectivities, Hall argued that: 
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Rasta was a funny language, borrowed from a text – the Bible – that did not belong to 
them; they had to turn the text upside-down, to get a meaning which fitted their 
experience.  But in turning the text upside-down they remade themselves; they positioned 
themselves differently as new political subjects; they reconstructed themselves as blacks 
in the new world: they became what they are.  And, positioning themselves in that way, 
they learned to speak a new language.  And they spoke it with a vengeance….[T]hey only 
constitute a political force, that is, they become a historical force in so far as they are 
constituted as new political subject.
301
 
As Hall argues, by using Rastafarians in Jamaica as an example, that new political 
subjects and practices are brought into being when a culture of the Other is 
borrowed in the construction of a ‘new’ language as a result of ‘rethinking’.  
Hall’s idea is helpful in seeing the use of Cultural Revolution imagery, in the 
context of the political situation of 2003, as a practice of borrowing a text of the 
cultural ‘Other’.  It is through differences highlighted in the process of using the 
cultural resources of the Other that Hong Kong identity could be reconstructed 
through representation.   
 
‘Reading the Little Red Book’ Screensaver 
In the first example, I argue that the deliberate use and reworking of Cultural 
Revolution imagery can be conceptualised as a site where cultural politics is 
played out in the process of redescribing Hong Kong identity.  In the second 
example, I continue to explore how tensions within and differences between Hong 
Kong and China are articulated through the manipulation of Cultural Revolution 
imagery and the use of contemporary captions.   
This screensaver was designed by G.O.D. which could be downloaded 
from its official website.
302
 (Figure 40) In the center of this moving picture, there 
are two male Red Guards reading a giant Little Red Book together.  Again, this 
suggests the reading of Quotation of Mao Zedong.  The Red Guards look at each 
other eye to eye as if they both are very interested in The Little Red Book.  On the 
cover of The Little Red Book under the title Today’s advice, there are quite a few 
pieces of ‘advice’, including ‘Seduce a stranger’, ‘Indulge in kinky sex’, ‘Tell 
your boss who’s the boss’, ‘Laugh out loud’, ‘Be an angel’ and ‘Cook yourself a 
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302 A screensaver is a type of computer program designed to protect the computer monitor by filling the 
screen with moving images or patterns when the computer is not in use.   
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nice dinner’, etc.  Above the two men a caption for the whole picture reads ‘We 
need to Live Better’ (Cantonese pronunciation: ngo5 dei6 yiu1 jyu6 hou2 di1).  
This suggests that nowadays people have a different way of life: if in the 
revolutionary past people were guided by Mao’s words, then in today’s Hong 
Kong people live according to a different set of ‘advice’ in order to ‘live better’.  
This modern advice might sound a little obscene to be considered guidance, but 
what is more meaningful is that it reveals the ‘obscene’ side of Hong Kong culture 
that plays with serious and political icons.  It also discloses the variegated lifestyle 
of people in Hong Kong (compared to life during the Cultural Revolution).   
Like the previous example, the caption in this screensaver determines the 
major readings of the imagery.  This is a spectacular example of the instability of 
the meanings of Cultural Revolution imagery.  With the captions changing every 
second, the textual meaning is unstable and cannot be confined to any single 
sentence or phrase.  Rather, the meaning is the outcome of the relationships 
between the imagery and all of the captions.   
I found the original source for this screensaver from a handbook for art 
workers published in the People's Republic of China in the 1970s.  (Figure 41) 
The function of this publication was to provide guidance for art workers to 
produce standardised, officially recognised pictures for disseminating messages 
and coordinating political campaigns.  This picture in its original context, except 
for the title Quotations of Mao Zedong, did not offer any specific clues as to its 
intended use, and thus could be used in a wide range of situations.   
Comparing the appropriated image in the screensaver with the original, the 
major difference between the two is the captions used in the contemporary version.  
These pieces of ‘advice’, which describe contemporary situations, are in no way 
connected to the revolutionary past.  This play of words radically destabilises the 
original textual meaning of the imagery, which was used to promote the 
leadership of Mao by advocating the habit of reading Quotations of Mao.  Similar 
to the previous example, this original Cultural Revolution imagery is appropriated 
so that it forms a new ‘vocabulary’ in a new context.  The depiction of the Red 
Guards is reworked from the decent portrayal to become joker-like characters, 
which radically violates the original sacredness and seriousness of the political 
picture.  The new captions mainly describe trivial daily matters which contrast 
with the nationalistic, hopeful slogans of the Cultural Revolution.   
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This example shows that the meaning of an appropriated Cultural 
Revolution image is entirely dependent on the reworking and juxtaposition of 
different written texts.  Some of these captions are somewhat too trivial to 
mention and some are awkward so that a kind of humour is constructed through 
such an arrangement.  As a result, a detailed analysis of the captions is less 
important for this example because they are primarily humourous texts.   
 
‘To Serve the People’ Underpants and ‘Toiling the field’ Postcard 
Another feature of the use of Cultural Revolution images in Hong Kong products 
is that the same image could be recycled and reworked into different commercial 
forms.  For example, the G.O.D.’s ‘To serve the people’ underpants (Figure 42) 
and ‘Toiling the field’ postcard (Figure 43) are products made out of the same 
Cultural Revolution image.  The print on the underpants is a man who is happily 
working with a shovel.  Around his neck there is a towel inscribed with the words 
‘People live better’. (人民住好啲)  The slogan ‘To serve the people’ juxtaposed 
with this picture suggests that nowadays people work hard because they have a 
common goal – to make a better living.  This picture of a happy worker is also 
reproduced in the form of postcard.  In the centre of the ‘Toiling the field’ 
postcard, however, the same picture is given different captions in both English 
and Chinese: ‘Toiling the fields’ in English and ‘Labour lives better’ (勞動人民
住好啲) in Cantonese.  
This example shows how a single Cultural Revolution image can be used 
to make several different types of products.  The original image is from a political 
poster from the Cultural Revolution, and shows a young worker in a field. Behind 
him are machines reaping grain and which symbolise the harvest of the season.  
The original Chinese caption of this picture is ‘Reap a Good Harvest and Store 
Grain Everywhere’ (duo feng shou guang zhi liang).  (Figure 44)  Other textual 
features in the original picture include a slogan which states ‘Prepared for battles 
Prepared against famine for the people’ (Bei zhan bei huang wei ren min).  These 
two examples demonstrate that the reworked images on G.O.D.’s products are 
simplified and abstracted versions of the original in which only the human 
character is left intact.   
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In the ‘To serve the master’ postcard, we can see a picture of a dog in the 
centre, and below is the caption ‘To serve the masters’ (wei zhu ren fu wu).  
(Figure 45)  This image seems to suggest that if it was the people who served 
society during the Cultural Revolution, then it is dogs which perform this function 
today.  This may suggest that such faithfulness could only happen in the 
revolutionary era, or that it can only exist in a dog-human relationship today.  
However, with a closer look, the dog in the picture is wearing a collar which is 
inscribed with the words ‘SPCA’.  Thus this picture also suggests that the Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) works hard for the welfare of 
animals in today’s Hong Kong.  In Hong Kong, many pet owners abandon their 
pets in the street.  Besides collecting and rescuing abandoned animals, the SPCA 
in Hong Kong organises education programmes in order to improve this situation.   
As the above examples show, the captions of the newly-made products 
play linguistically with the famous slogans, political symbols and even social 
practices which were popular during the Cultural Revolution.  The Chinese 
Communist Party’s slogan ‘To serve the people’ is a good example.  Its origin can 
be traced back to the time when Mao Zedong wrote a speech to commemorate the 
death of a PLA solider, Zhang Side, who died in the collapse of a kiln in the 
summer of 1944.  In this speech Mao said ‘we serve the people, therefore, if we 
have defects, we are not afraid of other people pointing them out’.  Mao pointed 
out that the spirit of Zhang Side should be highly valued and promoted because he 
died for the benefits of the other.  Since then the slogan ‘to serve the people’ has 
become a common phrase in daily life.
303
  This and other slogans in the same 
discourse such, as ‘never benefit oneself, always benefit others’, also became the 
core principles of the Chinese Communist Party.  The slogan ‘to serve the people’ 
is still in use in China.  During the inspection of the troops of the PLA, there is a 
standardised ceremonial exchange between the inspecting official and the troops: 
Inspecting official: ‘Greetings, Comrades!’ (tong zhi men ni hao)  
Troop: ‘Greetings, Leader!’ (shou zhang hao)  
Inspecting official: ‘Comrades [you] have worked hard’ (tong zhi men xin 
ku le)  
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Troops: ‘To serve the people!’ (wei ren min fu wu)  
In the above examples of G.O.D.’s products, some typical features of the use of 
Cultural Revolution images in Hong Kong products can be identified.  First, some 
particular cultural objects and social practices during Cultural Revolution such as 
The Little Red Book, the Red Guards, the mass assembly and slogans are 
borrowed and appropriated.  Second, Cultural Revolution images are adapted to 
suit modern culture usually by inserting contemporary captions.  Third, Cultural 
Revolution images are recycled in a variety of commercial forms which are 
contingent and unpredictable.  Fourth, the commercial value of Cultural 
Revolution images is highly connected to the ‘young’ and ‘vibrant’ subculture in 
Hong Kong.  These features are not only found in G.O.D’s products.   
 
People’s Recreation Community 
This section will examine some products in a commercial space in Hong Kong 
called the People’s Recreation Community. These products demonstrate the way 
in which Cultural Revolution imagery is used to reflect the position of post-
handover Hong Kong.  Hong Kong has always been seen differently from other 
cities in China, which has been shaped by different social and political 
developments.  In 2003, soon after the 1
st
 of July mass rally took place in Hong 
Kong, the HKSAR carried out economic measures in order to improve Hong 
Kong’s economy.  One of these was the Individual Visit Scheme, which lead 
directly to a dramatic increase in the number of mainland Chinese visitors.  This 
measure determined a new position for Hong Kong in its relationship with China 
— a tourist destination and a point of escape, within yet ‘outside’ of China.   
 
The Individual Visit Scheme 
The outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Hong Kong 
between March and June in 2003 dealt a terrible blow to the tourist industry.  In 
2003 the Individual Visit Scheme began which allowed mainland Chinese tourists 
to visit Hong Kong and Macau on an individual basis.  Before this scheme was 
launched, Chinese residents from the mainland could only travel to Hong Kong on 
business visas or in group tours.  The major reason for launching the Individual 
Visit Scheme was to boost the economy of Hong Kong and Macau.  According to 
the information on the Hong Kong Tourism Commission website, initially this 
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scheme was only introduced in four Guangdong cities including Dongguan, 
Zhongshan, Jiangmen and Foshan under the Closer Economic Partnership 
Agreement.  This allowed individual residents of these cities to visit Hong Kong 
without joining a group tours. By January 2009, around 270 million residents of 
forty-nine cities in mainland China were eligible to apply for individual tourist 
visas to go to Hong Kong.  The visa is valid for three months or one year and 
good for one or two visits to Hong Kong.  The visa holder can stay in Hong Kong 
for not more than seven days on each visit.  When the visa is expired the applicant 
may apply for a new one and there is no quota to the number of visas to be 
issued.
304
  In February 2009 Mainland authorities extended the pilot scheme for 
Shenzhen non-permanent residents to visit Hong Kong in group tours which 
increased the number of eligible people under the scheme by several million.
305
   
The series of measures to facilitate mainland Chinese residents to visit 
Hong Kong will continue to benefit the tourism industry of Hong Kong.  The 
Individual Visit Scheme was expected to bring an influx of mainlanders to visit 
Hong Kong which lead to the authorized saving of Renminbi, and boosts in the 
money exchange business and retail industry in Hong Kong.  Since then Hong 
Kong has become a popular tourist destination where a range of products have 
become particularly appealing to mainland Chinese visitors.  For example, many 
mainland tourists go to Hong Kong in order to buy cheaper international brand-
name products.  Recently, more and more parents from the mainland go to Hong 
Kong to buy dairy products for their infants.  The main reason for this is because 
of the Chinese milk scandal took place in July in 2008.  Dairy products were 
contaminated by melamine, and at least six infants who had consumed the tainted 
milk died from kidney stones or kidney damage.
306
  The milk scandal devastated 
both the internal sale and foreign exports of Chinese dairy products.  With an 
increasing demand for reliable infant dairy products and the reputation of food 
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security in Hong Kong, many mainland Chinese parents paid regular visits to 
Hong Kong to buy milk for their children.   
The People’s Recreation Community is the current name of a themed 
commercial space in Hong Kong which makes use of Mao icons in its company 
branding.  This intends to make its young and dynamic image stand out from 
other bookstores in a competitive market place.  While Cultural Revolution 
images are only used in some of their products, the shop owner Paul Tang sees the 
revolutionary images as perfect symbols for mainland China, which matches the 
shop’s identity as a bookstore specialising in Chinese books published in 
simplified-characters.  The first name of the bookstore ‘The People’s Bookstore’ 
(in Cantonese: yan4 man4 syu1 dim3) directly referenced the political slogan ‘To 
Serve the People’ used during the Cultural Revolution. 
In 2004 part of the bookstore was developed into a café corner, and the 
bookstore café was renamed as ‘人民公社’ (in Cantonese: yan4 man4 gung1 se5; 
in Putonghua: renmin gongshe) which is a deliberate reference to the idea of the 
people’s commune in the People’s Republic of China since 1950s.  (Figure 46)  
With the idea that everything in the commune was shared during the Cultural 
Revolution, the bookstore café is intended to be a social space for customers to 
spend time with people or create social networks.  Differing from the highly 
controlled life in the people’s commune in China, the bookstore café aims at 
providing a relaxing place for activities like reading, internet surfing and 
socializing; as well the bookstore provides an exhibition space for creative or 
artistic works, which is quite rare in a densely populated city like Hong Kong.   
Echoing the name ‘the people’s commune’, many aspects of the business are 
intentionally linked to the Cultural Revolution.  For example, the business logo of 
the bookstore café is a reworked image of Mao Zedong to complete the whole 
idea of the ‘Chinese revolutionary’ theme.  This Mao theme is constructed by 
using images of Mao and other political images originally produced in the 
mainland China during the 1960s and 1970s. This branding idea was used mainly 
because the Mao icon and images of Chinese political posters particularly from 
the 1960s and 1970s signify ‘China’ and ‘communism’ to people in Hong Kong.  
Chairman Mao is perceived to be the most influential political figure in the 
People's Republic of China and the images of Mao and the era of Chinese Cultural 
Revolution can make people think of simplified Chinese characters which are 
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extensively used in mainland China.
307
  To review, the emergence of Chinese 
character simplifications predated the founding of the People’s Republic of China.  
Since the use of simplified Chinese characters was promoted for the first time in 
1909, many Chinese intellectuals and writers have suggested the idea of 
standardising the simplifications of Chinese words to help boost literacy in China.  
In the 1930s and 1940s discussions on character simplification took place within 
the Kuomintang government.  Yet, most of the simplified Chinese Characters in 
use today are the result of the works moderated by the government of the People’s 
Republic of China during the 1950s and 1960s.  For example, the first round of 
official character simplifications was issued in two documents in 1956 and 1964.  
During the Cultural Revolution period the leftists promoted the second round of 
official Chinese character simplifications while those who opposed it were 
labelled as rightwing or anti-communist.
308
  The People’s Commune bookstore 
and café is an example which shows how Cultural Revolution culture is used to 
create associations with the simplified Chinese character books in a Hong Kong 
context.  This issue of simplified Chinese also discloses an aspect of cultural 
difference between Hong Kong and mainland Chinese culture.   
It is worth noting that different sets of Chinese characters are now popularly 
used in different Chinese locations.  While simplified Chinese is widely used in 
the People’s Republic of China and often among mainland Chinese immigrants 
overseas (e.g. Singapore and Malaysia), traditional Chinese is most commonly 
used in overseas Chinese-dominated cities or states such as Hong Kong, Macau 
and Taiwan.  In post-1997 Hong Kong, traditional Chinese is still the only set of 
Chinese characters that are officially taught in kindergarten, schools and 
universities whereas simplified characters usually only appear in mainland 
Chinese publications or websites.  While mainland Chinese publications written in 
simplified characters are usually much cheaper than those published in Hong 
Kong or overseas, those who are reluctant to buy more expensive foreign or local 
books would choose to buy the simplified Chinese versions.  Also, since 2003, 
more and more mainland Chinese tourists are allowed to go to Hong Kong on an 
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individual basis, and thus there is an increasing demand for books that mainland 
Chinese people can read legally in Hong Kong but which are banned in mainland 
China.   
With an increasing and freer flow of mainland Chinese traveling to Hong 
Kong, more and more businesses targeting mainland Chinese visitors have 
emerged.  The People’s Recreation Community is one of these emergent 
businesses in Hong Kong.  The founding of this company in 2003 and the specific 
types of products and services it offers are both the immediate outcome of the 
Individual Visit Scheme and the position of Hong Kong as supply centre for 
mainland consumers.  At the same time it serves as a middleman between China 
and the rest of the world, through which mainland Chinese visitors can obtain 
goods and information about the world which are banned in China, and non-
Chinese visitors can place an order for any mainland Chinese goods they want 
from mainland China without travelling to China personally.  These kinds of 
social practices and activities have become popular since 2003 when a specific 
government policy facilitated the flow of information and people.  This kind of 
new business opportunity in Hong Kong since 2003 has become crucial to its 
economy. 
In this sense, Bhabha’s notion of ‘situatedness’ is useful to understand this 
transformative role of Hong Kong.  Bhabha argues that: 
I think my notion of enunciation affirms the need to each time understand what is 
happening at the place of utterance, what each iteration and reiteration of a particular sign 
is, how it produces its own strategy, its own authority… political action not merely as 
liberation, but also as an active process of survival…
309
 
The founding of the People’s Recreation Community was one of the commercial 
developments fostered by the specific government policy. The policy developed 
after some contradictions and conflicts between Hong Kong and China manifested 
in mass social movements.  Hong Kong at that time was struggling with political 
rights in a context of economic depression.  As I discuss in earlier examples, 
Cultural Revolution imagery in Hong Kong culture is used to mark the meeting 
point of cultural differences between Hong Kong and the mainland.  The example 
of the People’s Recreation Community, which has a theme of the Maoist Cultural 
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Revolution, represents the new commercial opportunities and activities in this 
meeting point.   
 
Company logo 
I will examine different editions of the People’s Recreation Community logo 
produced between 2003 and 2006.  The first logo is composed of a disembodied 
image of Mao Zedong afloat on a yellow star encircled by a yellow circle, which 
is further surrounded by a red border with eight yellow starts. As part of the logo, 
the name of the bookstore at the time in 2003 ‘The People’s Bookstore’ (in 
Cantonese: yan4 man4 syu1 dim3, in Putonghua: Renmin shudian) is written in 
Chinese simplified characters, which were separated by three white stars, and the 
company’s website was included below the image of Mao. The image is a profile 
of Mao facing to the right of the viewer and looking up slightly as if peering far 
into the distance.  He is wearing a People’s Liberation Army’s cap and uniform 
which bears the red collar insignia.  An original Chinese political poster produced 
in the mainland China during the 1960s shows an image of Mao comparable to 
that of the People’s Bookstore’s logo. This Mao poster was one of the most 
widely disseminated political prints produced in the 1960s which features an 
outlined, disembodied portrait of Mao above a crowd of red guards, soldiers and 
workers carrying Selected Works of Mao Zedong.  Except for the shadow effects, 
the disembodied likeness of Mao in the People’s Bookstore’s logo is almost 
identical to the image of Mao in this poster.   
To correspond to the changing nature of business, the logo was reworked 
and the new company name was printed on business cards in 2004. (Figure 46) 
What interests me the most is that the yellow and red background of stars in the 
logo is replaced by a round frame in the second edition.  The new logo bears a 
close resemblance to the Starbucks’ logo.  (Figure 47)  Starbucks Coffee is a well-
known international coffee and coffeehouse chain based in the United States.  It is 
now considered to be the largest coffeehouse company in the world with over 
fifteen thousand stores in almost fifty countries.  Since the first Starbucks 
coffeehouse opened in Hong Kong in May 2000, coffee culture has become more 
and more prevalent in Hong Kong.  Starbucks in Hong Kong has been very 
successful, which is evident in that fact that by 2009 over one hundred branches 
have opened in such a small city.  With many of its products being specific to the 
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geographical locality of the stores, Starbucks in Hong Kong is also known in 
Chinese as ‘星巴克’ (Cantonese: sing1 ba1 hak1; putonghua: xingbake) in which 
the Chinese word ‘星’ means ‘star’ and ‘巴克’ is a transliteration of ‘bucks’.  Not 
only are their products adapted to local tastes, but the interior design of a 
Starbucks Coffee branch in Central is inspired by the fusion of an American style 
coffeehouse and a Hong Kong tea-house.  This kind of teahouse in Hong Kong is 
known as ‘冰室’ (Cantonese: bing1 sat1; pinyin: bingshi) which refers to shops 
that sell iced drinks, ice-cream or shaved ice.  These tea-houses were particularly 
prevalent in Hong Kong and Macau in the 1960s and 1970s, but most of these 
were closed down when tea-restaurants, which also sell local rice meals and fast 
foods, became more popular since 1980s.  This case demonstrates the impact on 
Hong Kong culture from both the global influence of international chain culture 
and the nostalgia for local culture of the recent past.  Making the company logo 
with the image of Mao and imitating the Starbucks Coffee logo is like putting 
together two popular icons of different times and spaces.  In the past the posters of 
Cultural Revolution and The Quotations of Mao spread all over the world, and the 
American coffee chain store opened branches around the globe.  This case may 
also suggest that both of the icons are just as popular and well-known as each 
other at least in Hong Kong context. 
 
Party poster 
Besides the company logo, a political poster of the Cultural Revolution period 
was appropriated and used in a printed advertisement for a party organised by the 
shop which was held at the café corner of the bookstore.  (Figure 48)  The 
cheerful and hopeful faces and smiles of the characters depicted in Cultural 
Revolution pictures are used in the party poster. (similar to the examples in Figure 
49 and Figure 50) This example suggests that the collectiveness, the nature of the 
Cultural Revolution as a mass movement, and the joy and happiness depicted in 
Cultural Revolution pictures are borrowed and transfer to the present situation and 
purpose.  The Cultural Revolution poster made to promote serious political 
campaigns contrasts strongly with the People’s Recreation Community’s poster 
made. One more similar example is that another Cultural Revolution poster image 
was reworked to advertise recycling bags which were for sale at the bookstore. ( 
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Figure 51) These two examples, which promote a modern happy lifestyle and the 
use of recycling bags, are very similar to the previously mentioned G.O.D.’s 
products which promote the attitude of living a better life and being a responsible 
pet owner.  These cases demonstrate a similar kind of use of Cultural Revolution 
images in both emphasising the difference from the values of the past and the 
significance of certain social values in today’s Hong Kong society.   
 
Little Red Book menu 
In the café corner of the People’s Recreation Community, the authentic copies of 
Quotations of Mao Zedong are converted into the café’s menus with some of the 
original pages changed into lists of food and beverages. (Figure 52)  The ‘Little 
Red Book’, once the spiritual food of everyday during Cultural Revolution in 
China, now engages with people’s contemporary life which is very often a 
Westernized lifestyle.  The food and beverages listed in the Mao menu are mainly 
coffee drinks in different flavours and cakes made with Western recipes.  In fact, 
Hong Kong coffee culture only began after Starbucks opened their shops in 2000, 
before this drinking coffee was hardly a popular local practice.  Cultural 
Revolution images are appropriated and adapted to fit the modern Hong Kong 
way of life. 
 
Other products 
Apart from books and coffee, the shop also produces its own ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ products such as tea cups and mugs printed with Chinese 
revolutionary images reproduced from posters or books published in China in the 
1960s or 1970s. (Figure 53) For example, the famous poster of comrade Jin 
Xunhua and the image of Chairman Mao are repeatedly reproduced on mugs, tea 
cups and bags. (Figure 26) Like the previous G.O.D. products, the same Cultural 
Revolution images can appear on a variety of materials and forms.  Alongside 
these products, the ‘original’ Cultural Revolution relics such as political posters, 
books, badges and Quotations of Mao Zedong are also available for sale, and a 
special ordering service is also available upon request.  (Figure 54) 
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Multiple businesses 
The People’s Recreation Community is indeed a typical example of a Hong Kong 
way of doing business with one physical shop and multiple business potentials.  
This shop is at the same time a bookstore, a café, a souvenir shop, a wholesaler of 
Japanese milk, a dealer of Cultural Revolution relics, an exhibition venue, an 
event organising agent and currency exchange.  The shop owner is the designer 
and producer of the Cultural Revolution products.  These products and services 
aim at both the local Hong Kong communities and mainland Chinese visitors, 
with the latter responsible for the majority of sales.  According to Tang, there is a 
constant group of non-local customers for these original relics and Cultural 
Revolution products.  Interestingly, the shop is popular among many mainland 
Chinese tourists who were at first attracted by the logo of Chairman Mao.  Most 
of them pay regular visits to this bookstore and look for books that are censored in 
the mainland China.  As Tang described, many of these mainland Chinese 
customers spend the whole day in his bookstore to finish reading the books that 
are censored in the mainland.  Many of whom are regular customers, and place 
orders for infant powdered milk directly imported from Japan.  
China’s policy of ‘the socialist market economy’ provides new economic 
opportunities for Hong Kong entrepreneurs.  Since the early 1980s many Hong 
Kong entrepreneurs started making their investment and building factories in 
China.
310
  Not only does the cheaper labour in mainland China greatly reduce the 
production cost of their businesses, but the availability of land and space provides 
better conditions for business expansion.  Thus the suspicion of the Chinese 
regime is distracted by new economic opportunities and advantages facilitated by 
the rapid economic development in China.  Yet, China’s unprecedented industrial 
growth over the last two decades has raised the question of whether it poses a 
threat to Hong Kong.  As Abbas Ackbar points out, the new opportunities also 
produce ‘another set of anxieties for Hong Kong because after China can easy 
access to global networks Hong Kong had to reassess and abandon its in-between 
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position and all the advantages of the para-site’.
311
  The transfer of Hong Kong’s 
sovereignty from the British colonial authority to the socialist Chinese authority 
opens an imaginary space fraught with mixed feelings of fear and suspicion 
tempered with economic benefits and advantages.  With such negative sentiments, 
the economic advantage is actually the key factor which smoothes the process of 
Hong Kong’s integration with China because the citizens’ major concern is for 
economic stability. 
From the official guarantee that socialism would not be practised in post-
1997 Hong Kong, we can see that a non-socialist Hong Kong has been an official 
criterion to maintain the status quo and stability of Hong Kong.  There has been a 
long established fear among Hong Kong people towards ‘communism’.  Back in 
1949 when the People’s Republic of China under the rule of the Chinese 
Communist Party was founded, many migrants fled to Hong Kong from the 
mainland because of their fear of being persecuted by the Chinese Communist 
Party.   
In his discussion on Hong Kong cinema, Abbas points out that the position 
of Hong Kong has always been a special case, either as an economically 
developed British Crown Colony or a Special Administrative Region of China, the 
city has been governed under a distinctive set of laws and systems.
312
  According 
to Article five, Chapter One of the Hong Kong Basic Law: 
The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain 
unchanged for 50 years.
313
 
The principle of ‘One Country Two System’ is that in spite of the practice of 
‘socialism’ in the mainland China, Hong Kong as a former British colony can 
retain the established system with a high degree of autonomy for at least fifty 
years after reunification.  It also stresses that the ‘Hong Kong way of life’ shall 
also remain as it used to be under the British colonial system.  While Hong Kong 
has been developed as a successful financial city in the world, the local population 
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has no say on the city’s future, economic power and the particular ‘Hong Kong 
way of life’ has indeed become the major source of impetus for the assertion of a 
local sense of Chinese identity.
314
  No matter if it was the British or the Chinese 
who claimed official authority over the city, Hong Kong citizens are reassured at 
least for the moment as the economy remains strong and local way of life 
unchanged.  Not only are different political systems practised in mainland China 
and Hong Kong, but there is also a cultural difference between the country and the 
city which has been developed long before reunification.   
 
Mass rally and freedom of expression 
Images illustrating the Red Guard rallies and protests during the Cultural 
Revolution in mainland China are in little way related to Hong Kong because 
there was no mass movement of teenagers who dressed like Red Guards in British 
Hong Kong during the 1960s.  Thus the Red Guard identity has never been related 
to ‘Hong Kong-ness’.   However, when the Red Guard movements were rampant 
in the mainland between 1966 and 1967, Hong Kong had a similar kind of 
experience with riots in 1967.  Though the radical and aggressive agitators in 
Hong Kong did not dress like Red Guards, the majority of them were aggressive 
and destructive teenagers whose actions were similar to those depicted in the 
Chinese political posters of the time.  For example, similar to Red Guards, the 
Hong Kong agitators wore Mao badges, carried the Little Red Book and big-
character posters, and shouted slogans when they marched to the Governor’s 
House in Central on the 15
th
 of May 1967.  The approach of the protests shared a 
lot in common with the mass movement and public assemblies on the mainland: 
Groups converged on Government House…they were not allowed inside nor did the 
governor come out.  Instead, they took turn reading aloud from the “little red book” of 
Mao’s quotations in open defiance of an administration that had exerted so much effort to 
safeguard Hong Kong from communist political studies.  The booklet and a Mao badge 
were standard accessories in China at the time, and Hong Kong leftist were no exception, 
despite many differences between the real thing and its local counterpart…the number of 
protestors there peaked at upwards of 2,000 when discipline finally broke on May 20, and 
                                            
314 Dirlik and Zhang, "Introduction: Postmodernism and China" , 3. 
 
Chapter Four 
 - 170 - 
the post-march crowd rampaged through Hong Kong’s central business district nearby in 
anticipation of worse to come.
315
 
Hong Kongers in general believed that the British rule was able to restore social 
order after the riots ended: 
Toward the end of the riots, the residents of Hong Kong, alienated by the leftists’ terrorist 
tactics, displayed their support for social and political order, and thus for the status quo of 
British rule.  In the meantime, the riot forced the British authorities to pay attention to 
public welfare and implement labour-protection laws.  The bloody confrontation and the 
ensuing compromise led to the development of a new political consciousness, and self-
identity, by the Hong Kong community.  The colony began to distinguish its existence 
from both its British colonial master and from its Chinese motherland.
316
 
It is noted that the impact of the riots was to form the impression that it was the 
violent Chinese influence that caused the social unrest and economic stagnancy in 
Hong Kong.  Culturally, Hong Kong people have cultivated among them a sense 
that the British Hong Kong environment would allow the development of peaceful 
and stable living conditions.  The Hong Kong experience of the riots in 1967 
helped develop an improved relation between Hong Kong communities and the 
British colonial authority, and on the contrary enhance the long-time fear towards 
the communist China: 
The stories of many of the refugees who had arrived in Hong Kong since the late 1940s, and the 
political and social dislocation as well as economic deprivation which accompanied the early 
history of the People's Republic of China, created in the majority of the Chinese in Hong Kong a 
fear of the Communist administration in the mainland.  This fear was drastically enhanced by the 
Communist directed riots in 1967 in the colony and the Cultural Revolution in China which did not 
come to an end until after the mid 1970s.  Coupled with the feeling of alienation from China was 
the growing search for identity of the people of Hong Kong, particularly on the part of the younger 
generation.  The search became all the more urgent with the onset of the “borrowed place, 
borrowed time” syndrome after the 1967 riots.317 
This shifting sense of belonging was to a great extent shaped by the propaganda of 
the Chinese Communist Party circulated in Hong Kong during and after the ‘riots’ 
and the British Colonial government’s counter measures.  In a series of campaigns 
which were associated with the Chinese leftist labour union took place in 1967, 
posters which depicted the violence of the British ‘fascist’ suppression and the 
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death of a Chinese protestor killed by the Hong Kong British government were 
circulated in Hong Kong: 
The [Chinese] leftist also had an arsenal of propaganda equipment in Hong Kong: approximately 
ten left-wing newspapers; the New China News Agency, which directed the propaganda campaign 
and sent exaggerated reports of local support to newspapers in China; loud speakers placed outside 
buildings such as the Bank of China; posters demanding “Blood for Blood”, “Stew the White-
Skinned Pig”, “Fry the Yellow Running Dogs”, “Down with British Imperialism” and “Hang David 
Trench” …The colonial government responded with its own extensive counter propaganda 
campaign …Under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, the police were allowed to detain 
suspected activists without trial.  In mid-May, the colonial government banned loudspeaker 
broadcasts such as those coming from the Bank of China.  Governor Trench appeared on television 
and encourage the public to stand tall during the disturbances.  On June 1, the government 
prohibited inflammatory posters and specified punishment for anyone who produced, distributed, or 
displayed such posters…318 
Many of these posters illustrate the furious response to the British suppression 
which justifies the physical resistance and emotional sentiments of Hong Kong 
Chinese people against the violent British authority.  
However, the end of the leftist movements did not mean the end of the 
circulation of the images of the ‘riots’.  In the post-1967 period a series of short 
videos produced by the Hong Kong British government were broadcast on the free 
wireless TV channel in Hong Kong at the time.  These were the official historical 
accounts produced by the Hong Kong British government.  In one of these videos 
we can see the chaotic, furious Chinese agitators and the patient, lenient Hong 
Kong police in neat uniforms.
319
  The British depictions of the Chinese leftist 
constructed a world of irrationality and impulsiveness which allowed the British 
to build up an image of themselves as the opposite of these features, as if under 
the British rule lay a world that was rational and civil, and therefore relatively 
favourable to live in.  In this very construction of the Chinese leftist ‘Other’ and 
the British ‘us’, the voice-over narrates the history from a Hong Kong citizen’s 
perspective to project an ‘objective’ point-of-view to see the events.  The series of 
labour campaigns were generally referred to as ‘riots’. Chinese leftists were 
simply described as ‘a group of impetuous rioters’.  The police were identified as 
the ‘Hong Kong police’ and the rioters remained unnamed and objectified and 
viewers were not provided any clue who the ‘rioters’ were.  The ‘objective’ view 
                                            
318 Carroll, A concise history of Hong Kong , 154-155. 
 
319 Ho and Li, "Jing tao hai lang zhong de 1967 (The Fearful Storm of 1967)"  
 
Chapter Four 
 - 172 - 
of the British claimed that they settled the dispute rationally which legitimatised 
the power to ‘peacefully’ control and rule the city.  In addition, news on natural 
disasters in China during this time were reported and broadcast on television 
which made China seem like a socially undesirable place to live in: 
…the serious damage of the revolution in China became apparent to the people of Hong Kong as 
news of widespread famine on the mainland was reported on the news media and through familial 
network.  The dead bodies of “revolutionaries” and “counter-revolutionaries” were discovered 
floating along the South China Sea into Hong Kong waters.  Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled 
over the border into Hong Kong320 
To understand this through Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism, there is a binary 
opposition between the ‘orient’ and the ‘occident’ which is a mutually constitutive 




Based on the Chinese posters and the British videos, both of accounts of 
the events were incomplete and biased in the sense that certain facts were left out.  
For example, while the Chinese posters depicted the violence of the British which 
caused the death of Chinese people, they never mentioned the damage from the 
hand-made bombs produced by Hong Kong Chinese leftists to private property 
and people’s lives.  The British account tended to project their passive role in 
dealing with the aggressive ‘rioters’, yet the Hong Kong British government did 
impose emergency regulations granting the police special powers in attempt to put 
down the ‘riots’, ban leftist newspapers from publishing and leftist activists were 
arrested.   
We can see in the above case the same incident (i.e. the labour campaigns) 
was being talked about and expressed differently by two political regimes (i.e. the 
Chinese Communist authority and the British Colonial authority) in the same 
place (i.e. a British colonial city in which the population was dominated by ethnic 
Chinese).   The reactions of some local factory workers to the exploitation from 
the factory owners, the subsequent campaigns headed by the Chinese leftists and 
the evidence of posters suggest that there was resistance to the British or to the 
Western system established in a colonized city.  This resistance was practised by a 
group of marginalised Chinese leftists in Hong Kong.  But it is necessary to note 
that this group was not only marginalised in terms of the colonizer and the 
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colonized.  The Chinese leftist was also the marginalized ‘other’ to many Hong 
Kong people, who fled to Hong Kong from the mainland because of their fear of 
the Chinese communist rule.  In this sense, the group of Chinese leftists were the 
marginalized ‘Other’ within the dominant group of marginalized people who were 
‘colonised’ under British colonial rule. The anti-British posters were thus the 
evidence of a resistance not merely to the British colonial government, but also to 
those migrants who escaped from China and favoured the colonial rule at that 
time.  To borrow Lawrence Grossberg’s notion of fragmentation, the Hong Kong 
identity in post-1967 was inherently contradictory which involved ‘fragmentation 
of either individual identities or of the social categories (of difference) within 
which individuals are placed, or some combination of the two’.
322
  Thus, in the 
case of the British colonial narratives, the simplistic oppositional binary concept 
of Coloniser and Colonised is more complicated than it seems because the 
category of the ‘Colonised’ involved a multiple of contradictory, fluid and shifting 
identities.   
Both the Chinese posters and the British colonial videos played a 
significant role in constructing partial knowledge of the Chinese leftists, Hong 
Kong in general and the British Colonial government.  Hong Kong in late 1960s 
as a whole was shaped by a politics which was played out between the Chinese 
propaganda discourse and the British Hong Kong counter discourse.  I argue that 
the heterogeneity of Hong Kong culture today is very much influenced by the 
always incomprehensive knowledge constructed by both the Chinese and British 
colonial authorities.  A demonstrate this heterogeneity can be done by engaging 
with the ways in which the representations, relations and practices of the past are 
reproduced or transformed in today’s culture.  As I have tried to argue all the way 
through, the use of Cultural Revolution images in post-1997 Hong Kong culture is 
a good example of the heterogeneity of Hong Kong.  The social practice of 
protesting and marching has become a site through which the past is represented, 
the relations between the Chinese leftists, the Hong Kong majority and the British 
colonial government in the 1967 are reflected, and the practice of resistance is 
revealed.   
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Since 1967 freedom of expression, symbolically represented by the 
freedom to demonstrate, has been the major political concern among Hong 
Kongers.  As we can see from the controversy of the legislation of Article 23 of 
Basic Law in 2003, the largest demonstration in scale in Hong Kong history was 
launched mainly because of the people’s worries and suspicion that the legislation 
would violate the freedom of speech in the city.
323
  The demonstration on the 1
st
 
of July 2003 was a peaceful protest with over five hundred thousand agitators.  
Since then the 1
st
 of July has become a day of mass protest for political rights such 
as human rights, voting rights.
324
  As the statistics have shown, the number of 
protestors on the 1
st
 of July each year since 2003 reached at least over ten 
thousands, which was never the case before 2003.
325
  Thus, to protest on every 1
st
 
of July has become a regular phenomenon in Hong Kong since 2003.   
Then what are the implications of the image of the Chinese leftist 
protest/Red Guards movements (which are exchangeable because both represent 
mainland China to Hong Kong) when they are reproduced and reworked in 
today’s Hong Kong popular culture?  In my opinion, the current use of these 
images of the past is focused on the site of resistance and counter resistance 
between the authorities and a site through which knowledge of the respective 
authorities was constructed among the Hong Kong public.  When an image of the 
Red Guard or 1967 demonstration is reproduced, it is as if the relations and 
practices of the past are not only transferred but also overlapped with the current 
situation.  For example, G.O.D.’s ‘Essential Little Red (note) book’ poster in 2004 
is not only visually connected to the 1
st
 July March in Hong Kong from 2003 
onwards, it is also a way through which the Hong Kong long-constructed 
knowledge of the Chinese communist regime is used to serve the local interests 
and a manifestation of Hong Kong’s creative resistance to the Chinese ‘coloniser’. 
The particular reproduction of demonstrations from the Chinese revolutionary 
past, which may recall the Hong Kong experience of the Chinese leftist 
campaigns in 1967, reproduces the Hong Kong fear of the ‘irrational’, ‘inferior’ 
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world of the mainland Chinese and the Chinese communist regime, which is a 
knowledge cultivated under the British colonial government.  The demonstration 
image implies the Hong Kong anxiety about the Chinese regime that would 
threaten the ‘freedom’ of Hong Kong established during the British colonial 
period.  When the representation of an ‘inferior’ Chinese revolutionary world is 
mixed with Western individualistic values, it demonstrates a Hong Kong creative 
resistance to the re-coloniser and how this resistance complicates and gives 
texture to the Chinese policy on dealing with the special situation of Hong Kong.  
This creativity utilised a range of strategies, including making use of the leftist 
disturbance and the biased account of China created by the ex-coloniser to 
legitimise the dominance of Hong Kong under the rule of the re-coloniser. 
 
The spirit to struggle 
Some images of the Chinese revolutionary past look exotic, primitive and difficult 
to connect with the city culture of Hong Kong.  For example, the smiling peasant 
in the ‘Toiling the field’ postcard, happily harvesting crops, has little in common 
with Hong Kong which has always been a harbour city dominated by business, 
trading and financial exchanges.  However, the attitude of struggle depicted in the 
original Cultural Revolution poster is highly relevant to the mind-set of many 
Hong Kong people.  The picture of this smiling peasant was produced to 
encourage agricultural development in China after the three years of natural 
disasters between 1958 and 1961 which resulted in a great famine and millions of 
victims.
326
  With a different historical and geographical background, the use of 
such an image in the Hong Kong context may suggest a different experience at 
that time.  As narrated in a film set in Hong Kong in the 1950s, Hong Kong was 
described as ‘a beautiful city in southern China where many people had to work 
all day but they were still unable to earn a living’.
327
  If mainland Chinese faced 
the problems of natural disasters and famine, Hong Kongers suffered from 
drought, poverty and a low standard of living.  In 1963 and 1967 serious droughts 
affected Hong Kong.
328
 Water supply was unable to support the rapid population 
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growth. The government introduced a water restriction policy. There were periods 
when water supply was restricted to four hours per day.
329
   
The year of 1967 in Hong Kong was marked by harsh living conditions.  
This became the driving force for the Hong Kong people to struggle for a better 
standard of living, which is an attitude deeply ingrained in the Hong Kong mind-
set because of this social hardship.  At that time the Hong Kong economy was 
marked by growth and success recognised by the rest of the world, and which led 
to the view that ‘economists have cited the success of Hong Kong as an example 
of other developing countries’.
330
  By 1966, Hong Kong’s economy was 
dominated by the export of Hong Kong-made goods to the United States, the 
Commonwealth, Europe and Asia in which clothing and textiles comprised of half 
of Hong Kong’s exports in 1966 following by toys, artificial flowers, electrical 
products, footwear and metal goods.
331
  While people were hired to work in 
factories, many others spent the majority of their days at home to work on the 
half-finished parts of these goods before sending them back to the factories.  The 
wages of these jobs were not high, but many local families relied on these jobs to 
make a living in slum areas.   
 Though facing different situations and difficulties, the same kind of 
attitude of perseverance in the face of social hardships is the common spirit of 
both the Chinese revolutionary era and Hong Kong in the 1960s.  It was this 
attitude and faith that provided Hong Kongers with hope for a better future.  A 
common goal of producing and consuming locally made products to sustain the 
economy was advocated by the Hong Kong British government not only because 
of economic reasons, but also the construction of a local identity among the Hong 
Kong people based on the common goal of striving for a better standard of living.  
The image of the hard working labourer represents this spirit of struggle which is 
deeply ingrained in the people of Hong Kong and endures through the years. 
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Spirited, happy and smiling faces 
I demonstrated in the previous sections that the images of the Chinese communist 
style of demonstration were reproduced in today’s Hong Kong popular culture.  
While many of these typical images are dominated by furious and serious facial 
expressions of the characters in the posters, for example, the demonstration scene 
in G.O.D.’s ‘Essential Little Red (note) Book’ poster in no way shares this feature.  
Unlike many Chinese political poster images of the mass movements in the 1960s, 
the image chosen by G.O.D. to advertise its product depicts a peaceful march of 
smiling Red Guards.  Those typical radical and furious faces are absent, and 
instead a picture of the peaceful and happy faces of the Red Guards is used to 
refer to the Cultural Revolution era.   
In most of the examples in the previous sections, from mass protest and 
physical labour work, to the reading of The Little Red Book and the movements of 
Red Guards, elements of these images were brought into post-handover Hong 
Kong popular culture. An example of this was G.O.D.’s use of Cultural 
Revolution images to express the importance of freedom of speech, individualistic 
values and the aspiration to make a better living.  In the case of the People’s 
Recreation Community, Cultural Revolution images are used to create a space for 
people to get together and relax (without constraints), to read books  (without 
censorship), to eat safely (without worries about contamination), to socialise with 
friends, and to express freely in artistic forms (with a low exhibition fee).   
Among these examples, freedom has been repeatedly stressed.  Together 
with the long-established fear, anxiety and suspicions among Hong Kong people 
towards the mainland Chinese authority, and the social demand for universal 
suffrage in the post-handover era, the ‘freedom’ that the Hong Kong people have 
considered as part of their way of life has become a heated topic.  Freedom of 
expression has to be emphasized in post-1997 era because this is considered 
important, yet it is not necessarily the case without the effort and perseverance to 
struggle for it.  This may be one reason why the images of happy faces during 
Cultural Revolution became good visual sources for the Hong Kong people to 
express a generic sense of ‘struggle in difficult situations’.  It is as if some 
encouraging images of happy, struggling faces are a kind of necessary relief from 
the anxiety, fear, suspicion and helplessness felt by the majority of Hong Kongers.  
The smiling Chairman Mao, which was a symbol signifying the leadership of Mao 
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Zedong, may now suggest that the new economic opportunities brought to Hong 
Kong by the growing buying power of mainland Chinese tourists forms the new 
‘direction’ and future of Hong Kong.   
 
Conclusion 
The above examples show some typical features of ‘Cultural Revolution’ products 
in Hong Kong.  Looking at the image itself, the examples show that the recycled 
image is usually an abstracted or simplified edition of the original.  Besides, the 
original slogans are usually replaced by contemporary slogans, some of which are 
specific to local Hong Kong culture or current situations.  The same ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ image can be found reproduced in different commercial forms.  To 
understand the recycled image with contemporary words, these products in 
general are characterised by playing with famous political slogans, symbols and 
practices during Cultural Revolution. This kind of manipulation of Cultural 
Revolution imagery is similar to the examples found in the mainland Chinese and 
Singaporean contexts, which are discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Four 
respectively.  The meaning of ‘Cultural Revolution’ images in this particular 
situation is not just about what the original means but the recycling and reworking 
of these images in certain specific contextual moments. 
However, what makes the Hong Kong case different is that the reiteration of 
Cultural Revolution imagery is strategic in particularly highlighting difference of 
certain aspects or developments between Hong Kong and China.  This idea is 
somehow contradictory in the sense that Hong Kong is a part of China after 1997 
which is supposed to be ‘One Country’, but in reality the city is governed 
according to a different set of law and a ‘Two Systems’ principle.  As I 
demonstrated, the reiteration of Cultural Revolution imagery shows an immediate 
connection with the latest economic, social and political situations in Hong Kong.  
With this, I argue that Cultural Revolution imagery is a sign of the specific post-
handover Hong Kong situation – the same set of cultural sources is used 
differently in Hong Kong according to its own way.  The People’s Recreation 
Community’s case of selling dairy products imported from Japan also shows a 
continuing role of Hong Kong in the post-1997 context as the ‘middleman’ 
between China and the rest of the world.  The practice of using and reworking 
Cultural Revolution imagery can be a good way to mediate the tensions, 
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contradictions and negotiations between Hong Kong and China so that Hong 
Kong can, borrowing for Bhabha’s work, ‘survive’ the national support of China 
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Chapter Five 
The Mao Restaurant in Singapore (1998-2003): 





Between 1998 and 2003 some typical Chinese communist revolutionary icons 
such as the images of Mao Zedong, the Red Guards and The Little Red Book 
appeared in Singaporean commercial spaces.  This was an interesting 
phenomenon because the use and consumption of Chinese communist imagery 
seemed contradictory to the multiracial capitalist ruling principle of an 
independent cosmopolitan city-state in Southeast Asia.  More significantly, the 
historically specific developments and practices which opposed and suppressed 
the spread of Communism in Singapore played a crucial role in the founding of 
the Republic of Singapore.   
The commercial exploitation of exotic cultural imagery of the ‘Other’ in 
Singapore could be considered a result or feature of a postmodern urban lifestyle 
characterised by seeking satisfaction in the purchase and consumption of 
commodities mediated by diffuse cultural images in advertising, display and 
promotion.
332
  However, I assert that the legitimate use of formerly banned 
imagery in Singapore in the early 21
st
 century is significant not just because it is a 
typical result of globalised consumption culture.  Cultural Revolution imagery 
used in contemporary Singapore can be understood as a manifestation of the 
changing relationship between China and Singapore across time.  I argue that the 
officially accepted emergence of Cultural Revolution imagery in Singapore can be 
interpreted as a form of recognition of the growing influence of China, both 
politically and economically, since the late 1990s.  This time- and site-specific 
phenomenon is a particular post-colonial product and a consequence of the 
interplay between historically specific developments, temporally specific 
economic circumstances, consumer culture and the particular development of a 
Singapore-oriented identity.   
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This chapter analyses the commercial use of Chinese revolutionary 
imagery in Singapore between 1998 and 2003 from both historical and 
contemporary perspectives.  It focuses on the tension and meaning between the 
suppression and legitimacy (from sensitive political culture to commercial popular 
icons) of the use and consumption of the imagery in Singapore in different eras.  It 
is organised into four sections.  In the first section, I lay out the historically 
specific developments and practices in Singapore in relation to the suppression of 
Communism, and address the issue of Chinese and multiracial identity in 
Singapore.  The second section looks at the economic recession in Asia during the 
1990s as an important context of the phenomenon.  The third section addresses the 
development of a consumption culture in contemporary Singapore through an 
examination of the ‘Mao’ restaurant which opened in Singapore in 1998.  In the 
last section I argue, through the work of Bhabha and others, that the contemporary 
use of Chinese communist revolutionary imagery can be construed as the 
‘meeting point’ where the Singaporean past and its cultural ‘Other’ are ‘re-
inscribed’, ‘reactivated’, ‘relocated’ and ‘resignified’.
333
   I also argue that the 
imagery was the visual narrative of an historical/cultural reconstruction on which 
Singaporean subjectivity was constructed in relation to a fantasy of a Chinese 
revolutionary past/present. 
 
Banned Chinese communist propaganda & an multiracial identity 
What makes the emergence of Chinese communist imagery in Singapore in the 
2000s a special phenomenon is its possible relationship with the historically 
specific anti-communist development in the 1950s.  During the 1950s, the British 
colonial authority in Singapore claimed to recognise signs of the spread of 
Communism in the region and therefore took measures to counter and suppress 
the ‘communist movements’ and ‘communist propaganda’.  The contrasting 
attitudes of the Singaporean government towards the Chinese communists in the 
1950s and in early 2000s must be taken into account if we wish to understand the 
role of Chinese revolutionary imagery in contemporary Singapore.   
In post-war Singapore a series of Chinese student and labour movements, 
which were widely understood in many official records as the manifestations of 
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the spread of Communism in the region, were deemed ‘subversive’ with an 
intention to overthrow the British colonial government.
334
  At around the same 
time in the late 1950s, Singapore residents were negotiating with the British 
colonial authorities for a change in its political status from a colony to a state with 
greater political rights and power.  This led to a series of corresponding changes 
to the structure of the government.  In the course of restructuring, it was believed 
that the spread of communist ideology in the British colonial state was not 
favourable for either the expansion of sovereign rights from the British authority 
or internal social stability.  The British colonial authority’s classification of the 
spread of Communism as ‘subversive’ and their control over any suspicious 
‘communist’ activities, such as the suppression of the student and labour 
movements and communist propaganda, had a considerable impact on identity 
formation in Singapore.  As Hall argues: 
We need to situate the debates about identity within all those historically specific 
developments and practices which have disturbed the relatively ‘settled’ character of 
many populations and culture, which I would argue are coterminous with modernity and 
the processes of forced and ‘free’ migration which have become a global phenomenon of 
the so-called ‘post-colonial’ world.
335
   
The British-Singaporean government’s proactive suppression of the spread of 
Communism was not unimportant because it did disturb the Chinese proportion of 
Singapore’s population in the 1950s.  The political changes in both Southeast Asia 
and China after 1949 resulted in a decrease in the number of immigrants from 
mainland China.  Externally, the founding of the People’s Republic of China gave 
reason for many overseas Chinese to go back to their ‘homeland’.  Internally, 
from 1
st
 August 1953 onwards, immigration to Singapore was barred except for 
those who had British citizenship, technical specialists and spouses and children 
of Chinese who were already residents in the colony.
336
  Most significantly, the 
British fear of the spread of Communism in Singapore paved the way for a ruling 
principle of the People’s Action Party stressing economic strength and 
development of the city state.  The following paragraphs give a brief historical 
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account of the developments and practices with a focus on the spread and 
resistance of Communism in the post-war period until Singapore declared its 
independence in 1965. 
 
The political and cultural contexts in Singapore 
Demographically, Singapore is a multiracial society consisting almost entirely of 
immigrants.
337





 centuries. They saw Singapore as a place of transition where they could 
make their fortunes before they returned to their homelands.  Until the 1950s, the 
immigrants who were under British colonial rule still did not see Singapore as 
home.  It was not until the 1949 communist takeover of China that a reorientation 
towards Singapore as ‘home’ occurred.
338
  Culturally and ideologically, these 
immigrants were more oriented to their homelands of China, India and Malaya.   
In his discussion on Singapore-China relations, Lee Kuan Yiu claims that 
‘no foreign country other than Britain has had a greater influence on Singapore’s 
political development than China, the ancestral homeland of three-quarters of our 
people.’
 339
  According to Lee, the diplomatic relations between Singapore and the 
Chinese communist regime could be traced back to the 1920s when the Chinese 
Communist Party sent an agent to Singapore to build up a communist movement 
in Nanyang.  In 1949, although both the KMT and the CCP were proscribed, the 
division of the Singapore community between the two remained.  With the 
founding of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in 1949, the PRC began 
radio broadcasts encouraging the ‘Nanyang’ Chinese to send their sons home to 
China for education and remittances for their relations.  Despite the long cultural 
orientation to their homeland China, the responses of the Chinese community in 
Singapore were by no means one-sided and pro-China.  After 1949, the parents of 
those who were educated in Chinese schools in Singapore avoided sending their 
children to China to pursue further education.  There was still a high risk that the 
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students would not be able to return to Singapore due to official restrictions on the 
movement of people between China and Singapore.  In the 1960s, some Chinese 
school students participated in the communist and anti-colonial movements in 
Singapore.  But the rioting was very much in the interest of all Singapore 
residents in the name of anti-colonial and pro-communist sentiments.
340
  In 
response to Chinese communist propaganda during the Cultural Revolution period, 
the Singaporean regime only suppressed the dissemination of Chinese communist 
propaganda and local Maoist activists in its territories without putting a stop to its 
economic activities with China: 
When the Cultural Revolution in China, we used to confiscate large quantities of Chinese 
stamps bearing “Thoughts of Mao” imported by some Chinese-language bookshops, and 
also thousands of copies of Mao’s Little Red Book brought in by Chinese seaman who 
wanted to distribute them.  Even the Singapore Branch of the Bank of China joined in 
this madness and gave out Cultural Revolution propaganda pamphlets to customers at 
their counters.  We arrested and prosecuted our own citizens who indulged in this frenzy, 
but left Chinese nationals alone to keep open the trade with China.
341
 
After independence, Singapore had no further diplomatic contact with the PRC.  
Although the Singaporean government adopted a policy of intervention on the 
dissemination of Chinese communist propaganda during the 1960s, in fact part of 
its population was influenced by Mao’s thought and Maoist political slogans.  Lee 
recalls the scenario when the Chinese Communist’s ‘Ping-Pong’ diplomacy led to 
a friendly visit of the Chinese ping-pong team to Singapore in 1973 when: 
During the tournament, a large part of the Singaporean audience jeered at the Singapore 
team and shouted slogans in praise of Mao.  There were ‘mini-Maos’ in Singapore in the 
1970s.
342
   
With the combination of historical, political and cultural factors, an independent 
Singapore not only had a problem of finding a ‘common bond’ to unite its 
population and of forming a shared identity; the expansion of the Chinese 
communists in Southeast Asia, as manifest in the dissemination of Maoist 
propaganda, was seen as a threat to Singapore.  Only trade with China was 
considered beneficial.  Like many other scholars, Chua points out that the 
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Singaporean government constructed a shared Singaporean identity in economic 
terms: 
[Singaporean] politics was reduced to economics…The “survival” of the new nation, 
defined in economic terms, in turn came to be entwined with the problems of how 
individual citizens “make a living”.  National economic growth and improvement of the 
population’s material life became both the rational basis for organizing the new nation 
and the criteria by which the performance of the regime to be defined, assessed and 
legitimated.  Sharing in this material progress became the entitlement of citizenship.
343
 
The government’s goal of capitalist economic development in Singapore was also 
effective in protecting against the political threat of Maoist ideology.  With an 
inscription of the culture of capitalism in Singapore, one of the cultural 
concomitants was the development of a sense of competitiveness in Singaporeans 
who desired to achieve comparative advantages in material consumption.
344
  The 
pride of capitalist economic achievement not only contributed to a positive self-
image among Singaporeans, the cultural consequences of capitalism were 
expressed in their necessities and preferences.
345
  The cultural, social and political 
consequences of capitalist economic development constitute the predominant part 
of the Singaporean culture of everyday life.  This pride in the development of 
wealth was reinforced by comparisons with others in terms of economic success. 
Singapore differentiated itself from other nations including China and India.  As 
Chua argues: 
comparisons with Chinese, Malays and Indians in their respective countries add to this 
identity building process, for the differences enable Singaporeans of Chinese, Malay and 
Indian background to distance themselves from whatever claims that their “lands of 
origin” may still make to them.
346
 
Thus, any Singaporean connection with China was ‘motivated entirely by the 
opportunities for profit in which racial-affinity is but grease to the cause’.
347
  
Bearing this in mind, I argue that the employment of a Chinese Revolutionary 
theme in the ‘Mao’ restaurants is what Laclau and Mouffe call a ‘temporary and 
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strategic alliance’ which fixes differences because of economic and political 
interests.   
Labour and student movements between 1940s and 1950s 
The suppression of communist activities in Singapore can be traced back to the 
mid and late 1940s when the labour movement developed and various strikes 
started to occur.  It was claimed that the Malaya communists attempted to 
overthrow the British colonial government with the aim of turning Malaya and 
Singapore into communist societies.  In 1948, the British colonial government 
announced a state of emergency to fight the communists.
348
  From the mid to late 
1950s, it was claimed that though many strikes were the result of economic 
factors, one-third of them were politically subversive which created social 
instability.
349
  After that the attitude of the British colonial government in 
opposing communist activities in Singapore was clear.  For example, the police 
attempted to drive away workers participating in strikes with water pipes and 
batons.
350
   
As the labour movements grew, there were also Chinese student 
movements, which included both peaceful class and examination strikes and also 
violent confrontations with the government.
351
  These students were fighting for a 
better education system.  But as Liu and Wong point out, the post-war British 
colonial government educational policies alone were not serious enough to spark 
the Chinese student movements.
352
  Liu and Wong argue that it was the National 
Service Ordinance announced by the government in 1954 that aroused discontent 
among Chinese parents.  This ordinance announced that ‘all healthy males 
between the ages of 18 and 20 had to be enrolled into the army’ and ‘offenders 
would be either jailed or fined or both.’
353
  This policy was objected to by many 
Chinese parents.  One of the reasons was that many Chinese people at the time 
                                            
348 Liu and Wong, Singpaore Chinese Society in Transition: Business, Politics and Socio-Economic Change 
1945-1965 , 174. 
 
349 Ibid. , 175. 
 
350 Ibid. , 176. 
 
351 Ibid. , 141. 
 
352 Ibid. , 142. 
 
353 Ibid.  
 
Chapter Five 
 - 187 - 
were already dissatisfied with the colonial government and ‘they felt they were 
not obliged to provide service to the colonial government’.
354
  Therefore, many 
Chinese students of national service age skipped classes to show their discontent 
with the ordinance.  In the early stages, the Chinese student movements were 
peaceful and involved submitting a written petition to explain why they disagreed 
with the terms of the Ordinance.  On 12
th
 May 1954, some students who prepared 
to set off for Government House from a Chinese High School to submit the 
petition found themselves surrounded by armed police.  The students were forced 
to remain on campus overnight.  The next day, the submission of the petition was 
turned down because they were told that the demonstration was illegal and 
violated the 1948 Emergency Act.  After this peaceful attempt failed, student 
responses turned into violent clashes with the police which caused many injuries; 
as well, the Singapore Chinese Middle Schools Student Union (SCMSSU) was 
established in 1955.  It was a student union with an aim to unify all Chinese 
school students in Singapore to fight for students’ interests.  However, the 
government believed that the Malayan Communist Party had been promoting 
communist thinking through student union activities such as ‘study groups’ and 
summer camps.
355
  This led to more student protests against the government.  
While the government took harsh measures to deal with the student protesters, 
such as arresting student protesters and the intention to punishment of teachers 
and students involved, the student activities were also supported by labour unions 
and other pro-communist organizations.
356
 
After the student demonstrations, another major conflict between the 
government and the Chinese residents was over the new education policy in 1959, 
when People’s Action Party (PAP) had just taken over the government from the 
British colonial authority.  The new government announced that from 1962 
onwards all students had to take a general school-leaving examination set by the 
government before they were allowed to move up to a pre-university level.
357
  
This provoked anger among Chinese educators and students, and eventually led to 
examination strikes by the Chinese students. 
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The government believed that these labour and student movements in 
Singapore in the 1950s were motivated and arranged by communists.  It was also 
believed that communist propaganda had a certain impact on influencing youth 
and workers.  According to Liu and Wong, people in Singapore at that time were 
moved by Mao’s unification of China and the communist ideal.  Some believed 
that the communists had gained power in many countries outside Singapore.  
Some students would bring up issues such as how the colonial government 
violated the Singaporean people to back up their support for Chinese 
communism.
358
  In general, the British official view towards the communist 
activities in Singapore in 1950s was that the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) 
and the pro-communist activists were the real forces behind the student and labour 
movements.  Since Chinese students were the major force in anti-colonial rule 
activities, the student movements had to be put down.  This resulted in the British 
armed suppression of student demonstrations and the government dissolved the 
SCMSSU.   
At the height of the government’s clampdown on student unions and 
‘subversive’ activities, Lee Kuan Yew, a well-known supporter of Chinese 
education, explained to the students that ‘a fair education system was not a result 
of communist propaganda and people should support a multi-racial, multi-lingual 
education system’.
359
  In 1961, Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister, analyzed that 
‘the Communist Party made use of the change of school system to add salt to the 
wound and cause further conflicts between the government and Chinese 
educators’ and ‘the “big boss” behind the student strikes were the same “boss” of 
the Socialist Party.’
360
  No matter whether the communists were the real force 
behind the movements, both the former British colonial government and the 
Singaporean government dominated by PAP saw the communists as the major 
cause of social unrest and destruction.  Communist propaganda was believed to be 
the tool through which communist ideology and anti-government messages were 
promoted.   
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In response to the student movements, the government began to implement 
the English-based education system and made English the official working 
language in Singapore.  It is important to note that in the 1960s the most stable 
jobs in Singapore at that time were government jobs.  This change in education 
policy meant that those who wanted to be civil servants had to speak English.
361
 
This was a turning point for many Chinese parents and students in Singapore 
because it was for the first time that they felt they would change their mind and 
support learning English and going to English schools.   
 In the previous paragraphs I provided a brief account of some key events 
of social movements in Singapore and some measures taken by the Singaporean 
government during the 1950s and 1960s.  It is not my aim to question whether or 
not the Chinese communist movement was the ‘big boss’ behind the Chinese 
students and labour movements.  What is more meaningful is that we can see the 
ways in which the idea of ‘the Communist’ as the ‘subversive political other’ 
were constructed in the official discourse and response of the Singaporean 
government; and the ways in which the Chinese students and labours claimed to 
engage in communist activities.  The construction of a ‘subversive’ and ‘anti-
government’ image of communism was a part of the politics played by the 
Singaporean government to justify its legitimacy to control and suppress the anti-
colonial, anti-government sentiments and most importantly, the spread of 
communism in the region.  Thus, the Singaporean government could use the 
excuse of ‘being communist’ or ‘being pro-communist’ to deploy government 
measures, harsh or violent, to suppress any anti-government activities.  The 
meaning of communism and pro-communism in Singapore was temporarily 
stabilized and regulated into a set of statements, or in Michel Foucault’s term, a 
‘discourse’.  Chinese communism can be seen as an object ‘produced’ by the 
regulated ways it was spoken about.  For example, the official line emphasised 
that communism was a danger and a threat to the safety and stability of society.  
In fact, according to Liu and Wong, many Singaporean-Chinese interviewers who 
experienced the student and labour movements still felt that it was reasonable for 
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the government to dissolve the student union, which was claimed by the 
government to be ‘communist’.
362
   
 What is equally significant is that we can see the Singaporean experience 
of the spread of communism in the 1950s as an early example of the globalisation 
of culture. It is obvious that the historically specific developments and practices 
mentioned above took place inside Singapore, but these were produced within and 
by a globalising communist discourse constructed through different forms of 
propaganda.  I would argue that the communist ideology and the developments, 
practices and social relations associated with it were all ‘resources’ contributing to 
an identity construction, which paved the way for the successful construction of a 
multi-racial Singapore-oriented identity. 
The Singaporean government’s concern about the spread of Chinese 
communism in 1950s was understandable.  One reason was that the Chinese 
community played an important part in the society of Singapore.  Hong Liu and 
Sin-Kiong Wong’s research was particularly focused on Chinese society in 
Singapore and stressed the significance of the Chinese community in the economy 
and politics of Singapore. The ethnic Chinese constituted more than 75% of the 
total population of Singapore.  In 1957, at the time when student and labour 
movements were frequent, ethnic Chinese dominated 75.4 % of the total 
population, which saw a stable increase to 76.2% in 1970.
363
  Thus, Chinese 
communist propaganda with nationalistic Chinese slogans promoting the 
strengthening of China would easily move the dominant Chinese population in 
Singapore.  The British-Singaporean government’s major concern was that if the 
Chinese communists gained power Singapore would be turned into a communist 
society.  There were several reasons to account for the eventual failure of the 
communist attempt to gain power in Singapore.  The major reason was, as 
discussed in the last section, the Singaporean government’s proactive suppression 
of the spread of communism.  Also the government’s control over the inflow of 
Chinese immigrants in 1953 effectively restricted the flow of Chinese people from 
mainland China to Singapore, and reduced the risk of spreading Chinese 
communist ideology in the region.  A further reason may be that Singapore was an 
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unfavourable environment for the rise of communism because a significant 
segment of local business has been traditionally controlled by the Chinese 
business community.   
It is also important to note that identity issues for the Chinese in Singapore 
have always been complicated.  As Wang Gungwu elucidates, there were at least 
three main types of Chinese who moved into Singapore in the early years under 
British colonial rule.  The first were those who were accustomed to Western ways.  
The second were those who had experienced the Southeast Asian world such as 
Malaysia and Thailand.  The third were those who came directly from China 
particularly from the southern provinces who had already had some connections 
with relatives trading in the region for decades.
364
  These overseas Chinese 
considered themselves as Chinese who had an origin in China even though they 
resided outside China.  This community of Chinese relied very much on an 
‘historical’ identity which was nurtured on stories about the Chinese past and 
traditional family values which helped to sustain a sense of ‘mainland’ 
Chineseness.
365
    
 
Multiple identities of Southeast Asian Chinese 
Before the 1920s, the local authorities still found it acceptable for Chinese 
communities, who were usually successful merchants and businessmen, to 
preserve their Chineseness.  However, because of political changes in China and 
Asia, the predominance of Chinese in Southeast Asia, which could threaten social 
stability, became problematic to local political leaders.
366
  However, as Wang 
proposes, the ‘Chinese sense of their own identity could be changed by changing 
events’.
367
  This is evident in how Chinese residents, who insisted on the 
preservation of a Chinese education system in Singapore, gradually decided to 
send their children to English schools and to take up a multi-racial Singaporean 
identity because of the changing political situation.  As Hall argues, identities ‘are 
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constantly in the process of change and transformation.’
368
  Wang states that 
‘modern Southeast Asian Chinese, like most other people today, do not have a 




The gradual detachment from China’s Chinese identity  
Facing the new political environment of the early 1950s when the British colonial 
authority gradually transferred greater political power to the local population, the 
Chinese business community became directly involved in local elections and 
promoting an identity oriented to the geographical place of Singapore.  This 
identity formation also took place in a favourable context when by 1955 70% of 
the Chinese population in Singapore was local-born.
370
  As a result of a number of 
factors including the government’s control on immigration and the spread of 
communism, changing political situations, the residents of Singapore began to 
establish a Singapore-oriented identity.  The government concern about Chinese 
communist propaganda as a threat to social solidarity and unrest was no longer 
relevant to the transforming society with a cultural identity oriented to the place of 
Singapore.  As Wang Gungwu points out: 
For them, as the majority people of Singapore, ancestral cultural values will only remain 
useful for social intercourse and business purposes.  For them, whatever links remain 
between Singapore and China would have to be on the same basis as those between 
Singapore and any other country.
371
   
This gradual detachment from the original ethnic mainland Chinese identity 
among the majority of Singaporean Chinese was a factor which made the Chinese 
revolutionary imagery in contemporary Singapore a special phenomenon.  From 
the examples I give in the later section, we can see that political images produced 
during the Cultural Revolution in the People’s Republic of China appeared in 
Singapore in the early 2000s.  Due to immigration control and a suppression of 
communist propaganda, these images were unlikely to have been previously, at 
least publicly, disseminated in Singapore.  Following Wang’s point, Chinese 
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communist images for the majority of people in contemporary Singapore, are 
simply foreign culture from another part of the world.  
 
Consumer Culture and the Asian Economic Recession in the 1990s 
The Republic of Singapore has been governed by the People’s Action Party driven 
by the pursuit of national economic growth and with the goal of improving 
material life for Singaporeans.
372
  This principle not only legitimises the rule of 
the party but also maintains the social stability and solidarity of the city-state.  
After its independence from the British Colonial rule in 1963 and its separation 
from Malaysia in 1965, the Singaporean government’s emphasis on economic 
development enabled the emergence of a consumer culture.  According to Chua 
Beng-huat, the emergence and expansion of consumerism led to the construction 
of shopping spaces for the consumption of entertainment, fashion and food since 
the late 1960s.
373
  Since the mid-1980s, the cityscape of Singapore had already 
been marked by shopping centres for the development of tourism as a national 
industry.
374
  The expansion of both local stores and foreign chains was prevalent.  
Orchard Road had been developed as a tourist belt with shopping spaces 
constructed where most of the well-known foreign brands and established local 
stores were located.
375
  American fast-food chains such as McDonald’s were 
found not only in the leisure districts but also in the public housing estates 
accommodating over 80% of the population.
376
 Lifestyle in Singapore has been 
marked by a consumption culture which can be attributed to both local and global 
forces.  As Chua surmises, ‘the consumption patterns of Singaporeans will be 
increasingly cosmopolitan, determined by and fitting into the global marketing 
strategies of producers of consumer goods’ while ‘cultural differences between 
localities will continue to be noticeable’.
377
  It is important to note that the 
Singaporean response to imported culture had been economically oriented, 
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corresponding to the ruling policy of generating national economic growth.  The 
business oriented values that the government implemented through measures for 
stimulating economic growth and stability had the effect of generating social 
support for the political status quo. 
The expansion of the retail sector in Singapore began to shrink in the mid-
1990s.  The Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 was a blow to Singapore, resulting in 
a sustained downturn in retail and tourist industries.  Though some other sectors in 
the city-state regained stability in late 1999, the retail sector in Singapore faced a 
sustained downturn.  By 2000, the Singaporean economy was facing structural 
unemployment for the first time in four decades since the city-state was founded 
in 1965.
378
  To a small city state with an economy-oriented ruling principle, the 
economic recession had to be tackled.  The establishment of the Economic 
Review Committee (ERC) in 2001 was obviously a response to the economic 
downtown in Singapore.  The committee outlined three major goals for the 
development of the economy.  The first was to make ‘a globalised economy’ with 
Singapore at the centre with links to all the major economies in the world; the 
second was to make ‘a creative and entrepreneurial nation willing to take risks to 
create fresh business and blaze new paths to success’; the third was to make ‘a 
diversified economy’ where ‘new start-ups co-exist with traditional businesses 
exploring new and innovative ideas’.
379
  The House of Mao chain restaurant was a 
product of this particular economic situation and the change of the government’s 
attitude in economic development.  I argue that a ‘Chinese revolutionary’ theme 
restaurant was a result of the ramification of economic, cultural and political 
factors under the impact of globalisation.  The role that Chinese revolutionary 
images played in this phenomenon was characterised by its temporary nature 
specific to a limited period of time when it was deemed ‘useful’.  In the next 
section I lay out the role Chinese revolutionary icons played in Singaporean 
cosmopolitan consumption culture, with a focus on the site- and time-specific set 
of networks that relate the icons to other forces. 
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Consumer culture in Singapore 
Singapore is recognised as a state saturated with a consumer culture with major 
fast food chains, fashion brands and luxury cars ubiquitously available.  The 
establishment of this consumer culture is attributed mainly to the ruling principle 
of the PAP of ‘improving the material life of Singaporeans through the expansion 
of material consumption.’
380
  This principle developed mainly because before 
independence in 1965, the first generation of people who settled in Singapore 
suffered from low living standards.  The economic and business oriented economy 
of Singapore today is also a result of the history of Singapore as a trading port.  
The trading business tradition in exports and imports, and the transitional point for 
international flow of products today is an expansion of the success in the old days.  
Thus, it is important to note that impacts of globalisation were evident in 
Singaporean history for a long time, not just as in the recent past.  In the 
discussion on consumption culture, perhaps what is more significant is the 
changing conditions and features of business and products that are available and 
popular in Singapore.  Chua says that ‘Singapore exports almost everything it 
produces, imports almost everything Singapore consumes.’
381
  Like consumer 
culture in many other urban cities, consumption in Singapore in the early 2000s 
involved an abundant use of signs.  The Western-style food and fashion chains 
were ubiquitous in major shopping malls on Orchard Road.  The ‘Mao’ 
restaurants in Singapore in the late 1990s and early 2000s were dominated by the 
active manipulation of cultural imagery and the nature of business as a food chain.  
Most significantly, the adopted ‘Mao’ theme and the marketing strategy displayed 
particular features of production and consumption in Singapore which had existed 
only for a short period of time.   
 
The Mao restaurants in Singapore between 1998 and 2003 
The ‘House of Mao’ was the name of the first restaurant with a ‘Mao’ theme 
opened and managed by a well-established enterprise called the Tung Lok Group.  
This commercial establishment owns over twenty chain restaurants in Singapore, 
Indonesia, China, Japan and India.  Having started the design stage around mid-
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1997, The House of Mao was one of the group’s chain restaurants opened for 
about five years since March 1998.  Using the same Maoist theme, the chain 
restaurant had branches in different locations in Singapore.  The ‘House of Mao’ 
was the first opened in the China Square Food Centre on Telok Ayer Street in 
Singapore in March 1998, which was the name for an agglomeration of Chinese 
restaurants in a food court spread over five floors.  ‘The Little Red Book’ was a 
branch opened in the Orchard Hotel Shopping Arcade five months later.  With the 
local success of the House of Mao in Singapore, the Tung Lok Group had planned 
to franchise the operation of this theme restaurant worldwide.
382
  However, the 
proposal for opening a franchised branch of the House of Mao III in London in 
January 2002 was eventually terminated by the group.
383
  
The ‘Mao’ restaurants served Hunan-Western fusion cuisine and Chinese 
‘hotpot’.  The marketing strategy of using a ‘Mao’ theme was partly because 
Chairman Mao was an influential Chinese figure who was widely recognised, as 
well, he was born in Hunan and was particularly fond of spicy Hunan cuisine. The 
managing director of the group, Andrew Tjioe, explained the use of the images 
and the ‘Mao’ theme in the interview in I-D Magazine:  
Hunan food is spicy and an acquired taste.  Chairman Mao is the greatest representative 
of Hunan; hence, the restaurant is called the House of Mao.  There are many Mao 




 Mao was the icon for China, spicy Sichuan food, and more importantly, a 
fashionable icon in the late 1990s.  It was two years after Hong Kong fashion 
designer Vivienne Tam made use of the images of Mao in her spring/summer 
collection in 1995 in New York.
385
  The use of a Levi’s stud button on a Mao 
portrait was seemingly, at least visually, similar to Tam’s works in which some 
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images of Mao were created based on an original portrait of Mao.
386
  These 
images broke the rule of a divine depiction of Mao in the political prints which 
corresponded to the ubiquitous cult of Mao in China since his rise to power, 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s.
387
  Tam’s works were deemed controversial 
particularly within Chinese communities at the time of their production in the 
mid-1990s when the image of Mao as the ‘sacred’ national icon of China was still 
deep-rooted in people’s minds.
388
  However controversial it was, Tam’s Mao 
collection was incorporated into the permanent archives of the Museum of FIT in 
New York, the Andy Warhol Museum, the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the 
Victoria and Albert Museum.
389
  The historical image of Mao, which was already 
accompanied by its own signifiers (i.e. Mao as a sacred figure in 1960s), was 
imbued with new aesthetic and cultural meanings by the mid-1990s, namely, a 
‘chic-and-modern-ness’.  Also in using Mao as a theme, the House of Mao 
restaurants were branded as chic and fashionable during the time when Tam’s 
Mao collection was internationally recognised as such.  It is notable that the 
House of Mao in Singapore came just before the rise of the contemporary Chinese 
art market, with many artworks using the theme of the Cultural Revolution, from 
2000 onwards.
390
   
In China, Sichuan restaurants could be found with advertisements 
employing political pictures produced during the Cultural Revolution or 
mimicking the ‘Cultural Revolution’ style with symbols such as the Red Guards, 
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green military uniforms and the revolutionary postures which were standard 
during the revolutionary period.  This demonstrates that the ‘Mao’ restaurant in 
Singapore was an example of an ‘imported commodity’, which had been popular 
in China since the 1980s, and was used to ‘re-configure the similarity in the 
lifestyles of its customers in the different locations of the world.’
391
  Interestingly, 
although an imported commodity, the food that the ‘Mao’ restaurant featured 
consisted of noodles, hotpot and spicy dishes which were typical of local 
Singaporean cuisine.  Spicy food and noodles, for example, were specific to 
Singapore as there is a local expectation for how noodles are consumed and how 
chilli is used and served.  Fusion cuisine served at ‘Mao’ restaurants showed an 
aspect of how foreign culture could be integrated with local culture to construct a 
modern lifestyle.  It was a ‘code of similarity and difference’ which signified 
‘social affiliation’.
392
  This was evident in the advertising strategies that created a 
‘lifestyle’ which aimed at a specific group of young consumers. 
This was incorporated closely with the marketing strategies and 
advertising images through which the foreign commodity was able to integrate 
with the local cultural context and the daily life of the people.  For example, there 
were two famous advertisements for the House of Mao that had been published in 
magazines.  One was a photographic image of a middle-aged man in his fifties 
who bore a resemblance to a solemn-looking Mao Zedong and three younger men 
wearing People’s Liberation Army’s uniforms walking out from Orchard Hotel 
Shopping Centre.  Another image was also a photographic image of a middle-
aged man in his fifties wearing a Chinese tunic suit using an escalator coming up 
from the Orchard station MRT. This joyful man was, again, a representation of 
Mao Zedong who during his life time had worn the same style of suit in public.  
These images were a hot topic for lifestyle magazines at this time.
393
   
The creative advertising campaigns also included performance.  Some 
middle-aged Chinese men wearing green PLA-style uniforms were ordered to 
walk around the Orchard Hotel Shopping Centre, where the restaurant was located 
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and one of the most popular shopping centres in Singapore, and other busy 
locations such as major entrances and exits of the Mass Rail Transit (MRT) as 
part of the marketing campaigns to promote the newly opened restaurant.  This 
advertising strategy was dominated by an active manipulation of Chinese 
revolutionary elements, i.e. Chairman Mao and the People’s Liberation Army.  
This was very successful in arousing public interest in the new theme restaurant.   
The performative advertising showed the significance of advertising in Singapore 
which creatively and playfully exploited imagery of the cultural ‘other’ in 
marketing mundane consumer goods.   This example also showed the particularly 
dynamic feature of the Southeast Asian consumer culture and the extent to which 
people lived in a vibrant consumer culture mediated by images and oriented to 
visual pleasure.  Tjioe was flattered that the ‘House of Mao was probably the most 
publicised restaurant in Singapore in 1998 – there was so much publicity you 
wouldn't believe it’.
394
   
The marketing strategy of the House of Mao aimed at creating a fantasy of 
a nostalgic and exotic ‘arrival’ of Chairman Mao in Singapore.  By creating a 
‘Chairman Mao’ who took the MRT, this marketing strategy not only successfully 
caught the attention of the majority of local Singaporeans; it also effectively 
produced a public image of the restaurant integrated with the everyday life of the 
local people.  In this sense, we can see that the advertising strategies partook in 
the construction of the idea and image of the ‘Mao’ themed restaurant as a 
‘cosmopolitan’ culture, which refers positively to a culture which appears in ‘no 
specific geographical site in particular and thus belongs everywhere in the 
cosmos.’
395
  In this way a local Chinese phenomena became local to Singapore 
and with the overseas expansion plan the House of Mao was intended to fit into 
other localities around the globe.  The House of Mao in Singapore was therefore 
an imported commodity which was originally foreign, but was adapted to a local 
cultural context and which was then planned to be ‘globalised’. 
To attract customers to spend money in a context of serious economic 
depression, the House of Mao was the result of a high input of design and 
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‘globally’ fashionable imagery.  The interior of the restaurant was designed by the 
American architect Ed Poole of Poole Associate Design Company based in 
Singapore since 1991.  The design team visited China for sourcing original 
information and materials for a creation of an ‘appropriate’ and ‘authentic’ 
interior environment for the Mao themed restaurants.
396
  The interior of the House 
of Mao recreated the mood of a banquet at the Great Hall.  Its interior decoration 
combined an ‘authentic’ Chinese setting of the 1960s with traditional Singapore 
coffee shop culture.  Artefacts from China, mainly 1960s prints, Mao memorabilia 
and daily use articles, were displayed on the walls inside the restaurant.  Most of 
the objects were sourced from China after detailed research. As the design 
described the design process: 
All the artefacts are real, sourced over three years in Beijing.  We wanted to create a 
space that would respect the history of the contents.  So “real” were their finds that when 
we had finished putting up the pictures, one of the floor tiles workmen who was once in 
the Chinese army, actually spent hours reading the captions on each and every one!
397
 
The cover image on the beverage list and menu was an image of Mao outlined 
against a red background.  Different kinds of cocktail drinks were given ‘Chinese 
revolutionary’ names such as ‘Darling Comrade’, ‘Long March Tea’ and 
‘Maogarita’.  Chinese beer (Tsing Tao), Chinese wine and Japanese sake were 
also available.  The food menu had an image of workers waving red flags beneath 
a disembodied Mao.
398
   
This ‘Mao’ restaurant targeted both local and foreign customers in 
Singapore, and was opened at the China Square Food Centre where many locals 
usually met up and socialised at a cluster of coffee shops called ‘kopi tiam’.
399
  
Like McDonald’s in Singapore, the business owner wanted to make the House of 
Mao a place where local residents would go.  At the same time dining is promoted 
by the Singapore Tourist Board as one of the reasons for visiting Singapore.  
There is a wide variety of cuisines in this multi-ethnic society and this theme 
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restaurant was a pioneer in a number of ways.  Not only was it the first Mao 
restaurant in Singapore, the House of Mao also had a noodle bar said to be the 
longest in the country.  Noodles are the kind of food which could be found 
everywhere in Singapore.  Eating noodles is common not only among the Chinese 
dialect group but also prominent in Malay and Indian cooking.
400
 The saluting 
Red Guard-like waiters and waitresses were unique at the time. (Figure 58 and 
Figure 59)  The illusion of dining in China was completed with the use of some 
visual features of the bygone era such as The Little Red Books, Long March 
Chicken and Tiramisu House of Mao Style.  The menu was created by an award-
winning Canadian Chef of the Year (1997) in order to give additional acclaim to 
the popular entertaining space.  An oil painting of Chairman Mao was reproduced 
with reference to the Mao painting in Tiananmen Square in China.  The price for a 
dinner per head at the House of Mao was around forty Singapore dollars which 
covered a three-course meal and service charges.  It was more expensive than 
going to the local food court but still widely affordable for the majority of citizens 
in Singapore.   
Another ‘Mao’ restaurant in Singapore was called The Little Red Book 
Singapore which imitated the mood of ‘a rally at Tiananmen Square in the 
evening’.  Inside the restaurant, the dining area was full of Chinese revolutionary 
objects and images including a giant Mao portrait (Figure 57), an energetic youth 
mural (Figure 55), Mao memorabilia on walls (Figure 60), and an exhibition 
corner to display Dr. Yeo Seen Huat’s private collection of original Chinese 
revolutionary relics.
401
 (Figure 61)  Some two hundred porcelain pieces and Mao 
memorabilia displayed in the restaurant were on loan from Dr. Yeo Seen Huat.  
Dr. Yeo Seen Huat is a collector of Mao memorabilia whose collection is famous 
for its precious porcelain objects and well-preserved prints.  He started collecting 
Mao memorabilia, particularly porcelain, in 1993 after he saw a collector from the 
US looking for Cultural Revolution relics in China.  The value of Yeo’s collection 
has been rapidly rising in value.  From interior design, menus, to food, the ‘Mao’ 
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restaurant was a constructed as a space of fantasy with heavy emphasis on design 
and a marketing strategy in which the reproduction of Chinese revolutionary 
images and authentic relics would provide the consumer with pleasure and 
entertainment.  More importantly, the collection also functioned as a ‘code’ which 
produced a particular meaning of Chinese communist style in the 2000s 
Singaporean context.  Since a commodity signifies social value and status, codes 
of similarity and difference in consumer goods also signify social affiliation and 
difference.
402
 This practice branded the ‘Mao’ restaurants as ‘different’, ‘tasteful’ 
and  places ‘cultured’ for socialising and dining when the fame of Yeo’s 
collection had already become renowned.   
It is interesting to note that the monetary value of authentic Chinese 
Cultural Revolution relics had been rising in the 1990s and this was recognised by 
Asian Chinese collectors.  Using Yeo’s collection as an example: 
In 1994, he [Yeo] bought a Mao Zedong brush pot at nine thousand dollars.  Four years 
later the market value [of this brush pot] was worth ninety thousand dollars…In 1995, he 
bought a bowl with lotus pattern which was originally for Mao Zedong’s appreciation.  
Three years later, the value of this lotus bowl reached fifty thousand dollars.
403
   
With this, we can understand the value of Chinese revolutionary culture was not 
only cultural.  Chinese Cultural Revolution relics had become investment objects 
for ‘antique’ collectors, and this was not unrelated to later high auction prices of 
contemporary Chinese artworks with a Cultural Revolution theme in the 2000s.  
The ‘Mao’ restaurant was one of the early signs which demonstrated the 
increasing commercial value of Chinese revolutionary imagery in Asia. 
The third ‘Mao’ restaurant was planned to open in London as the first step 
to making the House of Mao into a global franchise.  It was to be called the House 
of Mao London with a design concept recreating the ‘ambience of subtle Chinese 
sophistication reminiscent of the graceful time period before the Cultural 
Revolution’.
404
  The project was a business collaboration with the restaurant 
owned by Millennium & Copthorne Hotels in London and managed by the Tung 
Lok Group in Singapore.  The location was proposed for 140 Gloucester Road, 
SW7, and it was due to open in 2002.  However this overseas expansion of the 
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Mao restaurant was not to be realised and the House of Mao London never opened.  
According to the designer, the design was finalised and the out-fit arrived at the 
site in London as scheduled, but the project was cancelled without an official 
reason.  It was believed that the owner was worried that a ‘Mao’ restaurant in 
London could become a target for a terrorist attack.
405
 
Though the London branch did not open, the ‘Mao’ restaurant was indeed 
a novelty and success in Singapore.  Commercially speaking, it was successful in 
terms of combining local business interests and culture with foreign cultural 
imagery. This project won a Best New Concept Award from the trade publication 
Restaurant Asia.  The House of Mao Singapore, the last ‘Mao’ restaurant of the 
Tung Lok Group, closed down in July 2003.   
A particular range of Chinese revolutionary images was used in the 
restaurants.  These images were reproduced on the walls, menus and paintings and 
integrated into the interior design.  These were mainly images of youth in Red 
Guard or green military uniforms, and of course, images of Chairman Mao.  The 
House of Mao targeted young customers because it was an ideal place for pre-
party drinks.
406
  It was recognised as a trendy meeting point for various youth 
communities in Singapore.  Like the youth in other Asian Chinese cities, the 
youth of Singapore were usually the marketing target of consumer culture.  As 
Chua points out, the youth in Singapore are the generation free from the concerns 
of financing ‘big items’ such as the mortgage of a house or the ownership of a car, 




‘Rally of energetic youth’ mural 
The House of Mao I was situated at the outdoor terrace of the China Square Food 
Center. The graphics were designed by Pauline Evill, a freelance graphic designer, 
and painted by the muralist Willy Baet.  It was designed to ‘evoke the energetic 
youth and chaos that Mao thrived on’ and painted to fit the size of the walls.
408
  
The image was split into two by the entrance in the middle where two Chinese 
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style red lanterns were hung on both sides.  The graphics were based on an 
original image with the theme of ‘Learning and Applying Mao Zedong’s thought’ 
with the slogan ‘To explore one step further the mass movement of “learning and 
applying Mao Zedong’s thought in a lively manner ”’ written on a red flag, which 
comprised the background.
409
 Apart from some small adjustments, such as a 
bundle of grain in the arm of a girl in the original being replaced by The Little Red 
Book and some of the original expressions changed slightly, the composition was 
for the most part closely based on the original.  The original headline and texts 
such as ‘Unite together for even greater victory’ and ‘Quotations of Mao Zedong’ 
were left out because the mural image functions as a close-up of the original, 
focusing on the movement of the characters.  The image depicts a mass of 
energetic youngsters holding aloft their books which have a star on the cover.  
Some of the youngsters wear military uniforms of the communist revolutionaries 
of which the style is comparable to the Red Army uniform.  Some wear farmer’s 
sunhats and some wear the hard hats of builders or engineers.  There are badges 
on the clothes of the youngsters standing in the front.  A flying flag composes the 
background of the image.  The youngsters look enthusiastic as if they are stepping 
forward.  Their open mouths and facial expressions imply that they are shouting in 
a rally.   
This mural was painted to correspond to the ‘authentic’ Mao theme of the 
restaurant.  The original image of this mural is a typical political woodblock print 
characterised by its red-black-white colour composition. (Figure 56)  This is one 
of the defining features of political woodblock prints produced during the early 
stage of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 or 1967.  However, using only two 
colours – black and white – and modifying some facial expressions of the 
characters, the mural is actually far from an authentic reproduction.  Only the 
human figures from the original reappear in the mural.  This was mainly because 
of another intention of the designer to bring back the energetic youth and chaos 
that Mao thrived on during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. The mural 
suggests a visual link between the chaotic youthfulness of 1960s China and the 
‘trendy’ people gathering at the outdoor terrace at China Square in Singapore in 
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the late 1990s.  However trendy and youthful it was made to appear, China Square 
Food Centre was a social space for people in their thirties to fifties.  This age 
group includes people who experienced the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 
1970s in China, and therefore this mural very likely triggered their memories of 
the Cultural Revolution
410
.   
In one of the publicity images, four grinning young men wearing green 
uniforms and caps raised their right arms and fists, as they sit in front of the 
‘energetic youth’ mural at the outdoor terrace, (Figure 55) with red ‘Red Guard’ 
emblems on their left arms.  Their uniforms are visually comparable to some of 
the uniforms worn by the characters in the mural which represented the People’s 
Liberation Army, one of the three important social roles in China during the 1960s 
and 1970s.
411
 The men in front of the mural were the waiters of the House of Mao 
who wore these uniforms while they were working.  This image was a part of the 
marketing plan of the House of Mao based on the ‘retro chic’ look of 
revolutionary 1960s China.  The men were grinning as if what they were doing 
was hilarious and trivial.  The purpose of publicizing this image was to attract 
customers to the House of Mao as a constructed space where the waiters were 
obviously not real Chinese revolutionaries.  One important point to note is that 
though the designer and the owner of the restaurant tried to make it ‘authentic’, 
the staff uniforms were in fact not faithful reproduction of the Red Guard 
uniforms.  A faithful Red Guard style should be a green uniform with a green cap.  
A respectable Red Guard also wore at least one Mao badge on the left chest and a 
red sleeve badge which read ‘Red Guard’ on his or her left arm.  On the other 
hand uniforms for the People’s Liberation Army were usually characterised in 
political prints by a big red star on caps and a red collar insignia. However, the 
features of the uniforms of both the People’s Liberation Army (red collar insignia) 
and Red Guards (red sleeve badge) appear on the staff’s uniforms at the House of 
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Mao portrait 
Inside the House of Mao I was a giant portrait of Mao Zedong hung at the back of 
the dining hall. (Figure 57 and Figure 58) The painting was entitled ‘Portrait of 
Mao Tze-Tung’ and was especially created by the graphic designer and muralist 
Willy Baet in 1998 for the House of Mao restaurant located at China Square Food 
Centre.  It is an identical reproduction from the Mao portrait displayed above the 
Tiananmen gate in Beijing, one of the last and long-term publicly displayed 
portraits of Mao Zedong in China.  Painted with acrylic on canvas, the painting is 
five feet wide and eight feet tall and was hung on the centre of the wall with a 
back curtain right behind a large eighteen-person table.  This large round dinner 
table was a part of the design and represented the ‘state banquettes held at The 
Great Hall of the People’ in China’.
413
  This table was not meant to be reserved by 
one large group at a time.  ‘Here we expect customers to share this table’, Ed 
Poole, the designer explained in a magazine interview that he understood the idea 
of communal sharing in relation to the concept of Chinese communism.
414
   
To correspond to the Mao theme of the restaurant, the owner and operator 
of the Tung Lok Group commissioned a large Mao portrait for the House of Mao.  
Although it was proposed to be an ‘authentic’ space, the Mao portrait more 
accurately makes the site into a space for creativity and cultural blending.  I was 
told that the ‘authentic’ replica of Mao’s portrait in the House of Mao was not 
simply meant to be ‘authentic’ but also entertaining.  ‘Everything [in the Mao 
portrait] looked pretty accurate except that they [the operator of the House of Mao] 
changed one of his [Mao’s] buttons to a Levi's stud button.’
415
  In the late 1990s 
‘Maoist China’, as signified by the reproduction of the portrait of Chairman Mao 
at Tiananmen Square, was associated with popular commercial culture.   
A photograph of some customers dining at the red round table in front of 
the Mao portrait indicates how the restaurant operated.  A waiter wearing a Red 
Guard uniform was collecting some finished bowls from the customers.  The idea 
of using Red Guard waiters and waitresses, a giant reproduction of a portrait of 
Mao, displaying Mao memorabilia and Cultural Revolution prints and naming the 
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dishes and drinks ‘Long March Chicken’ and ‘Long March Tea’, which were in 
fact fusions of Western and oriental tastes, all together created the House of Mao 
as a pathway to the past, in a bizarre but interesting vision.  We can see this ‘Mao’ 
restaurant as a nostalgic recycling and commodification of the past in 
contemporary Singapore.  As Mike Featherstone argues, ‘if the contemporary age 
can be characterised as an era of “no style”, then it points to the rapid circulation 
of new styles (fashion, appearance, design, consumer goods) and the nostalgic 
invocation of past ones.’
416
   
Like the House of Mao I, there was a large portrait of Mao hanging on the 
wall at the end of the dining hall in the House of Mao II. It featured Mao Zedong 
wearing the uniform of the People’s Liberation Army waving his right hand as if 
he is facing and greeting a crowd.  He is smiling and holding a burning cigarette 
in his left hand.  The golden red lantern at the top left hand corner and the red 
pillar structure and panel in the background suggest that the setting is Tiananmen 
Square.  This painting is called ‘Mao portrait’ which was created particularly for 
the interior design of the House of Mao II (The Little Red Book) by Willy Baet of 
Poole Associates Private Limited around 1998.  The size of this painting is 4 x 8 
feet.   
This painting was placed inside the restaurant, but there was also a 
digitalized image of this painting uploaded on Poole Associates’ website.  This 
website provides details of the projects that Poole Associates Limited have 
worked on for clients mainly in south-east Asia.  Befitting the rally theme of the 
House of Mao II The Little Red Book, the designer reworked the static painting 
image to produce an animation effect of Mao waving to the people.  The right arm 
of Mao can be seen on the website waving repetitively left to right.  This is to 
amplify the ‘rally at Tiananmen Square’ theme of the restaurant which was 
represented by the historical moment when Mao Zedong summoned the Red 
Guards to gather in Tiananmen Square during the Cultural Revolution in the 
1960s.   
 
 
                                            
416 Featherstone, Consumer Culture and Postmodernism , 95. 
Chapter Five 
 - 208 - 
Analysis 
The Tung Lok Group’s the House of Mao and The Little Red Book restaurants are 
clear examples of Singapore’s consumption culture in the late 1990s and early 
2000s.   With most of its businesses based in Singapore, the Tung Lok Group also 
owned restaurants overseas in China, India, Japan and Indonesia.  The success of 
the Tung Lok Group was like a model for the government promoted the idea of a 
‘globalised economy’.   
The use of a ‘Mao’ theme was ‘creative’ and ‘risky’ in the late 1990s 
Singaporean context because Mao and the Chinese Cultural Revolution were at 
the time not yet widely used in public commercial space.  It was significant 
because it was the first time that so many Chinese revolutionary images were used 
in commercial spaces in Singapore: 
…it was with some surprise when the image of Mao started to appear in rather more staid 
Singapore, where communism remains a distinctly dirty word.  This time, however, it 
wasn’t in a lifestyle store but a restaurant.  Powerful advertisements picturing Mao 
appearing from the MRT or driving along Orchard Road suggested that making a visit to 




In a ‘staid’ society where people were ‘bodily and emotionally controlled’ when 
they were too stressed by unemployment and burdened by the will of property 
ownership, this theme restaurant was, in Featherstone’s terms, a ‘site of cultural 
disorder’ in which citizens were able to temporarily indulge in the fascination of a 
‘communist’ world where things were all shared and life was relatively simple.
418
 
Bhabha also shares a similar view of the recurrence of the past as an implication 
of present reality:  
The idea that history repeats itself…emerges frequently within liberal discourses when 
consensus fails, and when the consequences of cultural incommensurability make the 
world a difficult place.  At such moments, the past is seen as returning, with uncanny 
punctuality, to render the “event” timeless, and the narrative of its emergence 
transparent.’
419
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I argue that the nostalgic theme was not irrelevant to the current context because 
the sustained economic downturn in Singapore since the mid-1990s and the 
further blow of the Asian economic crisis of 1997 did put the PAP and 
Singapore’s citizens into a difficult situation.  The popularity and success of the 
restaurant may suggest that citizens needed such a bizarre place of ‘cultural 
disorder’ as an escape from financial pressures.  More importantly, this eye-
catching theme restaurant could also serve as a novel attraction for the sake of the 
national tourism industry. 
As the designer said, ‘we have done a few Chinese inspired projects [in 
Singapore], but nothing with Mao as an influence.’
420
  People talked about the 
restaurants because of the cultural imagery of the exotic which resulted in the fact 
that the consumption itself was not only the physical substance of food but the 
symbolic aspects of signs.  In Jean Baudrillard’s notion of ‘hyperreality’, objects 
in consumer societies are not consumed because of their use-value.  Thus, in a 
consumption culture it is signs which are consumed, and this has the effect of 
aestheticising of reality.
421
  The Mao restaurant is an example of how, in a real 
situation (i.e. in Singapore in the early 2000s), consumption was largely mediated 
by cultural images via advertising and display in which the symbolic aspects of 
commodity, produced mainly by cultural imagery, became the major source of 
satisfaction.
422
  As Jameson puts it: ‘everything in social life can be said to have 
become cultural’.
423
   
The idea that ‘Mao’ restaurants were recognised as ‘innovative’ should 
also be challenged because the image of Chairman Mao was prevalent in both 
public and domestic space, from work place to dining space in the Chinese 
revolutionary past.  I argue that the meaning of it as innovation was site- and time-
specific, and it was recognised as a novelty mainly because of the legal use of this 
serious political imagery of China which had been banned for many years in 
Singapore.  Featherstone argues that consumer society becomes essentially 
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cultural because social life becomes ‘deregulated’ and social relationships become 
‘more variable and less structured by stable norms’.
424
  In the case of the ‘Mao’ 
restaurant, I would argue that this was not a result of a total deregulation in the 
sense that the manipulation of the commodity-signs was obviously under the 
state’s surveillance.  According to the designer, the business owner had 
commissioned a large Mao portrait for the restaurant which was an attempt to 
produce an authentic portrait of Mao with a creative twist by changing one of the 
buttons into a Levi’s stud button.  After the inspection of the Chinese Ambassador 
in Singapore, the business owner was told to rectify it or take it down.
425
   With 
this, I also argue that the ‘Mao’ restaurant was not only a pure commercial 
decision but it was also a consensus between the government and the business 
owner.  With the ambassador’s warning, we can see the standardised, unchanged 
appearance of Chairman Mao at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing was preserved, 
otherwise the violated imagery would be forcibly removed.  The formerly banned 
cultural imagery of the Cultural Revolution in Singapore looked ‘creative’ or 
‘unprecedented’ but this does not mean that there was any less government 
control of commodity-signs.  The stable and singular official meaning of ‘Mao’ in 
China was challenged by the commodity and advertising in Singapore, but 
significantly the official resistance to this challenge was present and powerful.   
The above incident was significant also because we can see the clash 
between two sets of cultural values or ‘norms’: the political significance of Mao’s 
portrait to the Chinese authorities and the value of Mao as an exotic image.  The 
idea that the simulation produced by the reproduction and manipulation of cultural 
imagery leads to a loss of stable meaning is true in the sense that the multiple 
possibilities of relational associations may overwhelm the stable norms of 
interpretation.
426
  But the simulation itself is a product of these stable norms 
without which a ‘Mao’ restaurant would not be considered as ‘bizarre’ in 
relational terms.   
One outstanding feature of these ‘Mao’ restaurants was the creative use of 
signs.  Cultural imagery from the Chinese revolutionary era was used in 
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advertising and in the creation of a restaurant with a ‘Maoist’ atmosphere. (Figure 
62 and Figure 63) It is important to note that with the use of abundant signs, I 
observe a blurred boundary between the signs and the commodity, i.e. food and 
service.  This feature concurs with Featherstone’s idea of the ‘commodity-sign’ 
for which he further explains that ‘the autonomy of the signifier…means that 
signs are able to float free from objects and are available for use in a multiplicity 
of associative relations.’
427
  Looking at the current study, Chinese revolutionary 
imagery was reproduced and ‘reactivated’ beyond its original form and space.  
Thus, the ‘Mao’ restaurants were one of the ‘associative relations’ created, and 
this was a completely unpredictable phenomenon.   
Another significant feature was that the traditional Singaporean noodle bar 
businesses, which were almost everywhere in Singapore, was combined with 
unprecedented marketing strategies so that the restaurants became popular dining 
places.  In this respect Featherstone provides a useful observation on the function 
of marketing strategies and signs in the way that advertising is able to exploit a 
wide range of cultural associations and illusions, and attaches exotic images with 
mundane consumer goods.
428
  To apply Featherstone’s idea, the ‘Mao’ commodity 
and related advertising in Singapore, ‘renewed the capitalist drive for novelty’ and 
provided the source of images to summon up associations and half-forgotten 
illusions.  The associations were never predictable because, as Featherstone points 
out, cultural signs are able to float free and are available for any possibility of 
association relations, which can be radical in the globalisation of culture.  Thus, 
the consumption of ‘Mao’ and the ‘Chinese revolutionary’ ambience led to 
multiple interpretations of not only the sign itself, but also to the past Chinese 
leftist movements in Singapore which the signs might summon.  But since the 
curiosity and memory of the consumer was fed by a simulation created by the 
visual signs in which Cultural Revolution imagery appeared divorced from their 
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I apply Derrida’s concepts of ‘erasure’ and ‘différance’ to understand this 
phenomenon in relation to identity formation.  The notion of ‘différance’ refers to 
the production of meaning in the process of signification that is continually 
deferred and supplemented.
430
  The meanings of Chinese revolutionary imagery 
were ‘deferred’ and crystallised again when they were used as commodity-signs 
in specific times and spaces.  In the process both the old and the new meanings 
that the imagery stands/used to stand for coexist and supplement each other.  
Because of this, Chinese revolutionary imagery signified contradictory meanings 
in the Singaporean context.  This is evident in the fact that the government openly 
suppressed it, and then later tolerated it.  This contradictory view of Singapore’s 
government, I would argue, was exposed in the ‘Mao’ commodity-sign 
phenomenon.  This suggested that China, signified by those Chinese revolutionary 
images, meant something inappropriate and mistaken, but at the same time useful 
and necessary.   Chinese revolutionary signs, which signify both negative effects 
of the spread of Communism and the rising of China’s economic power, could 
neither be completely erased nor openly accepted.  The images of a smiling and 
friendly Chairman Mao and the happy youth in Mao restaurants functioned as a 
‘supplement’ which dramatically revised the meaning of ‘Chinese Communism’.  
In this sense, the active use of Chinese revolutionary imagery formed, in Bhabha’s 
term, ‘visual narratives of historical reconstruction’ which ‘negotiates the 
recurrence of the image of the past while keeping open the question of the 
future’.
431
  Bhabha points out how the narrative of historical reconstruction 
functions as an active agent in the meaning-making process: 
the importance of such retroaction lies in its ability to reinscribe the past, reactivate it, 
relocate it, resignify it.  More significantly, it commits our understanding of the past, and 
our reinterpretation of the future, to an ethics of “survival” that allows us to work through 
the present.  And such a working through, or working out, frees us from the determinism 
of historical inevitability repetition without a difference.  It makes it possible for us to 
confront that difficult borderline, the interstitial experience between what we take to be 
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More interestingly, the ‘Mao’ restaurant was a result of a negotiation between 
social interests and political claims which suggested that ‘solidarity may be only 
situational and strategic’.
433
  It displayed the interplay between the government 
and commercial interests.  Singapore’s position towards the history of Chinese 
(communist) student movements and today’s China as a strategic partner was 
exposed here as never singular but multiple, and it shifted according to situations 
and interests.  Hall points out that identities are about: 
questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of 
becoming rather than being: not “who we are” or “where we came from”, so much as 




I would argue that in the case of the Mao restaurant in Singapore, identity was a 
question of using the resources of history, particularly illustrated visual history, in 
the process of becoming ‘not’.  The role that Chinese revolutionary imagery 
played in contemporary Singaporean identity was the point of reference in which 
the relational difference was further confirmed and solidified.  I conceptualise the 
function and role of Chinese revolutionary imagery as a meeting point between 
Singapore’s idea of ‘communist China’ and the ‘real’ culture of communist China.  
Chinese revolutionary imagery was the interface on which Singapore could 
engage with the rising economic power at the time.  The appearance of Chinese 
revolutionary imagery in Singapore was a significant phenomenon in which we 
can understand the detachment of Singaporean Chinese identity from mainland 
Chineseness and the consolidated formation of a Singapore-oriented identity.  On 
the one hand, the spread of Communism in Singapore led to the suppression of 
discourses and the development of measures which attempted to shape people at 
that time, mainly Chinese, into anti-communists in order to control anti-
government forces.  On the other hand, considering Hall’s argument that a key to 
identity formation is the process which produces subjects that can be ‘spoken’, the 
idea of ‘subversive’ Chinese communism was in constructed by the government 
so that anti-government forces could be named and talked about, and thus 
allowing the social subjects of a Singapore-oriented identity to be distinguished 
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and unified.
435
  Thus, Chinese communist propaganda may be initially subversive, 
but also crucial in the construction of Singapore’s counter-discourse and of 
Singapore identity per se. 
 
Conclusion 
With the suppression of Chinese communist movements by the Singaporean 
government in the 1950s and 1960s, the banned images of the past were no longer 
considered as a threat to the Singaporeans state of the 21
st
 century.  These images 
were used in Singaporean commercial space apparently as an ‘exotic’ culture 
which could be exploited for commercial purposes.  However, the Mao restaurant 
in Singapore can be understood as a much more complex and significant 
phenomenon.  As G. John Ikenberry, in his article ‘The Rise of China and the 
Future of the West’ in 2008, writes:  
The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the 21st century.  
China’s extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming 




The case of the House of Mao restaurant implies that the Singapore-based Tong 
Lok Group was one of the pioneers who foresaw a business prospect with Cultural 
Revolution imagery and its fashionable yet controversial associations with China.  
Thus, in this sense, the business decision of a Mao theme restaurant was an 
attempt to make the most out of the opportunity to exploit the popular icons of 
China when they had a high commercial value.  At the same time, with a better 
developed Singaporean national identity based on the place Singapore and on the 
government’s support of creative business opportunities, Cultural Revolution 
imagery of the PRC was no longer politically subversive, but instead 
economically beneficial.  The company's plan to open a branch of the House of 
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Mao in London shows how the Singaporean company saw Cultural Revolution 
imagery as effective commercial icons for its global business.
437
   
This was a result of a ramification of political and economic factors when 
there was an increasing economic need to engage with China.  It was both local 
and global in terms of business scope.  This example shows the interplay between 
the various forces, such as globalisation of commodities, domestic economy, 
government policy, which framed the Singapore’s consumption culture and their 
vision of global business potential.   
In this chapter I argued that the government of Singapore saw it as a 
perfect way to reach two ends.  First, the unusual juxtapositions of formerly 
banned communist imagery with a Western style restaurant chain destabilised the 
dominant meaning of Chinese communist imagery in Singapore, and was a useful 
and necessary ‘evil’ in today’s globalised economy.  Second, the control over the 
manipulation of signs produced an image of a stagnant ‘China’ tied to the past, 
which made the theme restaurant remain simply a space of fantasy and nostalgic 
exotica.  I used the concept of ‘erasure’ to conceptualise the ‘Mao’ commodity-
sign phenomenon as a crossed-out version of the ‘subversive’ idea of ‘Chinese 
Communism’: it was useful and necessary for economic growth in the current 
situation so it was present; it violated social stability in the past so it was ‘erased’.  
The meaning of Chinese communism, signified in the imagery, was both 
constructive and threatening.  The ‘Mao’ restaurant was the phenomenon in which 
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This research on Cultural Revolution imagery was initially inspired by the 
trajectory of Chinese political posters travelling from China to the United 
Kingdom.  This physical travel of Chinese political posters and the later virtual 
circulation of Cultural Revolution imagery not only creates two interesting points 
of contrast for a discussion on the nature of these visual and material forms, but 
also suggests a particular value of Cultural Revolution imagery as a separate 
entity beyond its geo-political location.  Thus, it is eventually not just about the 
travel of Chinese political posters, but the movement of Cultural Revolution 
imagery, which used to be a political tool of mass communication and a few 
decades later (re)emerged in new cultural forms to play a part in popular culture.   
Most of the examples in this thesis show the communicative power of 
Cultural Revolution imagery even after its removal from the original narratives. It 
is this detachment and re-attachment that makes the imagery meaningful when it 
is used to serve the interests of different parties in different places.   
However, its history is not completely removed when the imagery is 
detached from its original form and context.  It is the choice of selection which 
revitalises and adapts certain historical traces of the imagery into new contexts, 
and which also indicates the power of Cultural Revolution imagery as a generic 
visual narrative which has an appeal across cultural borders.  Through my 
personal journey I witnessed how Cultural Revolution imagery becomes 
geopolitical in a different context at a different time, serving particular cultural 
interests in different areas and spaces.  As my research shows, even though 
Cultural Revolution imagery is circulated via new information technologies, its 
consumption and how it relates to daily practices of people is still very much 
regionally and geographically specific. Cultural Revolution imagery is found 
particularly re-emerging in commercialised popular products and texts aimed at 
mass audiences.  
Cultural Revolution imagery can now be disseminated through the internet 
and telecommunication networks.  China's technological development is 
extraordinary in the way it has developed so rapidly.  The Chinese government 
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aims to use technologies to speed up the dream to become an internationally 
recognised and developed country.  Thus, visual signs of modernisation that every 
developed country has, such as mobile phones, computers and the internet have 
become ‘must-haves’ for the Chinese government.  But as a communist country 
with a history marked by violent mass movements, power struggles and the 
overthrow of the Western system, how can the Chinese Communist Party deal 
with the potential threat that these technologies bring to society?   
Political leaders openly use online video conferences to interact with 
Chinese netizens, showing that the government recognises it as an effective 
communications tool.  This serves as a good example of how new information 
technologies are being used by the Chinese government to project a more ‘liberal’ 
image to the people.  In the revolutionary past, the posters were used to serve 
political ends, to shape how the masses think and to mobilize energetic, innocent 
teenagers; in the 21
st
 century the internet and telecommunication networks are 
used to reinforce the rule of the Chinese Communist Party and urban youth is the 
group which comprises the majority of netizens.  Thus, Cultural Revolution 
imagery in this research plays a significant role in creating interesting and 
inextricable connections between the two eras of the PRC.   
The cases of Google China and Yahoo Hong Kong show how China 
exercises internet censorship and uses the internet as a monitoring tool.  In 2006 a 
Chinese writer, Shi Tao, was arrested after Yahoo Hong Kong provided the 
Chinese authorities with information of Shi Tao’s personal email account.  He 
was imprisoned for sending an internal Communist Party message to a community 
overseas.  We can see how the CCP uses the internet to reinforce its rule: on the 
one hand it helps project a liberal image of the government and on the other land 
the internet is an effective system of control.  This is comparable to the situation 
when landlords were accused of being devils and demons during the Cultural 
Revolution, leading to the violent suppression of those who were perceived to act 
against the Party’s requirements.  
While the internet has been considered as a ‘global’ tool for fostering 
freedom of expression and information exchange, the Chinese use of it as tool for 
regulation and surveillance could be considered as strongly nationalistic.  Under 
tight censorship, however, digital power still has the potential to act as a counter 
to certain social forces.  In June 2009 there were millions of posts on internet 
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forums about a young Chinese woman who killed a government official during an 
attempted rape.  She was judged innocent by the Chinese courts.   
While the popularity of online forums and mobile modes of 
communication is increasing, the significance of the physical body in Chinese 
mass culture still plays an important role in the 21
st
 century.  During the Cultural 
Revolution, there are many political posters depicting Red Guards rallies and, 
apart from posters showing heroes and political leaders, mass movements are 
usually depicted as united, collective, powerful activities.  In the 2008 Olympic 
games in Beijing, the Chinese communist style of dance and performance was 
amazingly collective, highly planned and cohesive.  The supposedly ‘live’ 
international television broadcast of the opening ceremony was revealed by the 
Western media as in fact a rehearsed ceremony recorded in advance.  This shows 
the classic Chinese communist style of highly planned systems.  Besides, the 
national power of China still represents itself as collective and unified.  It is also 
this strong physical sense of collectiveness that makes the history of the Cultural 
Revolution, and even today’s China, as extraordinary and exotic to the non-
communist, Western ‘Other’.  The point here is that ‘modernised’ China is still 
very much a rigid, centrally planned process which has a lot in common with its 
former revolutionary period, and new technologies play a significant role in 
projecting a positive, modernised, orderly image of China. 
These technological changes and the construction of a ‘liberal’ image of 
the government, however, do not mean that the Chinese Communist Party has 
relaxed its control over society.  Instead, even though the Cultural Revolution was 
denounced as soon as it was over, a highly regulated, didactic mass culture has 
still been the case for decades.  Using mobile phone pictures as an example, 
though humourous and trivial, the taglines of reworked Cultural Revolution 
imagery tend to be instructive and moralizing.   
Comparing the Asian Cup in 2004 with the Olympics in 2008 (although 
these two occasions are very different in scale and scope) reveals certain Chinese 
characteristics when China needs to present itself in the international arena.  
Cultural Revolution imagery, with new ‘Go China!’ slogans, was accepted in the 
Asian Cup as patriotic symbolism.  However, during the Olympics games, the 
Chinese audience was not allowed to bring in Chinese language slogans like ‘Go 
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China!’ (Zhongguo Jiayou!).
438
  It was posited as an attempt to avoid 
miscommunication with people of different nationalities.  I am not going to over-
claim this as a means of suppressing Cultural Revolution imagery, but it 
potentially indicates a more recent Chinese notion of modernisation that projects 
China as moving on from its public image as dominated by violent revolutionaries 
to welcoming new civilized Chinese citizens.  Indeed, China is moving on from 
the period of the Cultural Revolution which was marked by backward socio-
economic developments to an ‘open’ society and an economy closely related to 
information technologies.   
While China attempts to move on from its revolutionary past, the Hong 
Kong use of Cultural Revolution imagery in the 21
st
 century may be understood as 
an expression of China which is still totalitarian, closed and illiberal from a Hong 
Kong perspective.  It signifies Hong Kong as a different city in China: a place 
where you can be free from censorship and where you can consume something 
unavailable in the mainland.  Hong Kong actively struggles against the rule of the 
central government which is deemed as potentially threatening to the freedom 
enjoyed in Hong Kong.   
Chapter Four examines the particular rise of Hong Kong pro-democratic 
movements since 2003.  A survey shows that there is a drop in Hong Kong 
citizens’ confidence towards the Beijing central government and the HKSAR.
439
  
With this, the use of Cultural Revolution imagery in Hong Kong popular culture 
can be understood as re-signifying an endeavour to struggle and an assertion of 
difference between China and Hong Kong more than a decade after the handover 
in 1997.  On the other hand, a friendly and collaborative relationship continues 
between China and Singapore.  Chapter Five shows an aspect of Singapore as an 
economic-oriented city-state.  Singapore has been seeking opportunities for 
overseas investments and the development of creative business.  The relationship 
between China and Singapore has developed remarkably based on collaboration 
and cultural exchange, such as in the project of the Suzhou Industrial Park in 
                                            
438 Beijing Aozuwei jiu guansai guize zhong xianzhi fuzhuang qizhi hengfu deng wenti (Beijing Olympics 
Committee's explainations about the rules for the audience about their outfits, flags and banners) (Huaxia 
Jingwei Wang, 23 July 2008); available from http://www.huaxia.com/ay/azwxw/2008/07/1054274.html. 
 
439 Man Nuo Wang, 調查：港人對中港台政府不信任比率上升(Survey: a drop in distrust ratio among 
Hong Kong citizens towards China, Hong Kong and Taiwan government) (CNA News,  2010 [cited 18 
March 2010]); available from http://news.pchome.com.tw/internation/cna/20100318/index-
12689033565235218011.html. 
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China. With major investments in research and development of creative media 
technologies, this has attracted thousands foreign enterprises investing 33.96 
billion USD by the end of June 2008.
440
 
Thus, my research on Cultural Revolution imagery in urban popular 
cultural texts, products and spaces brings out issues of wider social, cultural and 
political concerns in both the local and the international context relevant to 
China’s recent development. 
 
                                            



















Figure 1  ‘Produce more without waste, realise the Four Modernisations and contribute more to   
the fatherland’ 
Tianjin, 1980 







































Figure 2  ‘Let's think about what we have done for the Four Modernisations’ 
Tianjin, 1979 




























Figure 3  ‘Future summons us’ 
Shanghai, 1980 
































Figure 4  ‘Oppose Economism’ 
Shanghai, 1967 









































Figure 5  ‘Completely Smash the Liu-Deng Counter-Revolutionary Line!’ 
Shanghai, 1967 































Figure 6  ‘Down with the Soviet Revisionists’ 
Shanghai, 1967 



















Figure 7  ‘New Family’ 
Beijing, 1974 




















Figure 8  ‘Sending A Letter To Little Friends In Taiwan’ 
Liaoning, 1975 
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Figure 9  ‘Thoroughly expose the Monstrous Crimes Committed While Attempting To Take  
Over Party Power By The Anti-Party Clique Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, 
Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan!’ 
Beijing, 1976 
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Figure 10  Red Guard Plastic Toys 
China, circa 1966 






Figure 11  Gang of Four Toy Dart Gun 
China, circa 1978  















Figure 12  ‘Chairman Mao Is the Reddest Reddest Red Sun In Our Hearts’ 
China, circa 1966 

















Figure 13  ‘Revolutionary Proletarian Right-To-Rebel Troops Unite!’ 
Jilin, 1967 
























Figure 14  ‘Smash The Old Word, Establish The New World’ 
Beijing, 1967 


















Figure 15  ‘Chairman Mao Is The Red Sun In Our Hearts’ 
Shanghai, 1966 
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Figure 16  ‘Your Are The Best’  
Mobile phone digital picture, source from mms.tom.com 






Figure 17  ‘My Wife Is The Red Sun In My Heart’  
Mobile phone digital picture, source from mms.tom.com 
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Figure 18  ‘(I’ve) Got my red pockets’  
Mobile phone digital picture, source from mms.tom.com 






Figure 19  ‘I’m Not The Boss For Many Years’  
Mobile phone digital picture, source from mms.tom.com 















Figure 20  ‘Do You Love Me Afterall’  
Mobile phone digital picture, source from mms.tom.com 
[last accessed on 7 February 2010] 
 
 
   
 
Figure 21  ‘If Others Leave Me Alone, I Will Leave Them Alone’  
Mobile phone digital picture, source from mms.tom.com 
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Figure 22  Cultural Revolution imagery on Etang website 





Figure 23  Cultural Revolution imagery on Wapol website 
Internet source, last access in June 2006. 
 
























Figure 24  Cultural Revolution imagery on Tom Group China website 
































Figure 25  Newspaper Heading Reference (Baotou Ziliao) 
Shanghai, 1970, p.57 


























Figure 26  ‘Chairman Mao’s Red Guard: Jin Xunhua’ 
Shanghai, March 1971 































Figure 27  ‘With You In Charge, I feel At East’ 
Shanghai, 1977 


































Figure 28  ‘Chairman Mao Does Manual Labour With Us’ 
Shanghai, 1977 
































Figure 29  ‘Asking Who Is In Charge Of The Universe’ 
Shanghai, 1978 










































Figure 30  ‘The Chinese People Have High Aspiration’ 
Shanghai, 1978 









































Figure 31  Chinese Teenage Football Fans with Cultural Revolution imagery in Asian Cup 
Beijing, China, 2004 
Internet source from NetEase Sports News online http://sports.163.com 









































Figure 32  ‘Relentlessly criticise the “Gang of Four”, Set off a new upsurge of industry 
studying Daqing, Agriculture studying Dazhai’ 
China, 1977 
‘Gang of Four’ of Stefan Landsberger’s Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages 






































Figure 33  ‘All People of the World Unite, To overthrow American imperialism! To 
overthrow Soviet Revisionism! To overthrow reactionaries of all nations!’ 
China, 1969 
‘Foreign Imperialist’ of Stefan Landsberger’s Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages 





































Figure 34  ‘A great victory a red-letter day for the people’ 
China, 1977 
Cover page of Stefan Landsberger’s Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages 
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Figure 35  ‘Blood Debts Need To Be Repaid With Bloodshed!’ 
Guangdong, 1967 
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Figure 36  ‘We Must Triumph, The British In Hong Kong Must Be Defeated’ 
Guangdong, 1967 
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Figure 37  ‘Give Tit For Tat, Fight Resolutely!’ 
Guangdong, 1967 






















Figure 38  Metropop Hong Kong,  
1
st






















Figure 39  The advert for the Essential Little Red (Note) Book 






















Figure 40  ‘To Live Better’ screensavers 




         
 
Figure 41  Mao Zedong’s Thought Propaganda board Newspaper Headings Reference 
Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1970, p.10.   
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Figure 42  Underpants designed by GOD, Hong Kong, 2005.   
Cited in ‘Mao & Chic’, Metropop, 27
th






Figure 43  ‘Toiling the Field’ Postcard  























Figure 44  ‘Reap a Good Harvest and Store Grain Everywhere’ 
China, circa 1974                     
University of Westminster Chinese Poster Collection, London
  
 














       
Figure 45  ‘To serve the master’ Postcard 
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Figure 48  ‘The People’s Party’ poster 
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Figure 49 ‘Strive for a rich harvest; store grain everywhere’ 
Shanghai,1973,  







Figure 50  ‘Holding high the red flag of Dazhai and reap a rich harvest’ 
Shanghai, 1976,  























Figure 51  ‘The only strict truth is protecting the environment’ advertisement 
























Figure 52  ‘The Little Red Book’ beverage menu 









Figure 53  ‘Mao’ tea cups and ‘Cultural Revolution’ mug 










































Figure 55  ‘Energetic youth and chaos’ mural 
House of Mao Restaurant, Singapore, 1998-2003 






Figure 56  Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Newspaper Headings Reference 
Shanghai People’s Publishing House, May 1970 


























Figure 57  Mao portrait at House of Mao restaurant, Singapore 
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Figure 58  ‘Red Guard’ waiter of House of Mao restaurant, Singapore 








Figure 59  ‘Red Guard’ waiters of House of Mao restaurant, Singapore 



















Figure 60  Chinese political posters in Mao restaurant, Singapore 
























Figure 61   Dr. Yeo Seen Huat’s private collection at Mao restaurant, Singapore 
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Figure 62  Advertising campaign of Mao restaurant, Singapore 







Figure 63  Advertising campaign of Mao restaurant, Singapore 
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